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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigated the viability of community health insurance (CHI) as a means 
of increasing access to health care for rural households in Uganda. This was against 
the background that health care is a basic need and right and that, despite this, 
households especially in the rural parts of Uganda are still lacking effective access to 
health care. The study is informed by different theories of justice in health care 
delivery, namely, the libertarian, egalitarian and utilitarian theories. It also borrows 
concepts from Andersen’s (1968) behavioural model of health services access and 
utilization as well as Kutzin’s (2001) framework for analysis of health financing 
arrangements to assess the viability of CHI as a strategy to increase access to health 
care.  
 
Using a case study of Kisiizi health insurance scheme in Rukungiri district in 
southwestern Uganda, quantitative and qualitative approaches were engaged to 
conduct the study. Data was collected through a survey involving 260 households, 
three focus group discussions, twelve in-depth interviews and various secondary 
sources. Bivariate analysis and thematic and content analysis were undertaken.  
 
The findings indicate that CHI increases access to health care by reducing financial 
barriers. The results show no significant socio-economic differences between members 
and non-members of the CHI scheme; increasing levels of enrolment; and reasonably 
stable levels of treatment cost recovery by the scheme. Utilization of government 
health care is limited to between 20-30% of the population. Households that enrol in 
CHI are more likely to seek early treatment for illnesses. At household level, because 
of enrolment of whole households, there is improved equity in access to care with 
regard to gender and age. Some threats to the full-scale adoption of CHI include the 
limited providers of an acceptable quality and exclusions from the benefits package. It 
is argued that CHI can be financially sustainable with minimal external support. This 
case study does indicate that CHI is a viable health care strategy for the Rubabo 
county of Uganda but further research needs to be done on a much wider scope. The 
study recommends adoption of CHI as a transitional mechanism targeting subsidies to 
the very poor to improve equity in access to health care and collective support for CHI 
in order to strengthen its sustainability.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Insurance: Refers to the equitable transfer of the risk of a potential loss, from one 
entity to another, in exchange for a premium and duty of care. It is a form of contract 
in which one party agrees to compensate another party for any losses or damages 
caused by risks specified in the contract in exchange for payment of a lump sum or 
periodic amount of money to the first party. 
 
Health Insurance: This is a type of insurance, in terms of which the insurer pays the 
medical costs of the insured if the insured becomes sick due to causes specified in the 
agreement (insurance contract).  
 
Community Health Insurance: A process of securing financial access to health care 
through periodic payments of premium instead of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments at 
the time of service delivery. It is a mechanism of financing health services by 
spreading the risk evenly among policyholders. It is generally considered as a form of 
micro-insurance. 
 
Viability: This concept denotes the degree of worthiness and practicability in 
adopting a certain strategy.  
 
Access: Refers to the opportunity to make use of a given object or service. Access can 
be social, geographical or financial. Geographical access to health care is measured in 
terms of distance and has been set by the World Health Organisation at a maximum of 
5 kilometres from a health facility. Financial access relates to affordability of the cost of 
health care.  
 
Rural: In this study, it refers to an area that is outside a gazetted city, municipality or 
town council. In Uganda, a rural area is mainly characterized by peasant/subsistence 
farming as the major source of livelihood. 
 
Household: People living together in a single homestead. The concept is distinct from 
a polygamous setting where there is more than one household in a given homestead. 
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In that case, each group of persons with one caretaker is considered as a separate 
household, even when they are all related to the same household head. 
 
Rural household: A household permanently residing in a rural area 
 
Scheme-member: A household or person that is currently (i.e. at the time of the study) 
enrolled in a community health insurance scheme. 
 
Non-scheme-member: A household or person that is not currently enrolled in the 
community health insurance scheme. 
 
Scheme-drop-out: A household or individual that was once a member of a CHI 
scheme but was not enrolled in the scheme at the time of the study. 
 
Catastrophic health expenditure: Expenditure at such a high level as to force 
households to reduce spending on other basic goods (e.g. food or water), to sell assets, 
or to incur high levels of debt, and ultimately to risk impoverishment (McIntyre, 
2007).  
 
Co-payment: Out-of-pocket partial payment by a health insurance member for health 
services used in addition to the amount paid by the insurance scheme. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 General Background 
Good health is a pre-requisite for the development of any household, community or 
country. It is linked to increased enrolment and improved performance at school, high 
labour productivity, and is generally an indicator of the level of socio-economic 
development of a country. Access to health care is also a universal human right1. 
Despite this, access to health care remains a challenge. It is estimated that 1.3 billion 
people worldwide lack effective and affordable access to health care (Preker et al, 
2002; International Labour Organisation [ILO] et al, 2005). The bulk of these people are 
found in developing countries. In Africa, for example, more than 50% of the 
population lacks access to modern health care despite the fact that the continent bears 
the highest burden of disease worldwide2 (World Health Organisation [WHO], 2005; 
Kaseje, 2006). Besides the poor having limited geographical access to health services, 
they also lack financial access to health care due to low purchasing power at 
household level. People simply cannot afford to pay for health care and, at the same 
time, governments lack the necessary resources to provide adequate care. The poor are 
most vulnerable as they are less able to meet the cost of health care, as well as less able 
to recover from the financial consequences of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments and loss 
of income associated with ill health. In general, the majority of the poor lack social 
security to guard against the impact of ill health (ILO et al, 2005). Consequently, 
households are caught up in a vicious cycle of poverty and ill health. 
 
Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which is the national development 
framework, and medium-term planning tool, recognises ill health as a leading cause 
and effect of poverty (Uganda, 2004). In terms of this, health forms a critical element of 
the human development pillar of the PEAP (Uganda, 2004, 2006). Uganda’s National 
Health Policy (1999) also recognises health as a critical element of poverty eradication 
programmes. This policy is hence designed in the context of the broader objectives of 
                                               
1 See http://www.un.org/overview/rights.html.  
2 Seventy two percent (72%) of deaths in Africa are caused by diseases that are highly preventable and 
treatable. Malaria, diarrhoeal diseases and respiratory tract infections alone account for 51% of deaths 
in the region (WHO, 2005). 
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the national PEAP as well as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)3. Uganda is 
one of the few countries in Africa that have re-introduced free health services4. 
However, there is still the challenge of poor quality services manifested in frequent 
drug stock-outs, inadequate and under-motivated health personnel, overcrowding 
and limited financial resources – all of which render government health care services 
inadequate and not accessible to all.  
1.2 The Research Context  
Health and health care provisioning are a global concern. However, it is crucial to 
understand the specific context in which health care is sought and promoted as what 
works in a particular context may not necessarily work in another. This section 
contextualises the research agenda by highlighting the national context in which 
access to health care and the mechanisms of ensuring such access are being 
investigated. The section summarises the general geo-political and socio-economic 
situation in Uganda, gives an overview of social security issues (this is crucial because 
health care provision forms a basic component of social security), and illuminates 
primarily the health sector issues in the country. This sets the stage for crystallizing 
the research problem later on in the chapter.  
1.2.1 Uganda: General Overview 
Uganda is situated in the great lakes region of East Africa. It is bordered by the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the West, Kenya in the East, Sudan in the 
North, Tanzania in the South and Rwanda in the South East. It is a land-locked 
country covering an area of 241,551 km2. Map 1 shows the location and administrative 
divisions of Uganda. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 These are goals for development and poverty eradication contained in a United Nations Millennium 
Declaration signed in 2000 by 189 countries, which commits all member states to the realization of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. There are 8 goals in total, and 3 of these relate 
directly to health, namely, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, and combating 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (Travis et al, 2004).  
4 Free health care was provided in the period following independence, through the 1970’s and 80’s until 
1993, when user fees were introduced in public health facilities. 
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Map 1:  Administrative map of Uganda 
 
                       Study district 
Source: Uganda districts information handbook, 2007-2008  
 
Uganda has a total population of 27.2 million people, with an average population 
growth rate of 3.4% (Uganda Bureau of Statistics [UBOS] and Macro International, 
2007). Forty-nine percent of the population are aged below 15 years, with a 
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dependency ratio of 116. The country’s major economic activity is agriculture. Nearly 
71% of the productive age group are subsistence farmers. The population is 
predominantly rural, with only 12.3% of the population residing in urban areas (UBOS 
and Macro International, 2007).  
 
With regard to its socio-cultural composition, Uganda is composed of a variety of 
religions with the majority of the population being Christians. Catholics (42.4%) and 
Protestants (34.5%) form the majority of the Christian sub-sects. Others include the 
Pentecostals (8.1%), Seventh Day Adventists (1.9%), and others (1.9%). Islam is 
practiced by 11.2% of the population (UBOS and Macro International, 2007). Religion 
in Uganda has been significant in the development of the social sector with key 
services development being traced back to the early Christian missionaries. Religious 
based organisations operate more than a third of the hospitals and 24% of the lower 
level health facilities in the country (World Bank, 2005; Uganda, 2006). The Protestant 
and Catholic medical bureaux also run major medical stores (Joint Medical Stores) that 
are key suppliers of medicines in the country. Hence, religion plays a key role in 
health service delivery. 
 
In terms of its development, Uganda has recorded impressive economic growth rates 
since the early 1990’s with an average growth rate of over 6% per annum (Uganda, 
2007b). The percentage of the population living below the poverty line5 declined from 
54% in 1992/1993 to 44% in 1995/96 and 31% in 2006 (Sewanyana et al, 2004; UBOS & 
Macro International, 2007). However, Uganda is still ranked among the poorest 
countries of the world: it is at 154th position out of 177 countries, with a human 
development index (HDI) of only 0.505 (United Nations Development Programme 
[UNDP], 2007a). According to the 2005/06 National Household Survey (UBOS, 2007), 
nearly 8.4 million Ugandans lived in absolute poverty in 2005/2006. The majority of 
the poor reside in rural areas (42.7% of the rural population fall below the poverty 
line). The country exhibits significant levels of inequality, which have been rising since 
1997. The Gini-coefficient, a measure of income inequality, rose from 0.35 in 1997/8 to 
0.43 in 2003 (Uganda, 2003, 2004). Poverty correlates with low levels of education, 
                                               
5 The poverty line is set at 1 dollar a day per capita. Those who live on less than a dollar per day are 
considered to be living in absolute poverty. 
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health, nutrition and generally inadequate social conditions, which become worse for 
those in the lowest socio-economic quintile.  
1.2.2 Uganda’s Health Indicators 
Despite improvements in economic development, Uganda’s health outcomes have 
remained low and the health of the population is generally poor. The total fertility rate 
(TFR) is 6.7 children per woman. Life expectancy at birth is only 49.7 years. The 
Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) is 435 deaths per 100,000 births; the Infant Mortality 
Rate (IMR) is 76 deaths per 1,000 live births while the Under-five Mortality Rate 
(U5MR) is 137 deaths per 1,000 live births (UBOS & Macro International, 2007). Both 
the MMR and U5MR are some of the highest in the world (World Bank, 2005). Similar 
to differences in income, there are socio-economic differences in the health outcomes 
across the population. For example, nationally the IMR is 76 deaths per 1,000 live 
births, whereas in the lowest socio-economic quintile it is 105.7 deaths per 1,000 live 
births (compared to 60.2/1,000 live births among the highest socio-economic quintile 
(Uganda, 2005). The Uganda Demographic and Health Survey (UDHS) (2006) 
indicates that while the TFR for rural areas is 7.1 (urban 4.4), contraceptive prevalence 
rate is only 15.1%, with 42.6% of rural women reporting unmet needs for family 
planning. In addition, only 25% of rural women deliver their babies with the 
assistance of a health professional, compared to 80% in urban areas (UBOS & Macro 
International, 2007). With regard to health seeking behaviour, the above survey 
(UDHS, 2006) noted that in the rural areas, out of 2,921 under-5 children who had 
developed malaria in the 2 weeks preceding the survey, only 29.2% had taken any 
anti-malarial drug. The report linked this to inadequate access to treatment, possibly 
due to the perceived cost of health care.  
 
There is generally a high burden of disease in the country. Over 70% of life years lost 
to premature deaths are attributed to preventable diseases (Uganda, 1999; World 
Bank, 2005). Prenatal and maternal conditions, malaria, acute respiratory tract 
infections, HIV/AIDS, and diarrhoea together account for over 60% of the total 
national death burden. While HIV prevalence in the general population decreased 
from 18% in 1992 to 6.4% in 2004, it appears to have stagnated between 6.0 and 6.4% 
since 2000 (Uganda AIDS Commission [UAC], 2007). Disease prevalence in Uganda 
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increased from 29% to 40% between 2002 and 2006 (UBOS, 2006). Apart from the high 
burden of communicable diseases, there is an urgent situation with regard to non-
communicable diseases such as diabetes, mental illness, cancer, hypertension and 
chronic heart disease. A combination of these exacerbates the need for effective access 
to health care to prevent poor health.  
 
Geographical access to health facilities improved from 49% in 1992 to 72% in 2005 
(Uganda, 2003, 2008). However, as noted in the 2006 National Household Survey, this 
does not necessarily guarantee access to health care (UBOS, 2006). The rural 
households are especially disadvantaged in accessing health care. For example, there 
are severe disparities in geographical access to health care, ranging from 7% for some 
remote districts to 100% in Kampala city (ibid).  
1.2.3 Uganda’s Social Security Framework 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights6 and the UN Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights7 underscore health care as a form of social security.  Social 
security is broadly concerned with the direct role that public action plays in reducing 
human deprivation and eliminating vulnerability (Ahmad et al, 1991). This definition 
embraces all such welfare programs as provision of health care and education, food 
subsidies, as well as those more direct forms of state-administered schemes such as 
social assistance and social insurance. The narrow and operational definition of social 
security is that it is a regulated mechanism of protecting people against social 
contingencies such as loss of income. Besides state-administered schemes, there also 
exists informal social security, which is unregulated, voluntary and often embedded 
within the community context. In presenting the social security framework for 
Uganda, all these perspectives of social security are taken into account.  
  
In Uganda, responses to the social security comprise of broad programs contained in 
the PEAP. There are some social security arrangements in place, which in a broader 
sense include the provision of basic health care free of charge in public health 
facilities. Figure 1 indicates the framework. 
                                               
6
 See, http://www.un.org/overview/rights.html 
7
 See, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cescr.pdf 
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 Figure 1:  Uganda's social security framework  
 
 
Source: Based on the National Social Security Fund Act, (1985), Dau (2003), and Kasente et 
al (2002) 
 
Uganda’s formal social security is still undeveloped. The only prominent scheme is 
the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), a provident fund for private sector 
employees. It is a form of social insurance, where members contribute through their 
pay cheques (20% of their salaries8) and they receive a lump sum payment in the event 
of a defined contingency. The benefits covered include old age benefits, survivors’ 
benefits (for dependent relatives of a member of the fund upon his/her death), 
invalidity benefits, withdrawal benefits and emigration grants for members who 
emigrate permanently from Uganda. The strength of the scheme is that it offers 
financial protection for members during a period when they are no longer able to earn 
an income. Secondly, because it offers a lump sum payment, an individual member 
                                               
8 The employer contributes 15% and the employee 5%. 
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can invest his/her accumulated earnings upon receipt so that he/she maintains a 
standard of living that is close to what they enjoyed while in active employment. The 
major weakness is that it has an extremely limited coverage since it is restricted to 
about 1% of the population, employed in the formal private sector (UBOS, 2006). Thus, 
its contribution to the goal of protecting the poor against deprivation and 
vulnerability and consequently reducing poverty is still negligible. Arguably, the 
NSSF contributes to the widening gap between the poor and the rich. Instead of 
protecting the poor, it protects the living standards of the relatively well off. It is also 
evident that health cover is conspicuously omitted from the benefits packages. The 
only health insurance coverage is available through private health insurance, which 
can only be afforded by the minority, whose employers offer it as part of their 
employment benefits. However, this privilege is lost when they leave their 
organisations. Ideologically, it may seem a good idea for government to offer free 
health care to its citizens, but due to financial constraints, it may not be able to meet 
the demand for quality health care in the short and medium term.  
 
The government also runs parallel social security schemes for its civil servants and a 
separate one for those in the teaching service. The benefits are in form of regular 
payments upon retirement. The schemes are non-contributory and are financed 
through budgetary allocations by government. This implies that, government despite 
collecting revenue from all taxpayers both in the civil (or public) sector and in the 
private sector, including the informal sector, offers social protection only for a 
minority who are employed in the civil service. Even then, the proportion of the 
population covered is only 1% since the total civil service employs only about 244,000 
people (UBOS, 2006). Consequently, formal social security in Uganda covers only 2% 
of the total population, and this excludes the poor and the majority of rural residents, 
since most of them are not part of the formal sector. 
 
Ostensibly, the government of Uganda (GoU) offers universal social services to the 
whole population, notably in the education and health sector. Since 1996, the 
government has offered free primary education. Furthermore, free health care was 
introduced in all government health facilities in 2001. Ideally, universal health services 
funded through general taxation should offer financial protection against the cost of 
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illness. The challenge lies in whether a developing, highly debt-ridden country like 
Uganda can provide good quality health care to the whole population given its 
narrow resource base. Currently the government commits 9.6% of its total budget to 
the health sector (Uganda, 2008), and even with donor support only about 30% of the 
required minimum health sector expenditure is covered (ibid). Anecdotally, less than 
30% of the population are accessing free health care at public health facilities, while 
more than 50% make out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for health care at the point of 
service delivery. Thus the limited level of social security, particularly with regard to 
health care, is evident.  
 
At the local level, communities provide most social security to their members against 
the risks and vulnerabilities posed by poverty, unemployment, emergencies and other 
inevitable life cycle factors (Kasente et al, 2002). These arrangements are informal, 
voluntary and at micro-level. Due to the absence of state organised social security 
arrangements at community level, families and groups attempt to provide their own 
protection, although they are constrained by inadequate resources. Common groups 
such as burial societies, revolving funds, kinship solidarity groups and mutual health 
organisations are some of the forms of informal social security arrangements in 
Uganda. These commonly exist in the rural areas but also among the urban poor. 
When Community Health Insurance (CHI) was first introduced in Uganda, it was 
designed around existing solidarity groups (Musau, 1999). 
 
1.2.4 Uganda’s National Health Policy  
Uganda’s current health policy came into effect in 1999. Its major goal is to ensure 
good health for all people in Uganda. Its stated objective is the reduction of morbidity 
and mortality, while the major strategy is through a provision of a basic package of 
health services – the Uganda National Minimum Health Care Package (UNMHCP). 
Some of the key guiding principles for this policy include equity with regard to access 
to health care, quality of care, efficiency and accountability, gender mainstreaming, 
and collaboration and partnership with the private sector.  
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In line with the national health policy, a five-year Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) 
was drawn up in 2000 and reviewed in 2005. Both documents emphasize the reduction 
of morbidity and mortality through the provision of a UNMHCP in a decentralized 
health delivery structure. The package encompasses preventive, supportive and 
curative aspects of health care. 
 
1.2.4.1 The Health Care Delivery Structure 
The GoU, through the Ministry of Health (MoH) is responsible for overseeing the 
delivery of health services to the population. The system operates under a 
decentralized service structure, in terms of which local governments are responsible 
for planning and supervising the delivery of health services. The private sector is 
considered a key actor in the national health system. Recognised health service 
providers in the private sector include the Private-Not-For-Profit providers (PNFP), 
the Private–For-Profit providers (PFP), and the Traditional and Complementary 
Medicine Practitioners. According to a 2006 health facility inventory (Uganda, 2006), 
there are 104 hospitals in the country. Of these, 57 are public (government), 44 are 
PNFP and three are PFP hospitals. Different health financing mechanisms thus co-
exist within the health system, although the official policy in public health facilities is 
the provision of free health care. Figure 2 indicates the framework for the delivery of 
health services in Uganda. 
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Figure 2:  Framework for the delivery of health services in Uganda 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  denotes a strong partnership;  denotes a weak partnership 
Source: Based on Uganda’s health policy (1999) and the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2005/2006-2009/2010
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The health care delivery system in Uganda is under the oversight of the MoH. It is guided 
by a National Health Policy and a HSSP. The UNMHCP, which is the adopted strategy, 
consists of “cost-effective interventions that address the major cause of disease and death in the 
communities” (Uganda, 1999: 9). It has been clustered into 4 broad areas each with a focus 
on particular health conditions. Cluster 1 includes health promotion, disease prevention 
and community health initiatives, and cuts across the other clusters. It recognises the role 
of preventive and community health care as well as the participation of communities in 
health care planning and delivery. Cluster 2 includes integrated maternal and child 
health; Cluster 3, covers the control of communicable diseases (STI/HIV/AIDS, TB, 
malaria); and Cluster 4 deals with the management of non-communicable diseases 
(injuries, disabilities, rehabilitative health, mental health, gender based violence, oral 
health, and palliative care). Theoretically, a mix of these services offers basic health care 
to individuals in communities in all parts of the country.  
 
• Decentralized Health Service Delivery: the Health Sub-District 
Until 1993, the health sector was highly centralized, with the MoH directly involved in 
service delivery. In 1993, all service delivery was decentralized to the districts in line with 
the Local Governments Act (Uganda, 1997). Only hospitals providing referral services 
and medical training remain the responsibility of the MoH. The main role of the MoH is 
to develop policies and guidelines as well as to monitor and provide logistical support 
(Uganda, 1999). The health sub-district (HSD) is the focal point of health services 
delivery. The HSD is a health service zone within each district, whose primary aim is the 
further decentralization of health service delivery to lower levels. The leadership of the 
HSD is normally based at either a public or PNFP hospital or at an upgraded Health 
Centre IV (HC-IV). It oversees other lower level health centres (i.e. HC-I, HC-II, and HC-
III) within a given geographical boundary that is known as a constituency (which serves 
approximately 100,000 people). The rationale for decentralization is to bring services 
nearer to the people, to increase equity of access to essential services and to foster local 
community participation in the planning, management and delivery of health care. 
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• Public-Private Partnership in Health 
Although the government recognises the broad private sector as a key player in health 
care provision, it has only engaged in active partnership with the PNFP sector. This is 
based on the belief that this sector is motivated by concern for the welfare of the 
population, in contrast to the PFP sector, which is driven by profit motives. A policy on 
public-private partnership in health (PPPH) has been enacted, premised on the fact that 
this partnership can significantly contribute to the attainment of equity, access, efficiency 
and sustainability of health care in Uganda (Uganda, 2002). The relationship between 
government and the rest of the private sector is rather more one of regulation and 
monitoring than active partnership.  
 
The PNFP sector comprises facility-based providers and non-facility based providers. The 
facility based PNFP providers are mostly religious based, existing under three major 
umbrella organisations, namely, the Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau (UCMB), Uganda 
Protestant Medical Bureau (UPMB) and Uganda Muslim Medical Bureau (UMMB). These 
account for over 40% of hospitals in the country, with a considerable percentage of their 
health facilities located in the rural areas (World Bank, 2005; Uganda, 2006). In addition, 
more than a half (60%) of the 214 HSDs is PNFP based. Under the decentralized health 
system, local governments are permitted to contract out services to PNFP health service 
providers.  
 
Partnerships between the public and the PNFP sectors take the form of regular joint 
planning and coordination meetings, policy formulation and development, HSD 
management, seconding medical officers to major hospitals operated by PNFP sector and 
actually paying their salaries; and financial resource mobilization and allocation9. 
However, government has not taken effective steps to monitor whether or not the grants 
given actually translate into reductions in health care costs to the consumers of health 
care in PNFP health units. 
 
                                                
9 Government gives grants to selected PNFP hospitals that are directly involved in helping government to 
deliver the NMHCP. The aim is to offset some of the costs of health care delivery so that they (PNFP) can in 
turn reduce the total cost of health care charged from the users.  
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It should be noted that PNFP providers control a significant proportion of the health care 
delivery structure and at the same time charge user fees. The implication is that, despite 
the provision of free government health services, a significant proportion of the 
population still has to seek health services from private providers where they must pay 
for such services. Because of this demand to pay, the rural poor have limited access to 
health care. On occasions where they must access the service, they are forced to sell their 
assets in order to meet the cost of care (Derriennic et al, 2005), which pushes them deeper 
into poverty. 
 
1.2.4.2 The Influence of International Financial Institutions on Uganda’s Health Sector  
As has happened in many developing countries (Reich, 2002), the health policy and 
health reforms in Uganda have been greatly influenced by the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), particularly the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were introduced in Uganda in 1987, and one of 
their goals was to reduce government expenditure as a major instrument to control 
inflation (Makokha, 2001) and steer economic growth. Economic growth was believed to 
lead, in turn, to better household incomes, which would enable people to buy services, 
including health, from the private sector (Okuonzi, 2004b). In line with SAPs, health 
sector reforms were introduced in 1993 and broadly aimed to promote the private sector 
in health care delivery, to restrict the role of government to policy formulation and 
technical guidance, and to target public spending to health promotion and disease 
prevention. The IFIs promoted the reforms by offering incentives, such as future financial 
aid, and by threatening to cut off aid if the suggested reforms were not adopted (Reich, 
2002). Subsequently, health services were decentralized in 1993; user fees were 
introduced and partnerships with the private sector were established, with a view to 
supporting it to become a key provider of health care. The argument advanced for a shift 
from public to private health care provision was the promotion of allocative efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness (Turshen, 1999).  
 
User fees were introduced in 1993 as one of the key methods to finance health care. The 
fees were also expected to promote efficient use of resources and improve the quality of 
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health care. The objective seems to have failed and the fees were officially abolished in 
2001, largely in response to a World Bank commissioned study, namely, Uganda 
Participatory Poverty Assessment Review (Uganda, 2000), which indicated that the poor 
had extremely limited access to health care. Other studies on the impact of user fees 
yielded mixed results (see Section 2.3.5: 37 for a detailed discussion on user fees in 
Uganda).  
 
The World Bank was also influential in the promotion of the Minimum Health Care 
Package (MHCP) that replaced the 1987 WHO strategy of Primary Health Care (PHC). 
PHC had promoted the participation of communities in health services management but 
was considered too reliant on the public sector (Turshen, 1999). This minimum health 
care package has been adopted as the major strategy of health care provision in Uganda. 
It is expected to promote efficient use of resources since it claims to focus on cost-effective 
interventions.  
 
On the whole, IFIs and other bilateral donors have largely influenced the health policy-
making process in Uganda and still play a crucial role in financing the health sector 
budget. According to Turshen (1999), the outcome of SAPs in Africa manifested a 
position that macro-economic stability takes precedence over poverty reduction. Uganda 
is a perfect example of this. Despite impressive economic gains, health care has largely 
remained inefficient, leading to stagnant or even worsening key health indicators for 
Uganda (Okuonzi, 2004a; UNDP, 2007b). 
  
1.2.4.3 Challenges in Delivering Uganda’s National Minimum Health Care Package 
Although the strategies and targets of the HSSP may seem impressive, they have not 
resulted in corresponding visible improvements in the health status of Uganda’s 
population (Section 1.2.2: 5). For example, although geographical access to health 
facilities has improved in that 72% of the population live within a 5 kilometre radius10 of 
the nearest health facility (UBOS, 2005), it does not guarantee access to basic health care. 
                                                
10 The indicator for geographical accessibility is a radius of 5 kilometres from any health centre irrespective 
of the type of provider or level of health facility. Five kilometres is considered an acceptable walking 
distance for health care seekers (Parkr et al, 2006). 
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The nearest health facility could be an ill-equipped health post at local council level II 
(HC-II). The most recent National Household Survey (UBOS, 2006) reports that the 
average distance from a household to the nearest hospital is 27 km, and that walking is 
the primary means of transport. Besides this, there are continued disparities in access to 
health care between and within regions, ranging from 7% in Northern Uganda (Kotido 
district) to 100% in Kampala city.  
 
The HSSP II (Uganda, 2005b) acknowledges that the key constraints in the delivery of the 
UNMHCP include under-funding of the health sector; inadequacies in the production, 
recruitment and retention of trained health personnel; frequent stock-out of essential 
medicines; and lack of equipment for making the new health services delivery structure 
fully operational. Currently, the cost of delivering the UNMHCP is much higher than can 
be afforded. According to the national health financing strategy (Uganda, 2005) the 
minimum financing requirement to deliver the UNMHCP is US$ 28 per capita, with a 
minimum of US$ 3.5 per capita spent on drugs. However, government has only been able 
to provide US$ 7.8 per capita (Uganda, 2008), which is clearly far too little. Overall, 
government allocates 9.6% of the national budget to the health sector. As a result, the 
sector receives less than 50% funding of what is required to ensure full access of the 
population to the minimum health care services (Uganda, 2005). For example, only 30% 
of the HSSP I was funded (ibid). Although the policy promises a free health care system 
funded through general taxation, the narrow tax base makes this impossible. In 2006 
(during presidential campaigns), graduated tax was abolished, making it even harder for 
local governments to collect local revenue for service delivery. As the World 
Development Report (WDR) (2004) contends, it is difficult for public spending to create 
quality services and to reach the poor (World Bank, 2003: 40). 
 
Uganda’s health system is also constrained by an inadequate number of trained health 
personnel to service the well laid out decentralized structures. For example, the total 
number of medical doctors in both government and the PNFP sector is only 953. Of these, 
more than 200 are employed in the two national referral hospitals, while another 305 are 
in PNFP hospitals (Uganda, 2005b). The MoH estimates the staffing gap for all districts 
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and regional referral hospitals to be 4,909, while for lower level health centres including 
the HSD, the staffing gap is estimated at 1,082. Thus, whereas the policy stipulates that a 
Health Centre III (HC-III) should have a resident medical doctor, in practice this has not 
been realized and may not be in the short term11. Thus, a number of health units, 
especially in the rural areas (30% of all HC-IIs) are staffed only by nursing assistants and, 
according to the human resources inventory (2004), 65 HC-IIs were not staffed at all 
(Uganda, 2005). Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that a significant number 
of people seek alternative health service providers who are more likely to meet their 
needs, including traditional healers, private clinics and drug shops (which are in most 
cases unregulated), as well as PNFP providers. All these alternative providers charge fees 
for their services. In view of these difficulties, there is definitely a need to consider 
alternative mechanisms of minimizing the financial barriers to health care for the poor, 
while at the same time maintaining an acceptable level of quality of services.  
 
It is due to these severe resource constraints that government still finds it difficult to 
deliver the basic health care package to the population, notwithstanding the free health 
care policy. In view of these challenges, Uganda’s health care system needs a serious 
strategy review. Additional mechanisms of increasing access to health care, especially for 
rural households, need to be considered. 
1.3 The Case for Community Health Insurance  
Community Health Insurance (CHI) is part of the broader community health financing 
(CHF) strategy. CHF refers to any scheme that is voluntary in nature, where the 
community pays for health care and is involved in the control and management of health 
resources (Preker et al, 2002). Examples of CHF include micro-insurance or CHI, 
community health funds, mutual health organisations (MHOs), revolving drug funds, 
and community involvement in user fee management. CHI is defined as any scheme that 
is managed and operated by any organisation other than government or PFP company, 
which provides risk pooling to cover the costs or part of the costs of health care services 
                                                
11 There are no practical incentives to attract trained medical officers at lower levels, who are situated in 
rural areas. In urban areas, they can afford to work in more than one health facility and at the same time to 
operate private clinics in order to realize more income.  
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(Musau, 1999; Preker et al, 2002). In Africa, CHI takes the form of local initiatives with 
voluntary membership. The members are required to pay a fixed amount of money 
periodically in return for a defined package of health services such as in-patient care. 
Examples of countries where CHI has been relatively successful include the DRC (Criel et 
al, 1998), Rwanda (Musango et al, 2006) and Senegal in West Africa, where the average 
household enrolment percentage in CHIs in the Thies region reached 68%, with some 
schemes realizing a 90% enrolment level (Jutting, 2001).  
 
The Uganda government through the MoH recognised CHF as a possible option for 
financing health care in 1995. The government, with support from the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) initiated the CHF project to spearhead 
the establishment of CHI schemes. The first scheme was launched in 1996 at Kisiizi 
missionary hospital in Rukungiri district. It was piloted as an alternative health financing 
strategy at a time when the official policy of government was cost sharing (user fees). The 
already existing community groups that exhibited features of risk sharing and resource 
pooling motivated the establishment of this scheme. These were in the form of stretcher 
(engozi12) and burial groups. In these groups, for example, households pool resources to 
assist in transporting the sick and the dying. The logic for introducing CHI was that if 
people could save for and pool resources in preparation for death, then they could also 
prepare for illness if properly mobilized and sensitized. Other schemes subsequently 
sprang up in different parts of the country, all of them linked to the PNFP sector.  
 
In 2001, there was a fundamental change in the country’s health financing policy; cost 
sharing was abolished and free services introduced in all government health facilities. At 
the same time, the donor funding policy changed from direct project funding to the 
                                                
12  Engozi is a form of stretcher made out of local materials, mainly papyrus reeds, which is used to carry 
sick people to hospitals or to carry dead bodies from the hospital to the burial grounds. It is a form of 
‘ambulance’ commonly used in mountainous areas in Uganda, due to a lack of formal means of transport. 
Because a single household cannot afford its own engozi, groups of households co-own one. Secondly, the 
group was necessary to carry the sick or dead person, as it required at least 4 or more persons to carry the 
stretcher containing the person. If a household were not a member of the group, then it would have to incur 
the full expense in case of sickness or death. At worst, such a household would be completely neglected as 
a form of community sanction against individualism. The practice effectively reinforces the concept of risk 
sharing and resource pooling, which underlies insurance. 
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Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp), where donor funds are channelled through the national 
budget. Thus, government and donor support to the schemes was withdrawn. 
Notwithstanding these changes, the schemes continued operating. Currently, there are 
about 20 schemes operating in different parts of the country (UCBHFA, 2007)   
 
The need to consider and evaluate the viability of CHI in improving access to health care 
for rural households is based on five main arguments.  
• Firstly, there is empirical evidence that the GoU does not have or at least has not 
committed adequate financial resources to support a universal health care system 
(refer to Section 1.2.2: 5). The continued running of private wards in government 
health facilities and the proposed National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) are 
further proof of the inadequacy of the free health care system.  
 
• Secondly, the PNFP sector is a significant actor in the delivery of health care, 
owning over 40% of all hospitals in Uganda, as well as 60% of the 214 HSDs 
(Uganda, 2006). Since the PNFP sector charges user fees, the implication is that a 
significant proportion of the population still pays for health care even though 
government health services are free. Considering the high levels of poverty, it is 
important to consider a means of increasing access for the population while at the 
same time protecting them against the adverse economic effects of the cost of 
health care. CHI theoretically appears to contribute to this goal.  
 
• Thirdly, social health insurance, which is the focus of the proposed NHIS, targets 
the formal sector employees who constitute only 2.8% of the labour force (UBOS, 
2007). Even then, about 36% of that working class are classified as the working 
poor, earning less than US $50 per month (UBOS, 2002). It is therefore likely that 
such a category of workers will not willingly embrace the social health insurance 
scheme. In any case, the scheme excludes the majority of the rural population since 
71% of the labour force is engaged in subsistence agriculture.  
 
• Fourthly, the role played by private health insurance in Uganda is almost 
negligible. These schemes cover less than 1% of the working population, mainly 
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those who are employed by international agencies and large parastatal 
organisations. 
 
• Finally, the prepayment and risk sharing aspects of CHI at least in theory reduce 
financial barriers to health care for populations that would otherwise be excluded 
from effective access. 
 
It is against this background that the study sets out to examine the viability of CHI as an 
option in improving access to basic health care in Uganda with specific reference to 
southwestern Uganda. 
1.4.  The Research Problem 
There is increasing consensus that mechanisms of health care financing that do not 
require OOP spending  provide greater financial protection (WHO,2000; Hsiao, 2001; ILO 
et al, 2005; Baeza & Packard, 2007; McIntyre, 2007) and should therefore be pursued in 
promoting access to health care. Section 1.2.4: 9 of this thesis illustrates Uganda’s 
endeavours to provide basic health care to the population. The major policy option has 
been the provision of free health services through government facilities. It appears that 
this idealistic mechanism of ensuring equitable access to health services has not 
translated into effective access to health care, especially not for the rural households 
(WHO, 2005; World Bank, 2005). A large proportion of the population still have to make 
OOP payments for health care especially to private providers due to shortfalls in the free 
health care system (Section 1.2.4.3: 15). This impedes effective access to health care for the 
majority of the poor in the rural areas of Uganda. Currently, Uganda’s MoH is in the 
advanced stages of introducing a NHIS, which lists CHI as a key aspect alongside the 
mandatory social health insurance for those employed in the formal sector. Various 
authors such as Criel, 1998; Criel et al, 1998; Jutting, 2001 and Carrin et al, 2005 indicate 
that CHI has the potential to increase access to health care for consistent members of the 
schemes. Most of the studies in this area were done in Asia and West Africa, with a few 
studies having been conducted in East Africa (Kalk et al, 2005; Musango et al, 2006; 
Schmidt et al, 2006). CHI schemes have been attempted in some areas in Uganda, 
particularly through the PNFP sector, as an alternative for increasing access to health 
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care. However, little has been documented so far about CHI in Uganda. The purpose of 
the current study, therefore, is to analyse some of the aspects that could indicate the 
feasibility of adopting CHI as a complementary strategy in increasing access to health 
care for rural households. The study illuminates the complexities of accessing free health 
care in Uganda, and interrogates the potential of CHI to extend health care to rural 
households. The profiles of households enrolling in one particular scheme are examined 
in comparison with households not enrolled in the scheme, in order to determine the 
inclusiveness of CHI. In view of the importance of the design on the viability of any 
intervention, the study examines the design adopted in implementing CHI in Uganda 
and how this could affect its viability. The current performance of the one CHI scheme is 
also scrutinised in order to highlight the extent of its success or failure in improving 
access to health care for rural households.  
1.5 Purpose of the Study 
The overall purpose of the study was to explore the viability of using CHI to improve 
access to basic health care for households in Uganda.  
 
The topic can thus be summarised in the following question: “Community health 
insurance as a viable means of increasing access to health care for rural households in 
Uganda” 
1.5.1 Main Research Questions 
1  (a) What are the factors that affect access to free health care in the rural areas of 
Uganda? 
 (b) What health care is being sought by community members, other than formal 
health care? 
2 What are the socio-economic/health profiles of households that enrol/do not enrol 
in CHI schemes? 
3 (a)  What scheme-design features facilitate the enrolment of community members into 
CHI schemes? 
 (b)  What scheme-design features hinder enrolment in CHI schemes? 
4   What is the current performance of CHI in Uganda and hence its viability? 
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1.5.2  Objectives of the Study  
The specific objectives of the study were:  
1. To ascertain the factors facilitating/inhibiting access to free health care in the 
rural areas in Uganda 
It is assumed that the major source of health care for rural households is the formal 
health care system. It is also assumed that there are obstacles to accessing free 
health care in Uganda, and further, that members of CHI schemes have greater 
access to health care because they are insured. 
 
2. To analyse the socio-economic/health profiles of households enrolling/not 
enrolling in CHI 
It is assumed that, despite their poor incomes, rural households are willing and 
able to make a contribution to CHI. Therefore CHI can reach out to households 
from varying socio-economic backgrounds. However, there will be households 
unable to afford CHI.  
 
3. To examine scheme design features that influence the viability of CHI 
It is assumed that enrolment is not just influenced by socio-economic 
characteristics of households but also by the ways in which an intervention is 
designed (supply side factors). These features could either encourage or 
discourage enrolment. 
 
4. To assess the current performance of Kisiizi health insurance scheme 
The current performance of CHI in part indicates its potential for growth and 
sustainability, and therefore it is assumed that by analysing its performance, one 
can have a better understanding of its viability. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
Equitable access to health care has been a daunting challenge not only at macro but also 
at micro levels in developing countries. In Uganda, a significant proportion of the 
population lack access to health care. As a result, the country’s health indicators are 
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among the poorest in the world (Section 1.2.2: 5). There have been attempts at different 
strategies to improve access to health care such as the decentralization of health services, 
the introduction of user fees and its consequent abolition, and the introduction of free 
health care. Currently, there appears to be a realization that free health care is not in 
essence translating into effective access to health care due to the deteriorating quality of 
care in public health facilities. Meanwhile, schemes that involve prepayment for health 
care are gaining international attention and support (WHO, 2000; Hsiao, 2001; ILO et al, 
2005; McIntyre et al, 2005; Baeza & Packard, 2007; McIntyre, 2007). At the national level, 
debates on the introduction of a NHIS have been ongoing, and CHI is one of the 
components of the proposed scheme. The study therefore is significant in as far as: 
• It provides a deeper insight into the complexities of accessing health care and the 
use of health insurance.  
• It provides a critique of the current health policy, questioning the feasibility of 
the free health care system. 
• It is focused in a rural area of Rukungiri district, known for its high morbidity 
levels, particularly from malaria (UBOS, 2006). 
• It is a sizeable case study involving 260 households, 12 key informants and 3 
focus groups; it also makes use of both quantitative and qualitative methods, 
hence strengthening the reliability of the findings. 
 
Lack of access to health care is a major social problem in contemporary society and 
impacts particularly on the development of the poor and marginalised. This study 
highlights the role that community members can play in their own social development. It 
reinforces the importance of community organisation in achieving better access to quality 
health care, thus promoting the goals of social protection. It is hoped that the findings of 
the study will inform the health planning and policy making process in Uganda. 
1.7. Scope of the Study 
The study investigates CHI as a means of improving access to health care at community 
level. Kisiizi health insurance scheme, in southwestern Uganda is used as the case study. 
The level of access to free health care, the facilitating factors and hindrances to accessing 
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free health care are examined in order to understand the context in which CHI is 
emerging. Characteristics of households that are enrolling or not enrolling in CHI will be 
examined in order to assess how socially inclusive and equitable CHI can be. In addition, 
the design aspects as well as the current performance of the scheme will be analysed, 
highlighting the opportunities for and constraints of the viability of CHI in Uganda. The 
sample population included members and non-members of the CHI in the local 
communities of Rubabo County, Rukungiri district in southwestern Uganda. The sample 
size was 260 households (130 members and 130 non-members of CHI).  
 
1.8 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 gives the introduction and general 
background to the study. It defines the research problem and highlights the objectives for 
the study. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical underpinnings of the study, reviews the 
relevant literature, and maps the conceptual framework for the study. The 
methodological approach to the study is explained in Chapter 3. Chapters 4 to 7 present 
the findings. More specifically, Chapter 4 examines the key issues surrounding access to 
health care in Uganda, particularly focusing on the present opportunities and challenges 
in accessing free health care. Chapter 5 analyses the characteristics of households who 
enrol and those who do not enrol in CHI. The design features of CHI as well as the 
current performance of Kisiizi health insurance scheme are examined in Chapters 6 and 7 
respectively. The last chapter (8) gives key conclusions, and presents the issues and 
recommendations emerging from the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MAPPING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, the context of the study was laid out and the research problem 
explained. It was indicated that there is a need to assess complementary strategies to 
improve access to health care because of the challenges faced in the current health 
delivery and financing systems. This chapter attempts to map out the conceptual 
framework for the current study by firstly presenting some theoretical perspectives on 
health care systems and access to health care. Relevant literature is reviewed, in 
particular with regard to CHI as an emerging strategy in improving access to health care. 
CHI is examined with regard to its evolution, design features, enabling factors and 
obstacles to its viability. Its application in the context of free basic health care is also 
discussed. Finally, research gaps are identified, which affirm the need for this particular 
study. 
2.2 Theoretical Review  
Three major groups of theories have influenced the design of health care delivery across 
countries, namely, the free market or libertarian theories, the egalitarian (marxist 
theories), and the utilitarian  theories. These three are commonly referred to as theories of 
justice (Stefanini, 1999; Cookson & Dolan, 2000). They offer divergent approaches to the 
delivery of health services and the achievement of equity in access to health care. They 
help to explain how health systems operate, as well as influencing the strategies a health 
system may choose to adopt to ensure equitable access to health care. Similarly, there are 
theories and models that explain access to and utilization of health care. Of particular 
interest to this study is Andersen’s behavioural model of health services access and 
utilization. This section reviews these theories and models in order to inform the current 
research. It should be noted from the beginning that these theories and models are being 
reviewed to provide a conceptual background to the study and not for purposes of 
testing them in any way.  
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2.2.1 Libertarian Theory 
Developed by economists, this theory is based on the free market economy and is greatly 
influenced by neo-liberal thinking. It is normally linked to the work of theorists like 
Adam Smith13 and John Lock (Beauchamp, 1991) who advocate the free market economic 
system. The theory is premised on the belief that individuals and not states or other 
groups of any kind are primary in such a system. A market is seen simply as an 
adjustment mechanism for supply and demand, which permits the exchange of goods 
and services between consumers and producers without the need for government 
intervention (Donaldson & Gerard, 1993), and that these markets will coordinate the 
production of goods and distribution of goods and services better than any other 
institution (Kukathas, 2009). Hence, the theory’s cardinal principle is to help individuals 
assume control of their lives. The theory relies on the belief that people can make 
informed and rational choices and that a free market will best satisfy their needs and 
optimise efficiency (Hsiao, 1995). It also presumes that, on the one hand, consumers seek 
to maximize the utility of a good or service while, on the other hand, producers seek to 
maximize profit. In relating this theory to health care, Donaldson & Gerard observe: 
When applied to health care, it means that fully informed and knowledgeable consumers 
will weigh up the costs and benefits of health care relative to other goods. They will spend 
that amount of money on health care, which maximizes their wellbeing. This will result in 
the appropriate amount of resources being allocated to health care overall and to different 
types of health care, (i.e. there will be allocative efficiency). At the same time, health care 
producers, seeking to maximize profits, will produce consumers’ most highly valued types 
of health care at least cost, so behaving in a technically efficient manner. This combination 
of technical and allocative efficiency ensures that consumers’ well-being is maximized at 
least cost (Donaldson & Gerard, 1993: 15).  
 
Two value judgements underlie the libertarian theory, namely, that consumers are fully 
knowledgeable and informed and that they are the best judges of their own wellbeing; 
and that the prevailing distribution of income is fair and that consumers are 
appropriately empowered by their prevailing level of disposable income. In reality, 
however, neither of these assumptions holds true. Knowledge is rarely shared equally 
between providers and consumers of health care, and neither is there a fair distribution of 
income in society. The libertarian theory also views health care as part of society’s reward 
                                                
13 Adam Smith is considered as the founding father of economics, based on his 1776 publication The Wealth 
of Nations (Todaro, 1992). 
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system (Wagstaff & Doorslaer, 1998). The underlying argument is that people should be 
able to use their income and wealth to get more or better health care than their fellow 
citizens if they so wish. Thus, proponents of this theory suggest a private health care 
delivery system where health is provided or accessed according to willingness and ability 
to pay. Government should therefore not interfere with an individual’s search for 
appropriate care, including a right of access to health care markets (Filc, 2007). 
 
 With regard to equity, the libertarian theory views the free market as the sole legitimate 
and just mechanism of redistributing wealth (Stefanini, 1999), which includes health. A 
common libertarian maxim, according to Stefanini is, “to each according to what is honestly 
acquired in a free market” (1999: 709). The inequalities that emerge are not seen as unfair 
because the market rewards those who work hard and have initiative. Based on this 
theory, a state’s health policy would promote market intervention, rolling back the state 
and expanding the role of the private sector in health care provision.  
 
This libertarian ideology was advanced in the 1980’s as the soundest basis for structuring 
all social and economic programmes, including those in the health sector (Hsiao, 1995). It 
greatly influenced the 1990s health care reforms, recommended by the World Bank and 
the IMF. These were in turn responsible for the introduction of user fees, the 
encouragement of private insurance schemes, decentralization and private sector 
expansion in the health sector (Turshen, 1999). The theory has, however, been criticized 
on the grounds that health cannot be subjected to free market forces since it is a common 
good and a universal right. Furthermore, it is argued that private markets are not able to 
provide complete coverage against risks of sickness and in most cases exclude the 
neediest (ibid). Donaldson & Gerard (1993) argue that health care is characterised by risk 
and uncertainty (associated with contracting illness), and by asymmetrical distribution of 
information about health care between providers and consumers. These, combined with 
other externalities, such as income inequalities, render market forces inappropriate and 
call for government intervention. 
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2.2.2 Egalitarian Theory 
This theory has its roots in the Marxist ideology, which emphasises the principle of 
distribution according to need, coupled with the principle of “from each according to his 
ability to pay” (Wagstaff & Doorslaer, 1998; Stefanini, 1999). Prominent twentieth century 
egalitarian theorists include John Rawls (with his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice) and 
Amartya Sen who mainly used the concept of welfarism (Cappelen & Norheim, 2005). The 
egalitarian theory views health care as a right of everyone, and holds that it should not be 
influenced by income or wealth. Egalitarian theorists base their claims on universal moral 
equality, with the assumption that human beings are of equal worth and should therefore 
have an equality of condition, i.e. a condition where everyone alike, to the fullest extent 
possible, has his or her needs and wants satisfied (Hsiao, 1995; Filc, 2007). Justice in 
health care provision is viewed as the assignment of resources to those with the greatest 
need, so that inequities are removed and equality is achieved (Bole & Bondeson, 1991; 
Cookson & Dolan, 2000; Stefanini, 1999). The role of the state in health service provision 
is emphasised, as are equity considerations. The theory promotes central planning and 
relies on the belief that the government has the ability to advance the welfare of its entire 
population as well as to manage public sector operations efficiently (Hsiao, 1995). The 
egalitarian viewpoint suggests that a state sector should predominate, with health care 
being distributed according to need and financed according to ability to pay, which is the 
model currently adopted by Uganda (to some extent). Government-provided health care 
is considered a just means of satisfying the needs of all citizens (Turshen, 1999). The 
theory does not seem to give much attention to economic costs and hence it may be 
idealistic, with limited application, particularly in developing countries where resources 
are scarce and poverty levels are high. The state’s resources are constrained by a low tax 
base, and consequently an attempt to provide universal services is likely to result in 
inadequate provisioning and questionable quality of care in many instances. Mackintosh 
and Tibandebage (2002) highlight the paradox in most developing countries, where, 
though motivated by egalitarian principles to provide universal health care, market 
liberalism forms a key characteristic of the system. Hence, the egalitarian objectives fail to 
take effect. In view of this, some authors (Stefanini, 1999) suggest that resources be 
directed to where the need is greatest rather than leaving service provision to the 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 29
vagaries of the market. Another criticism of the theory relates to its lack of sensitivity to 
efficiency. It is meaningless to focus on equalising opportunities to ineffective health care. 
Some (Stefanini, 1999) have argued that concentrating resources on those most in need 
can deprive others who could have realized maximum utility from the intervention, as 
advocated by the utilitarian theory.  
2.2.3 Utilitarian Theory 
This theory offers a middle ground in approaches to social service provisioning and 
access. It considers the effects and consequences of human action and not so much the 
principles that are followed (Stefanini, 1999). Utilitarian theorists, like libertarians, tend to 
favour the free market approach to social service provision. The difference is that, while 
the libertarian theory emphasises the extent of justice, which underlies a particular 
system, utilitarian theorists are more concerned with the outcome of an action, approach 
or intervention. Utilitarian theorists argue that what is necessary is the production of 
desirable results while minimizing undesirable results, i.e. achieving maximum benefit 
for the highest number of people. Maximizing the sum of welfare, applying the notion of 
efficiency and hence allocating resources according to the likelihood of success are basic 
principles underlying utilitarianism (Wagstaff & Doorslaer, 1998; Cookson & Dolan, 
2000). In the health sector, it is therefore necessary to reach a compromise between 
limited resources and virtually infinite demand so that health outcomes are maximized 
and costs minimized for the majority of the population.  
 
Utilitarian theory has been linked to the promotion of a National Minimum Health Care 
Package (NMHCP), which emphasises efficiency and cost-effectiveness of interventions 
(Stefanini, 1999; Uganda, 1999). The theory has been criticized for over-emphasizing cost 
calculations in order to estimate benefits for the majority. Secondly, according to Drane 
(1990, cited in Stefanini, 1999), benefits for the majority may involve terrible costs for the 
smaller groups who are excluded. The theory advocates a consideration of financial 
affordability by the state before making the choice to provide free health services for 
everybody.  
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The key theories or ideologies that underpin health systems and approaches to health 
care provision have different implications for equity of access to health care. However, as 
Wagstaff & Doorslaer (1998) observe, in most countries, health care is delivered and 
financed by a mixture of systems and there are traces of each ideology in policy-making. 
For example, although Uganda professes, and has tended towards egalitarian principles 
in policy, in practice, health care delivery is as well characterised by liberal ideologies 
with market forces determining access. In the following section, a model of access to 
health care will be reviewed, with a view to conceptualising some of the factors that 
determine access to and utilization of health care. 
2.2.4 Andersen’s Behavioural Model of Health Services 
The behavioural model of health services was first developed in 1968 by Ronald 
Andersen to explain why families use health services, to define equitable access to health 
care and to assist in developing policies to promote equitable access (Andersen, 1968, 
1995; Andersen & Newman, 2005). It has been widely used to explain access to health 
care (Goldsmith, 2002; Andersen & Newman, 2005; Fouladbakhsh & Stommel, 2007). The 
model initially focused on the family as the unit of analysis because, as Andersen (1995) 
argues, the health care an individual receives is most certainly a function of the 
demographic, social and economic characteristics of the family as a unit. Access to and 
utilization of health services is seen as a function of three elements, namely, individual 
characteristics, the environment in which the individual lives, and some interaction of 
these individual and societal forces. These translate into three classes of determinants, 
namely, predisposing, enabling and need factors (variables). Figure 3 illustrates the 
model. 
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Figure 3:  The behavioural model of health service access and utilisation 
Predisposing Enabling  Illness level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Andersen and Newman (2005) 
 
According to the model, use of any health service is dependent on the predisposition of 
the individual to consume the service, his ability to secure the service, and his level of 
illness. According to the authors, demographic factors such as age and gender (sex) may 
compel someone to want to seek health care or may suggest that certain individuals are 
more likely to need health care. Conversely, social structure refers to and is measured by 
those factors that determine one’s status in a community, and one’s ability to cope with 
problems that arise and to command the resources needed to deal with these problems. 
Such factors may include education, occupation, family size, social networks and 
interactions as well as culture. It also includes characteristics of the general environment, 
such as the presence of social services. Similarly, the beliefs that people have about health 
and health services may determine how often they use those services and the efforts they 
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make to access these services. If people do not perceive any need for health care, then 
they will not make an effort to access that care. 
 
Enabling factors represent the means available to the individual to secure the service. 
Both community and family or personal resources must be present for effective access to 
health care. Such resources include the availability of health services, the existence of 
personnel within easy reach, and individual means to access those services. Such means 
relate to income, travel and waiting time at the health facility and the type of health 
service provider. Illness level influences the immediate use or willingness of the 
individual to seek health care. 
 
The behavioural model provides a suitable theoretical framework because of its ability to 
identify factors related to access to health services and its applicability to populations in 
diverse contexts. The current study borrows some concepts from the above model to 
assess in particular the characteristics of households that enrol in CHI vis-à-vis those who 
do not do so (Chapter 5). By its very nature, CHI is voluntary and so is the decision to 
enrol in the scheme. Both individual characteristics and societal forces are therefore seen 
to influence the adoption and success of CHI and the extent to which this will lead to 
increase in access to health care. 
2.3 Health Care Financing Options 
Various authors (Donaldson & Gerard, 1993; Criel, 1998; Bennett & Gilson, 2001; Preker et 
al., 2002; McIntyre et al, 2005; McIntyre, 2007) suggest five major financing mechanisms 
for health care systems, namely, tax based financing, OOP payments or user fees, social 
health insurance, private health insurance and CHI. 
2.3.1 Tax-based Financing 
Under this arrangement, health services are funded through the government budget and 
are provided ‘free’ of charge to the consumers. Strictly speaking, this is not quite correct, 
as the consumer’s contribution is part of their total tax payment. Funds for such services 
could also accrue from deficit financing whereby domestic or international loans are 
secured to fund government activities over and above the general tax revenue (McIntyre, 
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2007). The system is guided by the egalitarian theory (Section 2.2.2: 28), which recognises 
that everyone has a right to health care, irrespective of their level of income; as such, it is 
considered the most progressive form of health financing (Donaldson & Gerard, 1993; 
McIntyre et al, 2005; WHO, 2006; McIntyre, 2007). It is generally acknowledged that the 
system of direct taxation removes the problem of adverse selection because of the absence 
of competition between financial intermediaries. It also redistributes wealth according to 
health status and income (Donaldson & Gerard, 1993; Carrin, 2003). Donaldson & Gerard 
(1993) further argue that under this system, individuals are effectively charged a form of 
community rate: one, which is dependent on the ability to pay but not on previous 
experience of illness, thus making it a more equitable system of health financing. 
However, a number of weaknesses within the tax-based financing system render it 
inefficient. Several authors (Kutzin, 2001; Carrin, 2003; WHO, 2006; Baeza & Packard, 
2007) argue that the system is constrained by inadequate public resources, particularly in 
middle and low income countries. This implies that only a part of the population can be 
reached with these services and that, even if they are reached, the amount of benefits 
offered is generally insufficient. Because of this, the system yields theoretical results in 
several countries: 
…coverage through general taxation is only theoretical for parts of the population that lack 
effective physical and financial access to services of adequate quality. Hence, what in 
several countries is a constitutional guarantee of access to all is in fact an empty promise or 
at least an unfulfilled one (Kutzin, 2001: 191)  
 
Other authors (Preker et al, 2002; Gwatkin et al, 2004) agree that tax-based financing may 
in fact lead to inequitable access to services. Preker et al (2002) argue that public policies, 
which in theory offer health care to the whole population from general taxes may 
unwittingly shunt scarce health care resources away from the poor to segments of the 
population with more political influence. As a result, service delivery is often inequitable, 
and biased towards urban areas and hospitals rather than the rural poor. This is 
explained by the fact that in the developing world, a limited tax base provides low level 
funding for major sectors including the health sector. Gwatkin et al (2004) contend that in 
most cases tax funded services provide greater benefits for the well off, since they have 
the political muscle and connections to access the services. The authors recommend that, 
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to improve equity, the poor segments of society should be directly targeted rather than 
the whole population. 
2.3.2 Out-of-Pocket Payments  
This involves payment for health services at all levels of service delivery at the time of 
receiving the service. OOP payments can either be in the form of user fees, which are 
normally paid at public health facilities as well as direct payments to private providers 
(McIntyre et al, 2005). Co-payments made by members of a health insurance scheme, 
which reimburses only a portion of the cost of care, are also another form of OOP 
payment (McIntyre, 2007). User fees are normally constituted by payment per item of 
service received or to be received; in other words, individual acts of diagnosis, treatment, 
and drugs are added together and billed to the patient. The fee is normally paid at the 
time of use to the provider who retains it either partially or totally. This mechanism of 
health care financing was previously and strongly supported by the IFIs as an integral 
part of SAPs and as a conditionality for lending (McIntyre et al, 2005). User fees were also 
seen as not only a revenue generating mechanism but also as a means of improving 
community involvement in the management of health services. In most developing 
countries, the design and implementation of user fees has been poor. It does not provide 
any incentive to exempt the poor from payment. Due to its very nature, OOP payments 
are considered the most regressive form of financing health services. McIntyre et al (2005) 
explain that this is because the poor tend to bear the greatest burden of ill health and 
therefore bear the greatest financing burden since payment is directly linked to the use of 
health services. Various authors (Bennett & Gilson, 2001; McIntyre et al, 2005; McIntyre, 
2007) observe that user fees often result in less people using health services and in some 
cases lead to further impoverishment at household level, especially amongst the 
vulnerable populations. Of recent, the World Bank, which was the chief protagonist of 
OOP payments, particularly user fees, is softening its position and instead recommending 
prepayment mechanisms, such as insurance (Preker & Carrin, 2004; McIntyre et al, 2005) 
2.3.3 Social Health Insurance  
This is a compulsory (mandatory) prepayment scheme where health care is provided in 
exchange for a fee usually levied on earnings (Wagstaff & Doorslaer, 1998). Only certain 
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groups, usually the formally employed, are legally required to enrol in such schemes. 
Only those who become members are entitled to benefits (McIntyre et al, 2005). This 
feature distinguishes it from the NHIS, which is universal and covers the entire 
population, irrespective of whether one has contributed or not. In such cases, the 
government fully subsidizes the contributions of vulnerable groups or individuals. 
Contributions to social health insurance are normally community rated, i.e. based on the 
average expected cost of health service use by the entire insured group and not by that of 
an individual or subgroup (McIntyre et al, 2005; McIntyre, 2007). Everyone above a 
certain level of income pays a fixed percentage of his/her income to the insurance fund. 
Social health insurance minimizes catastrophic health expenditure, borrowing and 
dependence on weak social safety nets by individuals and households (WHO, 2006). It 
can also free up general revenues spent for providing health care to middle and upper 
income households and reallocate them to public health and subsidization of the poor 
(Berman et al, 2001). However, it also tends to redirect resources away from the poor to 
the relatively rich, since those with lower wages would still have to pay a substantial part 
of their income to the insurance fund. Further, it may work as a disincentive to 
employers, since it is a cost on their part (they have to pay a certain percentage of their 
workers’ salary to the insurance fund). Thirdly, even with universal coverage, inequitable 
access remains a problem, since those outside the formal sector employment are not 
covered (Berman et al, 2001). Kutzin (2001) argues that social health insurance may result 
in new costs to the health system through the creation of new organisations, paying 
providers and providing services, which may in turn lead to inefficiencies in the health 
system. Another complication pointed out by Kutzin is the potential of health insurance 
arrangements to exacerbate inequity, where the economically advantaged (in other 
words, those who are employed in the formal sector) get better benefits by virtue of the 
fact that they are insured. This implies that financial protection is only being offered to 
the well off, expanding the gap in health care utilization between the rich and poor. In 
Africa social health insurance is limited, with less than 10% of the population covered 
(Mwabu et al, 2002; McIntyre et al, 2005). Kenya, Burundi and Tanzania are some of the 
countries that have some form of social health insurance, while in South Africa and more 
recently in Uganda, there are ongoing debates about introducing the scheme.  
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2.3.4 Voluntary Health Insurance 
Voluntary health insurance is usually contrasted with the mandatory, publicly financed 
and publicly managed insurance (Sekhri & Savedoff, 2005). It is mainly comprised of 
private-for-profit insurance and CHI, which is most common among the informal sector.  
 
a) Private Health Insurance 
This is characterised as voluntary, for-profit (commercial) coverage of health risks where 
the contributions come from households, individuals or their employers. Historically, it 
referred to employment-based insurance where the contributions are shared between the 
employer and the employee (McIntyre et al, 2005). The premiums paid are related to risk 
and they are usually so high that only a small segment of the population can afford them. 
Hence, it normally targets the high-income groups. WHO (2006) notes that the system 
works well where there is a large formal sector, a situation that is lacking in most low and 
middle income countries. Sekhri & Savedoff (2005) argue that those who enrol in this 
type of insurance often benefit from capturing government subsidies, such as private 
insurers dumping expensive cases on the public system. Private health insurance does 
not promote equity in access to health care, since the basis of benefits is the ability to pay 
rather than need. Currently, the market share of private health insurance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is extremely small, covering only a small segment of the upper income class (Criel, 
1998). Examples of countries with some level of private health insurance include 
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, where more than 20% of health care costs are 
apportioned to private health insurance. 
 
b) Community Health Insurance  
As indicated earlier (Section 1.3: 17), community health insurance is part of a general 
concept of CHF. CHI schemes provide risk pooling to cover the cost or part of the cost of 
health care. They are usually run by not-for-profit organisations and they are either 
provider-based or run through an intermediary organisation but with a high level of 
community involvement. Premiums are usually set at community rates and they are 
irrespective of such factors as age, sex, occupation or health risks. According to Bennett & 
Gilson (2001), these schemes offer considerable benefits to the poor in terms of access to 
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health care, where operated successfully. Bjorn (2004) in a review of CHI in low income 
countries argues that there is evidence that the schemes provide some financial protection 
by reducing OOP spending. The author however adds that they may not contribute to 
cost recovery if seen as a mechanism of health financing, thus they are best suited as 
complementary health financing mechanisms. The current study, though taking into 
account aspects of CHI contribution to health financing, is more focused on their benefits 
to the consumers of health care in as far as increasing access to quality health care is 
concerned. 
2.3.5 Health Care Financing in Uganda 
In middle and higher income countries, health care is financed through general taxation, 
social health insurance, private health insurance and OOP user charges (Preker et al, 
2002). This is possible because a significant proportion of the population is formally 
employed and can pay for health insurance through the pay cheque, or because the 
economy is strong enough to offer universal coverage through general taxes and 
insurance systems. The situation in developing countries is different, with majority of the 
population engaged in either subsistence agriculture or in informal sectors without a 
regular salary. At the same time, government expenditure in the health sector is 
inadequate to meet the health care needs of the population. A report by the International 
Council for Science on Health and Well-being in Sub-Saharan Africa (Parker et al, 2006) 
estimates that African governments spend less than 10% of their budget on health.  
 
In Uganda, the major funding mechanisms for health care include general taxes and 
donor budget support, which in principle translate into the provision of free basic health 
care in all public health facilities. Other mechanisms include user fees in private wards of 
some government health facilities, direct payments to private providers (PNFP and PFP) 
private health insurance and, to a limited extent, CHI schemes. Inadequate financing 
remains the primary constraint inhibiting the development of the health sector in the 
country (see Section 1.2.4.3: 15). Total per capita expenditure on health from both GoU 
and donors is estimated at USD 7.8 (Uganda, 2008). Conversely, OOP spending was 
estimated at USD 9.9 per capita, thus making it (OOP) the largest source of financing for 
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health care (World Bank, 2005). There is still a huge financing gap between the current 
and the required funding levels for the sector. It is estimated that, to close the financing 
gap, the health sector must achieve a 15% GoU budget allocation, growing at 
approximately 6% per annum (Uganda, 2006).  
 
User fees were introduced in Uganda in 1993 as a mechanism of mobilizing additional 
resources for health. An assessment of the policy later indicated mixed results, with 
reports of improved services on the one hand and inability to pay for services on the 
other (World Bank, 2005). Various studies (Kipp et al, 2001; Kivumbi & Kintu, 2002, 
Mpuga, 2002; Burnham, et al, 2004; Deininger & Mpuga, 2004, Nabyonga et al, 2005), 
though highlighting the positive experiences with user fees, concluded that it was 
excluding the poor and the most vulnerable groups from health service utilization. Kipp 
et al (2001), for example, indicated that health service utilization had improved in the 
rural areas during the era of user fees, specifically due to improvements in the quality of 
care, but also argued that the system was excluding the poor from accessing basic health 
care. In 2001, the practice was abolished, albeit abruptly in the heat of political 
campaigns, and free health care was introduced in all public health facilities. Burnham et 
al (2004) reported that although the use of health services increased after the introduction 
of free health care, there were resultant negative effects, such as the loss of some 
autonomy by the health facility, the diminishing availability of drugs, and the loss of 
income to supplement health workers’ salaries leading to low morale and reduction of 
working hours. All these negatively affected the quality of care. Other studies, 
(Nabyonga et al, 2005; World Bank, 2005), indicated that the utilization of health services 
increased for  both government and private facilities; yet the abolition of user fees did not 
extend to the private sector, bringing into contention the argument that increased 
utilization was due to abolition of user fees per se. Nabyonga et al (2005) relate the 
simultaneous increase in utilization to differences in quality of services, and conclude 
that people may be willing to pay if they feel they are getting quality services. 
 
The GoU is currently in the process of introducing a NHIS. Its envisaged goal is to 
develop health insurance as a complementary mechanism of health care financing and to 
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make good quality and affordable health care available to all Ugandan citizens. The 
scheme is intended to complement inadequate funding of the health sector by the 
government. The major focus is on social health insurance for formal sector workers. 
Private health insurance and CHI are listed as part of the NHIS. Social health insurance if 
successful will cover about 2% of the total population, who are engaged in formal sector 
employment (Section 1.2.3: 6), thus excluding the poor majority particularly in the rural 
subsistence agricultural sector. Conversely, private health insurance currently covers less 
than 1% of the employed population (UBOS & Macro International, 2007). Given such 
resource constraints, the population still finds itself in a situation where it has to make 
OOP payments to access health services. It is because of this that other complementary 
strategies to ease financial access to quality health care need to be considered.  
2.4 Framework for Assessing the Viability of Community Health Insurance 
CHI is part of the broader health system and is often seen as one alternative in health 
financing. Its analysis has to be linked to the overall goals of the health system (Carrin, 
2003). According to the WHO, the final goals of any health system should include the 
following: health improvement (level and equity); responsiveness of the health system to 
the legitimate expectations of the population; and fair financing and financial risk 
protection (Murray & Frenk, 2000). Health improvement is reflected in the health of 
individuals, the average level of health of the population, and the distribution of health 
within the population. Responsiveness refers to the system’s respect of persons 
(including dignity, autonomy, and confidentiality) during their interaction with the 
health system. Fair financing and risk protection involve ensuring that households are 
not impoverished or that they pay an excessive share of their income to obtain needed 
health care; furthermore, the contribution to the health system should reflect differences 
in disposable income. Carrin (2003) lists the intermediate goals of CHIs as equity in 
utilization, financial protection and sustainability of the intervention. The above goals are 
directly linked to four basic functions of the health system, which include stewardship, 
resource mobilization, service provision and financing. Drawing on these principles, 
Kutzin (2001) suggests the following framework for evaluating health financing 
arrangements. 
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2.4.1 Kutzin’s Framework for Country-level Analysis of Health Financing 
Arrangements 
Kutzin’s (2001) framework for analysis of health financing arrangements emphasises the 
‘insurance function’ (i.e. access to needed care without financial barriers and/or 
impoverishment) among which is CHI. The overall goal is to ensure that people are 
guaranteed access to effective health care. Five associated functions of health financing as 
proposed in the framework, include revenue collection; pooling of funds; purchasing of 
services; provision of services and determination of the benefits package. Each of these 
associated functions is briefly explained below: 
 
a)  Revenue Collection 
Revenue collection is the process by which the health system determines and obtains 
financial contributions from households, enterprises and other organisations (Carrin 
2003). While building on Kutzin’s framework, Carrin lists 2 key performance criteria for 
revenue collection, namely, enrolment and the ratio of prepaid contributions to health 
care costs (cost recovery). With regard to enrolment, there is a need to assess what 
percentage and composition of the population is covered by the CHI scheme in relation to 
the target population. Broad membership is needed to make the scheme viable over the 
long term. In addition, membership should not be biased towards the well-off but also be 
open to vulnerable groups. With regard to cost recovery, Carrin (2003) notes that, the 
higher the volume of prepaid contributions, the more one can avoid the financial 
consequences of treatment costs. According to Kutzin’s framework, contributions do not 
necessarily have to be from households alone but also from external sources. Ultimately, 
what matters is the aggregate ratio of contributions (including subsidies and grants) to 
health care expenditure. 
 
b) Pooling of Funds (Health Care Revenues) 
‘Pooling’ refers to the accumulation of prepaid health care revenues on behalf of a 
population. In turn, health service costs are covered from the common pool. The key 
performance criterion here is the level of risk pooling (Carrin, 2003). Carrin argues that 
risk pooling is crucial because those who need health care will gain access to it in an 
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affordable and timely manner. Individuals or households with no insurance, in contrast, 
would have to bear the full burden of the health care cost. However, due to problems of 
adverse selection, the population may be segmented in different risk pools, with ‘sicker’ 
or poorer pools becoming unsustainable in the long term. Measures to address the 
problem of adverse selection, such as underwriting, tiered rating, enrolment of already 
existing groups, and exclusion of pre-existing and/ or high cost services from coverage, 
may be a good attempt to ensure financial viability of insurance schemes, and yet they 
detract from the effectiveness of the insurance function for the population as a whole 
(Kutzin 2001: 178). Therefore, health financing schemes should be analysed with respect 
to how they contribute to or detract from the insurance objective for the health system 
and the population. 
 
c) Purchasing and Provider Payment 
Purchasing is used to mean the transfer of pooled resources to service providers on behalf 
of the population for which the funds were pooled (Kutzin, 2001). Purchasing 
organisations can be ministries of health, local governments, health insurance funds, or 
member-owned insurers. Provider payment, in contrast, refers to the methods or 
mechanisms used to allocate resources to providers. The mechanisms generate incentives 
that affect the behaviour of the providers. For example, in cases where a fee-for-service 
(per each item of service provided) is the mode of payment, the treatment incentive on 
the part of the provider may be to increase the total volume of services provided, leading 
to provider-led cost escalation for the scheme. Kutzin suggests that there is a need for 
‘active’ purchasing (as opposed to purchasers being passive financial intermediaries) to 
regulate provider behaviour and increase efficiency. Some of the mechanisms to achieve 
this include: 
• Engaging provider payment methods that shift some of the financial risk for 
patient care costs to providers in order to control cost and quality. 
• Encouraging referral from a primary care gate keeper for non-emergency specialty 
services. 
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• Managing choice by pre-qualifying a group of participating primary care 
providers from which beneficiaries can choose, with services obtained from other 
providers not covered. 
• Contracting selected providers and requiring them to comply with certain 
utilization controls and to provide services at a discounted price in return for a 
high volume of patients. 
• Maintaining profiles of providers for purposes of monitoring and providing 
feedback to them on their treatment, referral and prescribing practices. 
• Use of standard treatment protocols to compare the practices of contracted 
providers with defined clinical standards such as adherence to the national 
essential drugs list.  
Carrin (2003) recommends a related concept of strategic purchasing as one way of 
ensuring access to rational and cost-effective health care. Elements of strategic purchasing 
re-emphasised by Carrin (2003) include determining the health care providers from 
whom CHI members can choose, establishing the benefits packages, setting quality 
standards and proposing provider payment mechanisms. He distinguishes this strategic 
purchasing from simple funding or reimbursement of non-specified health services by 
various providers with whom the CHI has no contractual relationship. 
 
d) Provision of Services 
To promote efficiency and enhance the insurance function, it is crucial to understand the 
market structure of service provision. Guiding questions include: to what extent is the 
structure of service provision competitive or monopolistic? How much autonomy do 
managers of provider units have, especially with respect to staff? What is the distribution 
of service providers – are there parts with no effective access to health care? Are there 
particular population groups that have limited access to health care? A promise of 
insurance protection is meaningless for people who do not have reasonable physical 
access to primary care, emergency services or necessary referral care (Kutzin 2001: 189). 
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e) The Benefits Package 
Kutzin (2001) defines the benefits package as not just a list of services to which the 
beneficiaries of an insurance scheme are entitled but as those services and means of 
accessing them for which the purchaser will pay from the pooled funds. Services excluded 
from the benefits package are those whose provision is partially or fully financed from 
direct OOP payment. Key questions to ask with regard to the benefits package, thus, 
revolve around the following: the basis for determining entitlement to benefits, demand 
characteristics of different kinds of services (i.e. primary versus secondary services), and 
whether the package covers essential services (essential package) or services that are 
likely to result in catastrophic expenditure (catastrophic package). Kutzin suggests that a 
well coordinated benefits package involves combining community risk pooling schemes 
(CHI) to pay for relatively low cost services with a ‘back up’ insurance arrangement 
protecting against the cost of financially catastrophic health care. Overall, a benefits 
package can enhance or cripple the ability of a health financing arrangement to increase 
access to health care, while at the same time offering financial risk protection. 
Additionally, a well designed benefits package can serve as a tool to raise levels of 
enrolment, thereby increasing the viability of a scheme. 
 
2.4.2 Other Indicators of Viability of Community Health Insurance 
Although Kutzin’s framework is central to the study, there are other significant indicators 
of viability of CHI. For purposes of this study, the researcher wishes to focus on equity, 
efficiency and sustainability. 
 
Equity involves extending coverage to the poor and most vulnerable groups to protect 
them from the adverse impacts of health care costs. Carrin et al (2005) breaks equity 
down to the percentage of the population covered, as well as the distribution of 
enrolment across socio-economic categories. The cardinal principle is for individuals and 
groups to be able to access services according to need and not so much according to 
ability to pay. Equity in the case of CHI is measured in terms of the extent to which 
premiums charged are based on not just average income at community level but putting 
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in place mechanisms to enable households or individuals pay according to their abilities 
or income. The premium can thus be set on a sliding scale or as a flat fee, which would 
disfavour the low-income groups (Atim, 1998; Criel, 1998). Some schemes in West Africa 
reportedly set separate premium rates for men and women, with the latter paying 
relatively low premiums (Atim, 1998). Another measure taken to ensure equity is 
enrolment of households instead of individuals. This would ensure that all household 
members have a chance to access health care when they need it, instead of being 
restricted according to age, sex or other differences at household level. In a few cases, 
systematic exemptions targeted at the very poor are adopted. For example, in Rwanda, 
government exempts the genocide survivors from payment (Musango et al, 2006), while 
in Benin, a health fund was set up for the handicapped and the elderly (Atim, 1998).  
 
Efficiency measures the optimal use of resources, including health services. The extent to 
which a scheme can minimize abuse of its services will have a direct bearing on its 
viability. According to Atim (1998), key issues to consider include risk management 
techniques adopted, mechanism of service provider payment, and benefits packages. The 
common risks identified among CHIs include moral hazard (unnecessary use of services 
by the insured), adverse selection (where the scheme attracts high risk individuals more 
than lower risk ones), cost escalation (rising costs related to the behaviour of both the 
provider and the patient), fraud and abuse (through false identity and other forms of free 
riding). Thus, risk management covers a range of strategies that the scheme 
administration will deploy to minimize the impact of the above risks. Various authors 
(Atim, 1998; Criel, 1998; Jutting, 2001; Bjorn, 2004) recommend common strategies that 
should be applied to minimize risks such as co-payments or deductibles; a mandatory 
referral system to avoid unnecessary use of higher-level health services; household or 
group coverage to reduce adverse selection; and the institution of waiting periods after 
subscription. If the risk management techniques are not effectively applied, then the 
schemes’ viability in the long term is questionable. However, if they are too rigidly 
applied, the techniques can outweigh the very essence and objective of CHI by denying 
access to those who need the service most. For example, co-payments can become an 
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equivalent of OOP user fees, and they may thus become a bottleneck to accessing health 
care for poor households. 
 
With regard to sustainability, it is necessary to look at the institutional setup, the 
administrative and managerial capacity as well as financial performance indicators 
(Atim, 1998). The volume of prepaid health insurance contributions is important not only 
in securing access but also in offsetting treatment costs, so that the health systems’ 
resources are not depleted in the short run. The ratio of prepaid contributions (including 
premiums, government subsidies and grants from donors) to total health care costs needs 
to be evaluated in order to determine the degree of sustainability of the scheme (Carrin et 
al, 2005). However, care must be taken not to emphasize financial efficiency at the 
expense of improving access to health care for poor households. According to Ranson 
(2002) and Schmidt et al (2006), a trade-off exists between maintaining the schemes’ 
financial viability and protecting members from catastrophic health expenditures. In an 
attempt to maximize health revenues, participation in CHI across all socio-economic 
categories could be compromised.  
2.5 Community Health Insurance: Related Literature 
CHI is being recognised as an option in responding to the constraints faced by countries 
in ensuring effective access to health care as well as extending financial risk protection to 
their populations (Hsiao, 2001; Khetrapal, 2004; McInytre et al, 2005; McInytre, 2007). CHI 
is a common denominator for voluntary health insurance schemes organised at 
community level (Carrin et al, 2005). The schemes are variously referred to as micro 
insurance schemes, community health funds, Mutual Health Organisations (MHO), rural 
health insurance, medical aid schemes or societies, and revolving drug funds (Carrin et 
al, 2005).The main features of CHI include: voluntary enrolment, non-profit motive, 
active involvement of the community in management, risk pooling, resource allocation 
and access to health services (Atim, 1998; Musau, 1999; Preker et al, 2002). According to 
various authors (Preker et al, 2002; Devadasan, 2004) the goal of CHI is to increase access 
to health care by reducing financial barriers. The following section reviews some of the 
related literature on CHI including, among others, its evolution, design, strengths, 
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enabling factors and threats to its viability. The issue of CHI in the context of a free health 
care policy is also briefly debated. 
2.5.1 Evolution of Community Health Insurance  
Community health insurance (CHI) can be traced back to the 19th century industrial 
revolution in Europe, which led to massive urbanisation and formal employment in 
factories. In Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, new labour migrants had limited 
access to health care, so they pooled resources every week to establish a sickness fund 
that would meet the cost of treatment for the sick (Devadasan, 2004). These evolved into 
the current social health insurance schemes in these countries and set the stage for other 
CHI programs. CHIs are currently operating in a number of countries, including, Japan, 
India, Thailand, China, Senegal, Ghana, and Rwanda among others. Preker et al (2002) 
attribute this emerging alternative to inadequacies in the government health care delivery 
to the poor. Criel et al (2004) argue that the rationale for CHI lies in the strong need for 
quality health care as well as the success of social health insurance in Western Europe, 
which actually began as small community based health insurance schemes. According 
Criel et al, this experience suggests that the financing of health care through pooling of 
resources and risk sharing may constitute a relevant policy option for African health care 
systems. Preker & Carrin (2004) link the evolution of CHI in the 20th century to severe 
economic constraints, political instability and lack of good governance in most 
developing countries. The authors further explain that due to weak taxation capacity and 
the absence of formal mechanisms of social protection for vulnerable populations, 
community involvement in health care financing is unavoidable.  
 
In Africa, the evolution of CHI schemes is linked to the 1987 WHO health sector reform 
strategy of Primary Health Care (PHC) and the decentralization of health services to local 
levels. Key aspects of this new approach to health care included community participation 
in the management of local health facilities and the use of fees to improve drug supply 
(Atim, 1998). The policy of user fees, however, became increasingly unpopular due to 
concerns over equity in access to health services, especially for the poor (Burnham et al, 
2004; Deininger & Mpuga, 2004; Nabyonga et al, 2005). During the same period, there 
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was widespread growth of grassroots organisations and the development of civil society 
in many African countries. This created an environment for autonomous grassroots 
responses to the problems that people were facing, including access to quality health care. 
Other authors (Preker et al, 2001; Khetrapal, 2004; Carrin et al, 2005; Kalk et al 2005) link 
the emergence of CHIs to the difficulties in achieving universal health coverage through 
general taxation. Khetrapal (2004), for example, argues that in many countries where the 
government funds and provides free or nearly free services for the populace, the poor 
often do not utilize those public health services. Instead, households use their meagre 
income to pay for services and drugs from the private sector. According to the author, the 
concept of CHI has emerged in this context. 
 
In West Africa, where CHI schemes are most common, they take the form of Mutual 
Health Organisations (MHO). They are often characterized by an ethic of mutual aid and 
grow out of already existing community associations, which were initially set up to 
provide members with a wide range of (informal) social security benefits, such as funeral 
grants, marriage and birth allowances as well as retirement benefits (Atim, 1998; Preker et 
al, 2002; Jutting, 2004). Thus health care becomes an additional area of need to be covered. 
This latter need (health care) is unique because, unlike the former, it is highly 
unpredictable. This has called for special arrangements where, instead of individual 
savings and benefits in the ordinary mutual aid, risk sharing as well as pooling of 
resources is required. Hence, CHI works on the principle of insurance, where the risk is 
spread and the cost of health care in the event of illness is transferred from the healthy to 
the sick, within the same pool. 
 
The East and Central African region is slowly picking up the concept of CHI. Examples of 
countries that have relatively developed CHI schemes include the DRC and Rwanda. In 
the DRC, one of the most successful and oldest CHIs, the Bwamanda hospital health 
insurance, was established by the local Catholic mission in 1986. During the first month 
32,600 people (28% of the target population) joined (Criel et al, 1998). By 1993, 
membership had grown to 66% of the target population. In Rwanda, the voluntary CHI 
system exists alongside the official institutionalised Rwandese health insurance, which is 
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run by the state for civil servants. The state also runs a compulsory mutual health 
insurance for the army, which is contributory. The prisoners and genocide survivors 
receive free health care. Kalk et al (2005) note that Rwanda considered CHI as a means of 
improving the financing deficit in the health sector, especially at health centre level. The 
authors argue that the schemes are able to pool their risks, and that they have improved 
financial access to health services. Currently about 37% of the country’s population is 
enrolled in these CHI schemes. It is important to note that 60.4% of Rwanda’s population 
live below the poverty line (Musango et al, 2006). This suggests that CHI can actually 
exist in the context of low incomes. Just like in the DRC and Uganda, there is a significant 
presence of the PNFP sector engaged in health service provision as well as in the 
initiation of these schemes. 
 
In Uganda, the concept of health insurance is relatively new. As an option for health 
financing, it was first proposed in the recommendations of the health policy review 
commission in 1987 (Uganda, 1987). In 1995, the MoH through the CHF project launched 
the first CHI scheme at Kisiizi hospital, a PNFP facility in Rukungiri district, 
southwestern Uganda (Section 1.3: 17). These schemes have continued to exist and new 
ones have been established even after the government abolished user fees and adopted 
free health care in all government health facilities. The schemes exist under an umbrella 
NGO, the Uganda Community Based Health Financing Association (UCBHFA). The 
association provides technical support, funding for operational costs, and training of 
staff, and to a limited extent, covers losses incurred by the schemes in their early years of 
operation. The MoH is effectively represented on the board of this association, indicating 
continuing partnership and support of the association’s objective and strategy. Other key 
promoters of CHI in Uganda include Health Partners and Microcare. Health Partners, a 
USAID project, runs a distinct Health Cooperative Society, while Microcare (a health 
insurance company) coordinates a number of schemes in different parts of the country. 
Examples of active CHIs in Uganda include Kisiizi health insurance scheme, Nyakibale 
prepayment scheme, Comboni hospital health plan, Kiwoko Hospital Save for Life, 
Kitovu prepayment scheme, Mutolere hospital health scheme, School Health Made Easy, 
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Health group (scheme), Ishaka prepayment scheme, and Mother Care Rescue scheme 
(UCBHFA, 2005).  
 
2.5.2 Design of Community Health Insurance Schemes 
The major feature of CHI schemes is that they involve prepaid, regular contributions into 
a pool that are then used to cover the cost of health care for those who fall sick and seek 
treatment. They are different from individual savings in that they involve risk sharing 
and resource pooling. Benefits are paid according to need and not according to 
contribution. The basic form of organisation is indicated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: How CHI schemes operate: the basic model 
 
 
Services Provided 
 
 
                         Premiums Paid               Provider Payment 
 
 
Source: Bennett, 2004 
 
As indicated in Figure 4, households enrolled in a scheme pay premiums to the CHI fund 
or pool. The scheme in turn pays health care providers for services and these providers 
offer health services as agreed upon to the members of the scheme.  
 
2.5.2.1 Organisational Model 
According to the literature (Atim, 1999; Arhin-Tenkorang, 2001; Devadasan, 2004; 
Devadasan et al, 2004b), three major types of organisational models for CHI can be 
identified, namely, the provider model, the insurer model and the linked model.  
 
 
Scheme 
Members/Patients 
Hospitals 
Primary Care 
Providers 
Community Health 
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a) The Provider Model 
This is where the scheme is initiated and managed by a health facility, usually a hospital. 
The health facility collects premiums from the subscribers and at the same time provides 
health care at either no cost or minimal co-payment at the time of receipt of service. An 
example is the Bwamanda hospital scheme in the DRC (Criel et al, 1999). Proponents of 
the provider model (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2001; Chirmulay & Devadasan, 2006) argue that 
the integration of insurance management and health care provision creates a strong 
motivation for health promotion and preventive health care in order to limit benefit 
claims and keep the costs low. In addition, the quality of care is usually of a level that is 
acceptable to the community. However, other authors (Atim, 1999; Tabor, 2005) have 
argued that, when CHIs are owned by health care providers, they tend to focus more on 
augmenting and sustaining health care revenues. This can in turn affect the acceptability 
of the scheme among community members. For example, Atim (1999) observes that the 
close association of Nkoranza community financing scheme in Ghana to Nkoranza 
hospital led to a belief within the community that the money collected would not be used 
to purchase drugs and equipment but rather to maximize the hospital’s surplus income. 
The author argues, too, that, since under the provider model, the management of the 
scheme is not distinct from that of the hospital, the possible cost reduction and efficiency 
that would result from negotiations between the purchaser and the seller are not 
available. Neither the quality of care nor the fees charged are negotiable. Chirmulay and 
Devadasan (2006) contend that hospitals usually have limited access to the community, 
and are furthermore not able to communicate with them effectively. Community 
aspirations are rarely expressed and met, since the hospital is in charge and in most cases 
technocratic. This, according to the authors, makes the provider model of CHI socially 
weak much as it may appear technically and administratively sound. Basaza et al (2008) 
in a similar tone posit that the model makes it difficult to utilize primary care facilities, 
since services are commonly provided at hospital level. This not only threatens the 
viability of the scheme, but also signifies inefficient resource use in the broader health 
system.  
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b) The Insurer Model 
This refers to an arrangement where premiums are collected and paid to an independent 
organisation, normally an NGO or micro finance institution or a local cooperative society. 
Members then seek health care from any health facility, and the intermediary 
organisation pays the bills. The Health Cooperatives in Uganda, run by Health Partners, 
is an example of such a model. Tabor (2005) contends that this kind of model facilitates 
growth in membership, since the other non-insurance activities of the organisation can 
attract community participation. Other authors (Chirmulay & Devadasan, 2006) argue 
that the model has more advantages than the provider model in developing the scheme 
in line with the community’s needs. NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) 
usually have a closer relationship with the community than, for example, a private 
insurance company because they operate at grassroots level. Other proponents of the 
insurer model, such as Bennett et al (1998), argue that it encourages the development of 
vertical bridging linkages, which are essential for capacity building. Local communities 
are able to link up with NGOs and other institutions, which strengthens their capacity as 
well as the sustainability of interventions. Devadasan et al (2004a) contend that the NGO 
is able to counter the power of the provider, since it is able to engage in negotiations on 
behalf of the members. The shortcoming of the model is that it may not maximize 
community participation, and consequently the community has less control over the costs 
(Chirmulay & Devadasan, 2006). 
 
c) The Linked Model 
This is where the intermediary organisation collects premiums and passes them on to an 
insurance company. Members seek health care from a number of providers, pay the bills 
and then submit the receipts to the insurance company via the intermediary organisation 
for reimbursement. One of the advantages of this model is that it encourages risk sharing 
on a large scale, since smaller risk pools are merged with the larger ones of the insurance 
company (Chirmulay & Devadasan, 2006). Chirmulay & Devadasan (2006) note that its 
major disadvantage is that the benefits package is inflexible and not aligned to the needs 
of the local community. It is normally run like the traditional medical claim policy with 
its exclusions and limitations. The model also has limited affordability, since the 
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premium is set by the insurance company on an actuarial basis and is therefore not 
aligned to the ability of the local community. It also retains OOP spending, since the 
patient is only reimbursed for the cost of health care. 
 
2.5.2.2 Other Aspects of CHI Design 
Other key aspects in the design of CHIs include eligibility and enrolment criteria, 
premium levels and mode of payment, benefits package, and level of community 
participation. Legal and institutional frameworks are also important in the design of the 
schemes. 
 
a)  Eligibility and Enrolment 
The unit of enrolment can be an individual, a household or a group (Atim, 1998; Carrin et 
al, 2005; Musango et al, 2006). The literature (Carrin, 2003; Khetrapal, 2004) indicates that 
most CHI schemes are based on household enrolment. Households are registered as a 
unit and not as individual members. Where there is group enrolment, different 
households come together and register as a group, but the costing unit remains the 
household. A certain minimum percentage of the group must have paid their premiums 
in order for the group to be registered. Various authors (Atim, 1998; Carrin, 2003; 
Chirmulay & Devadasan, 2006) defend this practice because it minimizes adverse 
selection. Adverse selection refers to a situation where high risk members of the 
community have a higher probability of enrolling in the scheme than low risk ones. This 
may lead to faster depletion of finances, which in turn affects the sustainability of the 
scheme. Chirmulay and Devadasan (2006) argue that, when households are enrolled, 
both the healthy and the sick join, which leads to cross-subsidization within the scheme. 
Carrin (2003) advises that, in reviewing CHI schemes, it is important to assess whether 
the scheme is accessible across different population groups. With regard to this, a study 
commissioned by the WHO (Bennett et al, 1998) concluded that very few CHIs reach the 
most vulnerable populations. 
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b)  Premium Rates 
A premium is the payment made for insurance. While the basic principle is that the 
premium should be affordable (Government of India, 2007), other factors need to be 
taken into account in the setting of premiums for CHI, namely, the cost of the benefits 
package, the degree of risk, and the approximate administrative costs. Premiums can be 
either risk rated or community rated. Conversely, they can be set on a flat rate, where 
every household makes the same contribution, or on a sliding scale, where the 
contribution matches the income and socio-economic status of the household. 
Community rating refers to a policy in which the premiums are related to the risk of the 
group in totality (Criel & Kegels, 1997) and also take into account the average incomes of 
the community in order to ensure affordability and minimize social exclusion (Chirmulay 
& Devadasan, 2006). Most research on CHI has indicated that appropriate premium rates 
are community rated (Atim, 1998; Criel, 1998; Khetrapal, 2004; Dong et al, 2005; Kalk et al, 
2005; Chirmulay & Devadasan, 2006) as opposed to the conventional practice in private 
health insurance, where premiums are related to the amount of risk, such as the age of 
the target beneficiary. Chirmulay & Devadasan (2006) contend that, whereas the ideal 
would be to have income rated premiums, in a rural setting, it is difficult to assess 
income. Therefore, a community rated premium, where everybody pays a flat rate, 
should be adopted. The downside of community rated premiums, however, as argued by 
Criel and Kegels (1997), is that they may discourage people of low risk from joining the 
scheme, while encouraging high risk individuals to join, since they know that they will be 
cross-subsidized. 
 
According to Khetrapal (2004), the use of flat rate premiums eases the procedure for 
revenue collection, reduces scope for manipulation, and contributes to low transactional 
costs. However, other studies (Atim, 1998; Criel et al, 1998; Acharya & Ranson, 2005; 
Dong et al, 2005) highlight the fact that these rates are regressive, since they do not take 
into account the differences in the socio-economic profiles of community members. 
Hence, they disfavour poor households who have to pay a higher proportion of their 
income as premium. A sliding scale system, where different rates are set for different 
socio-economic categories in the population, is believed to contribute to equity (Atim, 
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1998; Criel, 1998; Dong et al, 2005). The categories can be age, sex, observed wealth index 
of a household, household size and geographical distance to the provider. In terms of the 
mode of payment, cash or in-kind payments are the two options. Whereas the former are 
the most common mode of payment, in-kind premium payment has been reported. 
Research on the Bwamanda scheme in the DRC (Criel & Kegels, 1997; Hope, 2003) 
indicates, for example, that subscribers can pay in the form of agricultural produce such 
as potatoes. While acknowledging the difficulties in handling in-kind payments, 
Chirmulay and Devadasan (2006) advocate this option for rural areas, where subsistent 
economies are the norm and households hardly have any ready cash.  
 
c) Benefits Package  
This refers to a list of services to which the beneficiaries of an insurance scheme are 
entitled. It includes both the services and the means of accessing these services, for which 
the purchaser will pay from the pooled funds (Kutzin, 2001). Bennett (2004) suggests that 
the effective degree of risk protection offered by an individual CHI scheme depends 
upon the extent to which the benefits package offered covers comprehensive services, 
particularly higher cost services. The choice of the benefits package depends on a number 
of factors, namely, the needs of the community, the cost of the package and whether it is 
affordable for the target population, the administrative burden in delivering the package 
and the availability of these services (Government of India, 2007). Dror’s work (2006) 
demonstrates that even the poor, illiterate, rural population are able to make judicious 
decisions about the benefits package and should therefore be involved in its design.  
 
In-patient care has been seen as the most likely to lead to catastrophic health 
expenditures for the household, and it should therefore be prioritized in the benefits 
package (Carrin, 2003). However, Dror (2006) and Dror et al (2007) in a study of CHI in 
India contend that the aggregate cost of drugs and in-patient care does not actually differ. 
Whereas in-patient care is rare and expensive, out-patient care and drugs, which are 
more frequent, may in the end cost as much. As a result, the authors support a basic 
benefits package that covers both out-patient care (drugs, consultations and tests) as well 
as in-patient care. Other authors (Gumber & Kulkan, 2000; Kutzin, 2001; Preker & Carrin, 
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2004; Chirmulay & Devadasan, 2006) similarly argue that a benefits package that covers 
both in-patient and out-patient care is more acceptable to the community and should 
therefore be aimed at.  In addition, adding some elements of primary care to the package 
helps to demonstrate the advantages of scheme membership as well as to encourage 
members to seek early treatment (Tabor, 2005; Dror et al, 2007). 
 
From the above section, it is clear that the benefits package is an important aspect of 
scheme design, because it makes the scheme either attractive or unattractive; hence, will 
affect enrolment and the overall viability of the CHI scheme. However, if it is not 
carefully designed, it could lead to high escalation of costs and render the scheme 
financially unsustainable. 
2.5.3  Strengths of Community Health Insurance 
Studies done mainly in West Africa (Atim, 1998; Jutting, 2001; Musango et al, 2006) and 
Asia (Devadasan, 2004; Devadasan et al, 2004a,b, 2006, 2007) indicate that CHI improves 
access by rural and informal sector workers to much-needed health care and provides 
them with some financial protection against the cost of illness. Jutting (2001) observed, 
for example, that in Senegal, members of a MHO had better access to health care than 
non-members. Preker et al (2002), in an intensive literature review on CHI, also note that 
in Bangladesh, CHI enabled marginalised sections of the population to access quality 
health care through the Dhaka community hospital health insurance program. Similarly, 
in Rwanda, where CHIs have been embraced, health care utilization has almost 
quadrupled even among the low socio-economic categories of the population (Musango 
et al, 2006), underscoring the potential of CHI to increase access to health care. Ranson 
(2002) argues that prepayment (even in the absence of risk pooling) can facilitate access to 
expensive medical care, because it spreads costs over time and prevents people from 
paying at the time of treatment. By pooling resources, health insurance schemes can 
improve equity of access to health care. Carrin et al (2001, cited in Carrin et al, 2005) 
argue that risk pooling allows for transfers from low-risk to high-risk members and from 
wealthier to poorer members. This contrasts with the case of non-insurance where poor 
households have to bear the full burden of the health care cost. The argument presumes, 
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however, that coverage is extensive and that there is equity in enrolment in CHI schemes. 
In some cases, however, CHI may attract only the relatively well-off or only the sick and 
poorer members of the community, hence negating the advantage of risk pooling.  
 
Another common strength of CHI cited in literature (Preker et al, 2001; Ranson, 2002; 
Ahuja & Jutting, 2004; Wang et al, 2005; Devadasan & Nandraj, 2006) is its ability to offer 
financial protection against the cost of illness. On the basis of this, some (Ranson, 2002; 
Ahuja & Jutting, 2004; Wang et al, 2005) have argued that CHI should not only be 
promoted as a tool for increasing access to health care but also be viewed as an integral 
part of any poverty alleviation program. Ranson (2002) and Wang et al (2005) observe 
that poverty due to illness poses a significant social problem in rural areas and that the 
prepayment features of CHI would protect households from further impoverishment. 
Research in mainly India (Carrin, 2003; Devadasan et al, 2005a, 2007) found significant 
reduction in catastrophic health expenditures among insured households as compared to 
non-insured households. Authors (cf. Carrin, 2003) attribute this financial protection to 
the high prepayment ratio associated with CHI as well as to a benefits package that 
includes costly in-patient care.  
 
It has also been argued that CHI can help to increase health awareness and disease 
prevention through education, nutrition and self-help training (Atim, 1998). This is linked 
to the fact that CHI encourages community participation, and that it stirs up the interest 
of the community in the affairs that concern their health and wellbeing. According Atim, 
CHI represents community participation in health, which is a platform for influencing the 
priorities, resource allocation decisions and responsiveness of the health authorities to the 
concerns of the population on such issues as waiting time at the health centre, staff 
behaviour, and quality of services. In a related argument, other authors (Chirmulay & 
Devadasan, 2006; Ndiaye et al, 2007) point out that CHI has the potential to empower 
local communities to demand improvements in the quality of health care. This potential 
function is however limited by a lack of technical capacity, a lack of information on the 
health system, and in some cases inadequate participatory political culture. Golooba-
Mutebi (2005), in a study of decentralization and popular participation in Uganda, argues 
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that community participation in social service delivery can only bear fruit when the 
public is not only well informed but where the political environment encourages a 
culture of freedom of expression, a situation that is lacking in most countries of Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
2.5.4 Enabling Factors in the Adoption of Community Health Insurance 
Affordability of premiums is one of the key facilitating factors for effective adoption of 
CHI. It is also linked to the wealth and income levels of the community. Premiums that 
are set at community rates, bearing in mind what the community regards as affordable, 
will facilitate higher enrolment of members and thus contribute to the scheme’s viability. 
In addition, the timing of premium collection matters. Bennett et al (1998) suggest that it 
is better to collect annual contributions during the time of harvest in rural areas, given the 
seasonality of their incomes. Conversely, monthly payments may create difficulties for 
households with seasonal income. Khetrapal (2004) suggests that a flexible payment 
schedule, which allows poorer households to pay in instalments, can improve enrolment. 
 
Provision of subsidies to the poor to reduce the amount of premiums to affordable levels 
is another opportunity to improve the viability of CHIs. Preker et al (2002) argue that, 
although income may be a key constraint to participation by the poor, they are willing to 
participate with some level of subsidy. These subsidies could come from government or 
charities. In Senegal, for instance, donors pay subscriptions for street children while in 
Benin, a solidarity fund was set up for the aged and the disabled (Atim, 1998). It is 
recognised that members’ contributions normally set at community level may not be 
enough to cover the cost of illness, calling for a need to subsidise the schemes. Kalk et al 
(2005) argue that the subsidies are justifiable, basing this on the same principle applied in 
voluntary private health insurance where the employee contributes only a percentage 
and the employer contributes to the employee’s premium (normally higher than what the 
employee contributes). It should be noted, however, that the lack of sustainability of this 
kind of support to the schemes poses a challenge for their successful long-term viability. 
Other authors (Ahuja & Jutting, 2004) contend that subsidizing premiums can potentially 
aggravate problems of moral hazard. The authors argue that the more appropriate 
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intervention to generate demand for CHI is to ease access to saving and credit facilities 
for the poor. In this way, they would be able to afford premiums.  
 
Another enabling factor in the viability of CHI is the availability of good quality health 
care. A number of studies (Alderman & Lavy, 1996; Atim, 1998; Criel & Waelkens, 2003; 
Jutting, 2004) have indicated that even relatively poor people are willing to pay for good 
quality health services. In an evaluative study of the Maliando health scheme in Guinea 
Conakry (Criel & Waelkens, 2003), members and non-members of the scheme expressed a 
willingness to enrol in the scheme if that would assure them of access to good quality 
health care. They referred to rapid recovery, a welcoming reception at the health centre, 
the availability of health officers and drugs as some of the most important features of 
quality. Similarly, in a rural setting in India, people expressed a willingness to pay for 
good quality health services instead of the poor quality government services 
(Mathiyazhagan, 1998). In contrast, a study done in Guinea-Conakry (Criel et al, 2002 
cited in Carrin, 2003) indicates that people preferred not to enrol in CHI but to seek care 
from elsewhere due to the poor quality care provided through the scheme. In view of the 
above arguments, Jutting (2004) cautions that the quality of institutions providing health 
services should be analysed in-depth before introducing health insurance for the poor. 
 
Design features of the scheme are also cited as enabling factors for its success. Preker et al 
(2002) argue that design characteristics can significantly affect the achievement of good 
targeting and equity by CHI schemes, just as they matter for large-scale public 
expenditure programmes. For example, the unit of enrolment can either lead to social 
exclusion or inclusion where even the poor gain access to health care. In a study of 
Rwanda’s health insurance (Schneider & Diop, 2001) it was found that large families with 
more than five members had a greater probability to enrol in CHIs than smaller families. 
The explanation was that premiums were kept flat irrespective of household size up to 
seven members, making the average contribution per household member less for the 
bigger households. In a number of other studies, however, (Criel & Waelkens, 2003; 
Jutting, 2004,) large family size is noted to increase contributions and becomes a 
hindrance to enrolling in CHI schemes. Other aspects of the design, such as the timing 
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and nature of premiums may also affect the success of CHI. Ahuja and Jutting (2004), for 
example, argue that flexibility in premium payment, where small amounts are collected 
more often, and where both cash and in-kind payments are allowed, increases the 
viability of the scheme. 
 
The viability of CHI may also be dependent upon geographical access to health care 
providers. Carrin et al (2005) argue that geographical proximity enhances information 
flow and is therefore likely to help voluntary risk sharing arrangements. Schneider and 
Diop (2001) relate proximity to development of trust in the provider. In their study of 
Rwanda’s health insurance schemes, Schneider and Diop (2001) document that 
households who lived less than 30 minutes from the participating health facility had a 
much larger probability to enrol in CHI than those who lived further away. They argue 
that those who live closer to the health care provider are more likely to know its 
personnel, and that they are therefore better informed about prepayment. This builds 
their confidence and increases their level of enrolment. Another dimension of 
geographical access involves the non-health related costs associated with distance and 
time taken to reach the provider (Jakab & Krishnan, 2001). The indirect costs of travel and 
time in a rural area may outweigh the direct costs of hospitalization. Hence, the scheme 
will be neither attractive nor helpful to those living far away from the providers. Some 
measures introduced in some schemes to reduce the impact of distance on enrolment 
include a sliding scale of co-payments where those farther off pay relatively lower costs 
than those nearby (Bennett et al, 1998). But still this may not improve access due to the 
travel costs. 
 
Preker et al (2002) contend that CHI schemes benefit from their connections with the 
overall welfare of the society in which they operate, including the system of public 
financing and the broader social policy underpinning the national health system. Such 
connections broaden the enrolment and operating capacity of the scheme and offset the 
disadvantages of privately run services to the population or community particularly 
efficiency and equity. Dror (2001) similarly argues that the viability of CHI schemes 
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depends on their linkage to another larger entity through social reinsurance (i.e. transfer 
of liability from a primary insurer to another non-profit insurance company). 
 
The level of community involvement has also been cited as a facilitating factor in the 
effectiveness of CHI. People are more likely to enrol if they have been involved in the 
design and management of the scheme and if benefits relate directly to their health 
priorities or problems (Preker et al, 2002; Baltussen et al, 2006). The opportunity here lies 
in the fact that CHIs operate at community level, which should make it easier to involve 
community members in the planning and overseeing of the scheme. This creates 
confidence and a sense of ownership of the scheme, thus attracting more membership. 
2.5.5 Hindrances to the Viability of Community Health Insurance 
According to various authors (Preker et al, 2002; Criel et al, 2004; Basaza et al, 2007, 2008), 
CHI in Africa still has limited success. Where the schemes have been introduced, only a 
limited number of households have joined. In Guinea Conakry, West Africa, the 
Maliando scheme only attracted 8% of the target population in the first year and 
subscriptions dropped to 6% in the second year (Criel & Waelkens, 2003). Research on 
this particular scheme showed that a failure to understand the concept of insurance did 
not explain low rates of enrolment. The target population understood health insurance 
principles and concepts (Criel & Waelkens, 2003). Furthermore, there does not seem to be 
sufficient evidence to link low enrolment rates to massive poverty and low household 
incomes in rural communities in Africa. For example, in Rwanda, with over 60% of the 
population living below the poverty line (Schmidt et al, 2006), CHI has been adopted 
with relative success, with over 37% of the population covered after about 7 years of 
existence (Diop & Butera, 2005; Musango, et al, 2006).  
 
 Criel et al (2004) contend that the success or failure of CHI cannot be dissociated from the 
context in which the scheme is developed. Their argument is based on the ‘context-
mechanism-outcome’ complex, developed by Pawson and Tilly (1997, cited in Criel et al, 
2004). The model attempts to show that there is no linear relationship between 
intervention and outcome in complex social interventions. It is therefore pertinent to 
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analyse and understand the factors within a given context that lead to the success or 
failure of a scheme before it can be recommended as a best practice to be replicated 
elsewhere. In line with this thinking, some authors (Dror, 2001) relate the limited interest 
in health insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa to differences in attitude that households in the 
industrialized world and Africa hold in relation to the notion of risk. It is assumed that 
Africans are less risk averse, i.e. not interested in investing today in order to avoid future 
health care expenditure. It is also assumed that they are reluctant to be involved in risk 
pooling that goes beyond the traditional boundaries of family, clan or ethnic group. This 
assumption is challenged by the findings from the Maliando MHO in Guinea Conakry 
(Jutting, 2004), where the population understood and appreciated the notion of insurance 
and risk sharing. According to this particular study, the people appreciate the schemes’ 
re-distributive effects, which operate on a scale that goes beyond village or next of kin. 
Thus, the socio-economic contexts in which health services are provided as well as other 
social dynamics in the environment need to be taken into account when assessing CHI. 
 
Obstacles related to scheme design could hamper the viability of CHI. Some of the 
commonly cited problems include adverse selection, moral hazard, cost escalation and 
fraud and abuse (Atim, 1998). With regard to adverse selection, if the greater majority of 
those joining the scheme are people with recurring health problems, then the scheme’s 
resources will be quickly depleted, making it insolvent. However, from the equity 
perspective, it serves the health system’s objective of providing care according to need. 
Atim (1998) recommends the adoption of risk minimizing techniques, such as enrolling 
households or groups instead of individuals, and the institution of waiting periods after 
subscription to discourage members from joining only after they have fallen ill. Moral 
hazard is the tendency of those insured to use services more intensively than they would 
if they were not insured (Atim, 1998). This over-consumption, which is sometimes 
unnecessary, can impair the financial viability of the scheme. For example, moral hazard 
was reported in the Bwamanda hospital scheme in the DRC (Criel et al, 1999). To 
minimize this, some schemes institute co-payments and mandatory referrals so that 
members do not skip the PHC providers for hospital services, which may result in misuse 
of resources for the health system.  
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Another potential hindrance to the viability of CHI in increasing access to health care is 
the use of traditional medicine/healers. Traditional medicine refers to ways of protecting 
and restoring health, which existed before the arrival of modern medicine. Traditional 
medicine is defined as the sum total of all knowledge and practices, which are used in the 
prevention, diagnosis and elimination of physical, mental or social imbalances, and 
which rely exclusively on practical experience and observation handed down from 
generation to generation (Akerel, 1984 cited in Sekaya et al, 2004). Methods used in 
traditional healing are based on social, cultural and religious backgrounds as well as on 
the knowledge, attitudes and beliefs that are prevalent in the community regarding 
physical, mental and social wellbeing and the causes of disease and disability. According 
to a report of the International Council for Science (the ICS regional office for Africa), 
over 80% of the African population depend on traditional medicine for its health needs 
(Parker et al, 2006). The report relates this trend to the fact that traditional medicine is 
often the only type of health care that is readily available. In Uganda, use of traditional 
medicine is prevalent just like in the rest of the Africa region. Bodeker et al (2006) 
estimate the ratio of traditional medicine practitioners to the population at 1:200-400, 
compared to the doctor–population ratio of 1:20,000 (which increases to 1:50,000 in the 
rural areas). Apart from easy access, use of traditional medicine is linked to cultural 
preference as well as the perceived inadequacy of services provided by the formal sector 
(Ndyomugyenyi, et al, 1998). In general, if people in a given community have a higher 
probability and preference for using traditional medicine, then there will be challenges in 
promoting a strategy that is directly linked to access and use of formal health services. 
Thus, a high level of use of traditional medicine among members and non-members of 
CHI is a potential hindrance to the viability of CHI. 
2.6 Community Health Insurance in the Context of Free Health Services 
Most of the advocacy for CHI occurs in contexts where user fees are charged, for 
example, in most parts of West and Central Africa and in some countries in East Africa, 
such as Tanzania and Rwanda (Criel & Waelkens, 2003; Mwabu et al, 2003; Schellenberg 
et al, 2003; Bennett, 2004; Kalk et al, 2005). Uganda’s context is unique in that the official 
policy is the provision of free health care in all government health facilities. Such access 
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to free health services may act as a disincentive for households to participate in risk 
pooling schemes (Baeza & Packard, 2007). How then can one promote CHI, which 
involves payment, when the population has an option of free health care? To answer this 
question, it is important to take note of the health services structure in Uganda, especially 
the key health service providers who include not only government but private providers 
too (Section 1.2.4: 9). PNFP providers, in particular, play a significant role in the provision 
of health services in the country. This role dates back to the pre-independence period 
(Sembojja & Therkildsen, 1995). They normally complement or fill the gap left by 
inadequate government provision in social services as a whole.  
 
Despite the re-introduction of free health services in 2001, both the PFP and the PNFP 
sectors have remained vibrant, with reports of increased utilization of services in the 
sectors corresponding to increased service utilization in government health facilities 
(Burnham et al, 2004; Nabyonga et al, 2005). In fact, the 2006 National Household Survey 
(UBOS, 2006) reported that the majority of people who fell sick in 2005/2006 sought 
treatment from private health service providers, and those who did not seek any medical 
attention gave financial cost and distance as the major barriers. As stated earlier (Section 
2.3.5: 37), OOP payments remain the predominant means of financing health care in 
Uganda despite the free health care policy. This underlines the fact that cost of health care 
is still a valid obstacle to health care access and utilization, even in the context of free 
health care. From the perspective of quality, the PNFP sector has traditionally been 
perceived as providing relatively better quality services than the state (Sembojja & 
Therkildsen, 1995; Atim, 1998). In Uganda, all CHI schemes operate in the PNFP sector. 
This sector offers a national minimum health care package as prescribed by the national 
health policy, thus removing any conflict of objective or strategy. 
 
Carrin (2003) argues that health systems that depend on government tax revenue have 
generally been constrained by insufficient funding, which renders service delivery 
inadequate, in terms of both quantity and quality. Other studies (Alderman & Lavy, 1996; 
Wagstaff, 2002; Bennett, 2004) have shown that people, including the poor, are willing to 
pay for better quality services rather than to receive poor quality free health care. For 
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example, in India, the government offers free health services to the population. In 
practice, however, the quality of government-provided services is considered poor and at 
the same time informal charges are widespread (Bennett, 2004; Devadasan et al, 2005a,b). 
As a result, patients resort to the private sector in search of better health care. It is due to 
this that CHI has emerged to assist in improving access to better quality care, while at the 
same time protecting against catastrophic spending. The Self-Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) in India is an example of a successful CHI scheme in the context of 
free government health services. The scheme allows members to seek private health care 
of relatively better quality (Ranson, 2002). 
 
From the aforementioned, it is clear that there can still be obstacles to accessing health 
care even in the context of a free health care policy. One of these obstacles is the 
continued use of OOP payments, from either the private or even the public sector, which 
makes it difficult for poor households and/or individuals to access health care. To 
minimize some of these financial obstacles, it is proposed that CHI is an appropriate 
strategy. 
2.7 Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model for the study of the viability of CHI takes into account the 
theoretical perspectives that underpin the study. The main variables for analysis include 
participation in CHI with a particular focus on the socio-economic characteristics of 
households that enrol and those that do not enrol in CHI. Most of these are derived from 
Andersen’s behavioural model of health services utilization (Section 2.2.4: 30). Other 
variables considered are household head characteristics, household size, wealth index, 
occupation status, and source of income and distance to the nearest health centre. These 
are used to measure the degree of social inclusiveness of the scheme. Utilization of health 
care (both modern and traditional), perceived quality of care and the cost of premiums 
are also considered. Specific aspects of the CHI design to be evaluated relate to the 
associated functions of health systems as reviewed in Kutzin’s framework for health 
financing arrangements, namely, revenue collection, resource/risk pooling, purchasing 
and the benefits package (Section 2.4.1: 40). The performance of CHI in terms of its 
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contribution to equity in access to health care, its efficiency and sustainability, are also 
examined. Figure 5 shows the detailed conceptual framework. 
 
Figure 5:  CHI and access to health care: a conceptual framework 
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The official policy of government is free health care in all government health facilities. 
Due to various constraints (Section 1.2.4.3: 15), the system does not meet the health care 
needs of the population. Because of this, a significant number of people still have to seek 
health care from private providers. In urban centres, there is a mix of PFP (mainly in form 
of doctor clinics) and PNFP providers. In the rural areas, the viable alternative source of 
formal health care is the PNFP providers, and these too charge user fees. In a bid to 
increase accessibility for rural households, some health facilities and other CBOs have 
come up with community based financing mechanisms; prominent among these is CHI. 
 
CHI is supposed to serve several functions, namely, revenue collection, resource and risk 
pooling, and purchasing and provision of services, and determining the benefits package. 
These in turn should contribute to equity of access to health care. The other two 
intermediate goals of CHI are financial efficiency and sustainability of the intervention. 
The nature of households enrolling or not enrolling in the scheme indicates whether the 
scheme is socially inclusive or not. Both demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
are crucial indicators of households and population subgroups reached by CHI. 
Determinants of the viability of CHI may include, among others, community perceptions 
(acceptability), affordability of premiums, physical accessibility of health services, quality 
of care, level of community solidarity, the legal and institutional framework and the level 
of use of traditional medicine. The expected output from CHI is increased access to health 
care by rural households. This should in turn contribute to the achievement of better 
health and better quality of life for such households. 
2.8 Issues Emerging from the Literature Review 
It is generally agreed in the literature that tax based financing (egalitarianism) is the most 
ideal and equitable mechanism of providing health care to the population. It was 
however also indicated that, due to weaknesses in government financed health care, 
alternatives have to be sought. CHI was proposed as an emerging alternative to realize 
improvements in access to health care, especially for populations outside the formal 
sector. The following issues emerge from the literature: 
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• Most literature on CHI is discussed in the context of health financing. The 
emphasis tends to be on CHI as an alternative health financing mechanism, 
viewed as a way of complementing meagre public resources. The area of interest 
of the current study is to discuss the potential of CHI in increasing access to health 
care for the rural households, and not necessarily as a significant contributor to the 
financing of the wider health system. The researcher subscribes to the view that 
the primary responsibility for financing health systems lies with the state. 
However, if CHI can lead to improvements in access to health care for rural 
households, then it is worth exploring and adopting. 
 
• Although a number of factors have been suggested for the low levels of enrolment 
prevalent in CHI schemes, there is little evidence to show that particular 
characteristics of the population either encourage or discourage enrolment and 
retention in CHIs. This study will critically examine the socio-economic profiles of 
members and non-members of a CHI scheme in order to understand their 
influence on enrolment.  
 
• Most CHI schemes reviewed in the literature exist in the context of user fees. The 
uniqueness of the present study is that it reviews the viability of CHI within an 
environment of free health care in public health facilities. Why CHI continues to 
exist when the population is presumed to have a cheaper or free option of public 
health services gives a unique dimension to this study. 
 
• Methodologically, most studies on CHI have tended to be qualitative in nature, 
describing experiences of the schemes. This study uses both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to assess the viability of CHI in extending healthcare to the 
rural households in Uganda. 
 
The next chapter (chapter three) explains the methodological approach and research 
process taken in conducting this study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
This chapter introduces the reader to the methodological approach to the study. It 
describes the research design, the study area and population, sample size and selection, 
research instruments, research assistants, data collection approach, data cleaning and 
editing, and data analysis. Research ethics and the limitations of the study are also 
discussed. 
3.2 Research Design 
A research design is a plan that “guides the investigator in the process of collecting, 
analyzing, and interpreting observations” (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992: 77-78, cited in 
Yin, 2003b: 21). It is the logical link between the data to be collected (and the conclusions 
to be drawn) to the initial questions of the study. This study adopted a case study design 
with regard to the area selected and the CHI scheme to be analysed. A case study is 
understood as: 
The intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is at least in part to 
shed light on a larger class of cases (population)… Researchers may choose to observe lots 
of cases superficially or a few cases more intensively. We gain a better understanding of the 
whole by focusing on a key part (Gerring, 2007: 20, 1) 
 
A case study is considered from a specified perspective and with a special interest. It is 
unique, one among others (Stake, 1995: 2) and always related to something general. Case 
studies may be descriptive or explanatory. They are often used as a pragmatic research tool 
in order to understand thoroughly the complexity of a given problem and to support 
decision making (Scholz & Tietje, 2002: 2, 5) 
 
Thus, a case study of Rukungiri district would be undertaken with a particular focus on 
Kisiizi health insurance as a CHI scheme in Uganda. This approach was deemed 
appropriate because the study sought to conduct an in-depth examination of CHI in an 
area where the scheme has existed for a comparatively long time (over ten years). Yin 
(2003b) has argued that the case study is the preferred strategy for investigating real life 
events in their natural settings because it captures both the phenomenon and its context. 
This approach was therefore well suited to understanding the phenomenon of CHI and 
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access to health care within the natural setting of the community in which it is being 
implemented. Scholars (Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Yin 2003b) distinguish between embedded 
case study and holistic case study designs. Embedded case studies (as opposed to holistic 
case studies) normally involve more than one unit or object of analysis and thus look at a 
multiplicity of evidence. This evidence is investigated at least partly in sub-units, which 
focus on different aspects of the case. The sub-units can often add significant 
opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case (Yin, 
2003b). Hence, this research has adopted an embedded case study approach in that it 
investigated not just the CHI scheme, but other aspects too, such as the households that 
enrol or do not enrol in the scheme and their respective characteristics. 
 
Consistent with case study research with its multiple sources of evidence (Scholz & Tietje, 
2002; Yin, 2003a, b), a mixed methodology approach was employed, where both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies were used in the execution of the study. 
Although this study could be primarily classified as a quantitative-descriptive design, it 
did involve some qualitative aspects in data collection, analysis and presentation. As 
various authors (Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Yin, 2003b) have argued, when findings, 
interpretations and conclusions are based on multiple sources, the case study data will be 
less prone to the quirks deriving from any single source, such as an inaccurate interview 
or a biased document.  
 
According to Burns (1997: 292), “quantitative methods count and measure occurrences in a 
given phenomenon.” Similarly, De Vos (2002: 142) characterises quantitative-descriptive 
designs “as often of a quantitative nature, requiring questionnaires as a data collection method. 
Respondents are ideally selected by means of randomized sampling methods.” Based on these 
definitions, 
• The current study used a random sample of respondents from two clusters of (a) 
members of the CHI scheme and  (b) non-members of the scheme; and 
• A pre-coded household questionnaire was used to collect data. 
• Part of the analysis involved counting and measuring the frequency of occurrence 
of different characteristics in the sampled population in order to draw conclusions. 
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Such quantitative methods were especially helpful in delineating the 
characteristics of households who are enrolled in the CHI scheme in contrast to 
those who are not, in order to draw conclusions on the question of equity of access 
to health care through CHI, among other objectives. 
• However, the study does not claim to provide a cause-and-effect relationship 
between key variables, since it did not use a case-control experimental design. 
 
The other facet of this design was its qualitative (exploratory) nature. “Qualitative methods 
attempt to capture and understand individual definitions, descriptions and meanings of events” 
(Burns, 1997: 292). They allow the researcher to explore the phenomenon being studied 
and to arrive at a detailed understanding. Hence, this aspect of the design was geared 
towards exploring the perceptions of community members and key informants (KI) with 
regard to CHI, gaining a deeper understanding of the findings, and providing an 
accurate explanation of the results obtained through the quantitative methods. The study 
design is graphically represented in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6:  Study design 
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The research design was conceptualized after an extensive literature review had been 
undertaken. This included, among other things, an analysis of Uganda’s health policy 
and available literature on CHI. The objectives of the study were then clearly defined in 
relation to the topic (Section 1.5: 21). Bearing in mind these objectives, a mixed 
methodology approach (quantitative and qualitative) was deemed the most appropriate 
for this study. 
3.3  Study Area and Population  
The district chosen for the study was Rukungiri, which is located in southwestern 
Uganda, about 400 km south-west of the capital, Kampala. Rukungiri covers an area of 
1,567 km2 and has a total population of 308,696 persons; with approximately 40,000 
households, (Uganda districts information handbook, 2007/2008). The area is 
predominantly rural with subsistence farming as the major economic activity. The district 
has the highest levels of malaria at 74.5% (UBOS, 2006), and lies within the southwestern 
region, which records the highest levels of child malnutrition (UBOS & Macro 
International, 2007). There is thus a significant need for effective health care. The district 
has only 2 hospitals, both of which are PNFP. It has 767 hospital beds, with a ratio of 1 
bed to 368 persons (UBOS, 2006). The district was purposely selected because it has one 
of the oldest CHI schemes in Uganda, namely, the Kisiizi health insurance scheme, which 
started in 1996 as a MoH CHF project (see Section 1.3: 17). The area is therefore likely to 
be information-rich in respect of the use or non-use of the CHI scheme. Rukungiri district 
is made up of two counties, namely, Rubabo and Rujumbura, with the longest operating 
scheme located in the former. Therefore, Rubabo County was deliberately selected as the 
more specific focus of study. The County has a total population of 132,000 people. The 
immediate catchment area for the Kisiizi scheme is Nyakishenyi sub-county (with 31,000 
people) and Nyarushanje sub-county (with 40,100 people). Hence, the estimated target 
population for the CHI scheme is 71,100 people (UBOS, 2007). The selected areas are 
shown in Map 2. 
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Map 2:  Map of Rukungiri district showing the study area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study sub-counties  
Source: Uganda districts information handbook 2007/2008.  
 
The local population of Rubabo County formed the study population. Both members and 
non-members of the CHI scheme in the local communities were regarded as part of the 
study population. Both men and women were included in order to mainstream gender in 
the CHI experience. Key persons from the MoH, the PNFP sector, the PFP sector, 
UCBHFA, CHI administration, and complementary and traditional medicine sector were 
also interviewed.  
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3.4  Sample Size and Selection  
3.4.1 Sample for the Household Survey 
The sample for the household survey was scientifically determined using the Kish (1965) 
formula. This formula is used when the survey population (N) is more than 10,000 
subjects14; and is best suited when the unit of analysis is the household and not 
individuals. The formula takes into account the amount of error that can be tolerated by 
the study and the proportion of the population with a particular characteristic. The aim is 
to maintain sufficient scientific rigor, reduce sampling errors and increase the possibility 
of drawing generalisations from the findings. The formula is as follows: 
 
n =z2 p (1-p)/e2 
Where 
n is the required sample size 
z is the probability lying outside the normal curve (standard normal deviate), normally 
set at 1.96 to correspond to the desired confidence level of 95%. 
e is the amount of tolerated error, set at 0.05 
p is the proportion of the population with a particular characteristic, set at 0.2. It was 
assumed that 20% of the population are exposed to community health insurance. 
Inserting the figures into the equation:  
 
n=1.96x1.96 x0.2 x0.8 
          0.05x0.05 
 =246 
The actual number of households sampled was 260 (in order to cater for an adequate 
number of subjects in each stratum). The sample comprised 130 scheme-members and 
130 non-scheme-members, selected from two sub-counties in Rubabo County. The 
detailed selection framework is indicated in Figure 7.  
 
 
 
                                                
14
 Rukungiri district has approximately 40,000 households (Uganda districts information handbook, 2007/2008) 
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Figure 7:  Multi-stage stratified sample selection process 
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*A parish is the local administrative unit below the sub-county, made up of numerous other local 
units called cells or local council 1.  
 
Rubabo County was purposely selected for the study because it hosts the CHI scheme 
that was used as a case study. The county consists of four sub-counties, namely, Buyanja, 
Kebisoni, Nyakishenyi and Nyarushanje. Of these, the two sub-counties of Nyakishenyi 
and Nyarushanje were chosen because they constitute the immediate catchment area of 
Kisiizi hospital where the scheme operates. From each sub-county, three parishes were 
selected randomly, and households were in turn selected from each of these parishes. 
Sixty-five (65) members and 65 non-members of the CHI scheme were selected from each 
sub-county, thus adding up to 260 households. The sampling frame for members of the 
CHI was obtained from the Kisiizi health insurance scheme office. The non-scheme- 
member households from each parish were chosen with the assistance of the local council 
(1) officers (LC1)15  and the local stretcher (engozi)16 group chairpersons in the selected 
parishes. From each selected parish a random sample of households was drawn. The 
non-scheme-member households were determined to correspond as much as possible to 
                                                
15  The local council 1 is the lowest administrative division in Uganda’s local government.  
16 See footnote 12 (pg 18)  
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the sample of the scheme-member households. This non-proportionate stratified sampling 
was preferred because of the need to conduct an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of 
both categories of respondents (Corbetta, 2003). Table 1 shows the sample of households 
taken from each parish: 
 
Table 1:  Sample of households from each parish 
Sub-county Parish Scheme-members Non–scheme-members Total 
Nyarushanje Ibanda 20 21 41 
Ndago 22 22 44 
Ihunga 23 22 45 
Nyakishenyi Kahoko 24 24 48 
Ngoma 24 17 41 
Kacence 17 24 41 
Total 130 130 260 
 
The study respondents who consisted of heads of households were randomly selected 
using systematic sampling with a random start17. 
 
3.4.2 Selecting the Key Informants 
Key Informants were purposely selected to include 12 respondents from the key 
stakeholders in the various sub-sectors of the health system in Uganda, namely, the 
public sector, the private sector, the traditional medicine sector as well as representatives 
from the health insurance sub-sector. The detailed sample is indicated in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 This was done by calculating the sampling interval (k), derived from the sampling fraction, whereby the 
population N is divided by the sample n. 
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Table 2:  Sample of key informants 
 Category No. of 
respondents 
1 MoH (Dept. of policy, planning & development) 1 
2 MoH (District directorate of health services [DDHS]) 1 
3 Public service provider  1 
4 PNFP health service providers  1 
5 CHI coordinating institution (UCBHFA) 1 
6 CHI promoting institution (Microcare) 2 
7 CHI administrators (project co-ordinator & field worker) 2 
8 PFP sector 2 
9 Complementary and traditional medicine (sector) 1 
 Total 12 
 
The rationale for the mix of KIs was to collect information from all key actors in Uganda’s 
health care system because they all have an influence on the success or failure of any 
given strategy. 
3.4.3 Selecting the Focus Group Participants 
Three Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were held. The number was purposely 
determined to represent three categories of community members, namely, scheme-
members, non-scheme-members and those who had ever enrolled in the CHI scheme but 
dropped out (scheme-drop-outs). Three FGDs were deemed adequate since the technique 
complemented the data collected through the household survey. Participants in the FGDs 
were purposely selected based on their knowledge of the CHI scheme, their headship of a 
household and their membership or lack of it in the CHI scheme. The participants were 
selected from the two sub-counties of Nyarushanje and Nyakishenyi in Rubabo County, 
where the quantitative survey was conducted. The total number of participants in the 
FGDs was 20, consisting of eight scheme-members, six non-scheme-members, and six 
scheme-drop-outs. The original target was to have 6 participants in each category but for 
scheme-members, all the 8 people who were contacted actually turned up for the 
discussion on the appointed day. The participants were selected based on their shared 
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characteristics in order to comply as much as possible with the principle of homogeneity 
(Bailey, 1994). The number of participants was deliberately limited to between six and 
eight in each group in order to allow meaningful discussion to take place (Babbie, 2004). 
Little attention was paid to gender (male and female), since the topics under discussion 
were not considered sensitive, and therefore both men and women would find freedom 
to air out their views. 
3.5.  Research Instruments 
Three main instruments were used to collect data, namely, household questionnaires, KI 
interview guides and focus group discussion (FGD) guides. The choice of the instruments 
was based on the mix of quantitative and qualitative methodology. 
3.5.1 The Household Questionnaire 
A standardised questionnaire with pre-coded questions relating to key research 
objectives, was administered to 260 respondents (heads of households), each representing 
a household (See Appendix B: 241). The technique adopted was a face-to-face interview 
as opposed to a self-administered questionnaire or a telephone interview. Face-to-face 
interviews were preferred because of the relatively low literacy levels in Uganda’s rural 
community, and the lack of traceable addresses or telephone contacts. Thus, a face-to-face 
interview was considered more practical; moreover, it would greatly minimize non-
responses with regard to all or parts of the questionnaire. Key sections of the 
questionnaire included: the nature of the households (demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics), the level of health and health seeking behaviour, access to free health 
care, knowledge and awareness of CHI, reasons for enrolment into CHI schemes or not, 
linkages of CHI to other grassroots organisations, and a household asset inventory for 
use as a proxy to indicate the welfare status of households. Questions were organised in 
such a way that scheme-members and non-scheme-members would only answer 
questions that were relevant to their particular category. Space was provided for 
interviewers to note down any detailed comments and explanations during the course of 
the interview, which could not be captured in the response categories.  
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3.5.2 Interview Guide 
An interview guide was designed for each category of the KIs selected. The guide could 
not be uniformly administered to all the KIs, since specific information was being sought 
from particular categories of the informants as indicated in Table 2: 76. The KI interview 
guide sought to explore perceptions regarding the health care system in Uganda, 
including free health care, and the prospects of CHI as a strategy in increasing access to 
health care for rural households. The interview guides are contained in Appendix D (I-IX: 
261). 
3.5.3 Focus Group Discussion Guide 
A Focus Group Discussion is a research technique that collects data through group 
interaction. The goal is to elicit participants’ feelings, attitudes and perceptions about a 
selected topic (Puchta & Potter, 2006). FGDs can be used in an initial exploratory study 
for generating assumptions or in a final follow-up phase, which pursues exploratory 
aspects of the analysis. FGDs provide evidence about the differences and similarities in 
the participants’ opinions and experiences as opposed to reaching such conclusions from 
post field experiences of separate statements or categorical responses from individual 
interviewees (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). The limitations of FGDs are that they seldom 
provide detailed opinions and experiences from individual respondents, and that there is 
less control about what is shared, thus requiring greater ingenuity on the part of the 
moderator. In this case, the FGD guide was designed as a follow-up instrument for 
generating further information to augment the data generated from the quantitative 
survey. As argued by Bailey (1994: 193), the FGDs complemented the survey by “telling in 
more detail why respondents answered the way they did” in the survey. The guide was used to 
solicit information from three main categories of community members, namely, members 
of the CHI scheme, non-members and scheme-drop-outs. Key sections of the guide 
included access to free (government) health care, enrolment in CHI – both the facilitative 
and inhibiting factors to enrolment), the design aspects of CHI and how these enhance or 
weaken its viability, and general recommendations on easing access to health care in a 
rural setting. The sample FGD guides are provided in Appendix C (1-3: 252).  
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3.6 Piloting the Research Instruments 
This phase involved piloting the household questionnaire as well as making contact with 
KIs and FGD participants who would later be considered for a full interview and 
discussions.  
3.6.1 Piloting the Questionnaire 
The household questionnaire was administered to 4 households in the district, which 
were not part of the sampled area of study. These households comprised 2 members and 
two non-members of the CHI scheme. The purpose was to identify any inconsistencies, 
vagueness and ambiguities in the design of the questions, and to gain a feel of how the 
respondents understood and reacted to the questions. Because of the pre-test and the 
reconnaissance meetings with the scheme administration, some sections were added to 
the questionnaire, for example, the relationship between CHI and microfinance 
institutions. In addition, some specific questions and response categories were refined in 
accordance with what the respondents during the pilot more easily understood. 
3.6.2 Setting up Contact with the Key Informants 
Informal discussions with selected KIs were held in order to test the interview guide and 
to set up appointments for in-depth interviews at a later stage. The KIs met through 
preliminary appointments included: the national coordinator for UCBHFA, which is the 
umbrella organisation for CHI schemes in Uganda; the country manager for Microcare, 
which is the implementer of the scheme that was studied; and the Senior Planning Officer 
from the MoH (the planning department is directly responsible for overseeing all CBHF 
activities in Uganda). The researcher also had an opportunity to attend a two-day annual 
general meeting of all CHI scheme managers and service providers. This provided an 
avenue for more informal collection of information about CHI in Uganda, which was 
used to refine the data collection tools. 
3.6.3 Mobilizing the FGD Participants 
This was done after the completion of the household survey and the initial analysis of the 
quantitative results. Two community guides helped to identify the potential participants 
based on pre-determined criteria for each of the three categories (see section 3.4.3: 76). 
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The respective dates and place of meeting for each category of participants were agreed 
upon and fixed with the participants. On the agreed dates, all participants travelled to the 
place of meeting, which was considered central and convenient for the majority. 
3.7 Research Assistants 
Research assistants were carefully selected, trained and employed to collect quantitative 
data alongside the principal researcher.  
3.7.1 Profile of Research Assistants 
Four interviewers with some prior experience in interviewing and with a minimum of a 
University degree in social sciences or a related discipline were identified through a 
private research firm. A deliberate attempt was made to recruit interviewers who knew 
the local language in order to minimize misinterpretation of questions and responses. 
Table 3 shows the profiles of research assistants in terms of their gender, age, and 
qualifications, as well as the language spoken. 
 
Table 3:  Profile of research assistants 
Research 
Assistant (RA) 
Gender Age Qualification Tribe/language 
spoken 
Number of 
Interviews 
RA 1-BT Male 25 B(SWSA) Rukiga 60 
RA 2-MA Male 26 B(ECON) Rukiga 40 
RA 3-CA Female 21 BA (EDUC) Rukiga 60 
RA 4-LT Female 45 BA (SS) Rukiga 60 
Researcher Female 35 PhD candidate Rukiga 40 
Legend 
B (SWSA)Bachelor of Social Work & Social Administration (MA student) 
B (ECON)Bachelor of Economics (MA student) 
BA (EDUC)Bachelor of Education 
BA (SS)Bachelor of Social Sciences  
 
3.7.2 Training of the Research Assistants 
The research assistants were trained by the researcher herself and oriented in the current 
research to make sure they understood the subject matter, the key objectives and research 
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questions, and the techniques of administering the questionnaire in such a way that 
vague or non-responses were minimized. As part of the training, the questionnaire was 
reviewed in detail in order to make sure that all the interviewers properly understood the 
questions and all the response categories. Role plays in asking questions and recording 
responses were conducted. This helped all the research assistants to gain a level ground 
on what was expected in the course of data collection. Only the household questionnaire 
was the object of training, since the RAs would only aid in the collection of quantitative 
data.  
3.8 Data Collection Approach 
3.8.1 Collecting the Quantitative Data Using the Questionnaire 
Quantitative data was collected with the use of a household questionnaire, with mostly 
pre-coded responses. The researcher, accompanied by all 4 research assistants, would 
collect data in each parish. One interviewer would interview individual household heads 
once. The interviewer would ask the questions and tick or fill in the appropriate response 
on the questionnaire. This was done because the literacy level in the study area was not 
adequate to permit the use of a self-administered questionnaire. The study hence realised 
some of the advantages of face-to-face interviews, such as a high response rate, 
opportunities to correct misunderstandings, and controlling for incomplete responses 
and answering sequences, all of which are common with self-administered and postal 
questionnaires (Oppenheim, 1992). Interviewer bias, which can easily arise from face-to-
face interviews, was minimized through standardized questions, pre-coded responses 
and daily group editing to check for inconsistencies. 
3.8.2 Collecting the Qualitative Data  
Qualitative data was collected through FGDs, KI interviews and secondary data sources. 
The detailed process for each of these is discussed in the following sections. 
 
a) Focus Group Discussions 
As indicated in Section 3.5.3: 78, three FGDs were held with community members in the 
study area to determine the views of scheme-members, non-scheme-members and 
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scheme-drop-outs of CHI. The discussions were held in one of the trading centres (Ndago 
parish), that was considered  central to the participants’ respective places of residence. 
The objectives of the study were explained in simple terms to the participants, and that 
this study was primarily for academic purposes. The aim of this was to minimize 
suspicions about the purpose of the research in order to create a free environment for 
discussion and to avoid raising any unrealistic expectations among the participants. The 
researcher acted as the moderator while an assistant took notes to back up the taped 
records. Because of the mixed gender of the participants, the moderator (a female 
researcher) deliberately selected a male note-taker in order to improve rapport, and 
enhance the freedom of participants of both sexes. The moderator made every effort to 
draw meaningful responses from all participants while at the same time not coercing 
anybody to answer any particular question. Though each individual was encouraged to 
participate actively, it was ultimately the views of the group rather than those of the 
individual participants that were of interest to the researcher. The nature of the 
discussion gave the moderator the necessary advantage to probe for details, while at the 
same time keeping the discussion focused on the key themes and objectives for the study. 
The moderator refrained from giving her personal opinions in order to avoid influencing 
participants to adopt any particular position about CHI and access to health care. All 
FGD proceedings were tape recorded in order to guard against loss of information or 
errors in recording by the note taker.  
  
b) In-depth Interviews with Key Informants 
The researcher herself conducted all the in-depth interviews with the 12 key informants 
(KIs). Most of these in-depth interviews were conducted in the respective offices of the 
KIs, while a few were conducted in a private place on prior appointment with the KI, if 
the office did not provide a private, quiet environment. Tape recording was used in KI 
interviews with prior permission from the informant, to ensure that all information is 
captured. In a few cases, the KIs declined to be tape recorded, for instance, if they felt that 
their opinions and perceptions, especially about health care provisioning in Uganda, 
might not be considered politically correct. In such cases, the interviewer made an effort to 
write notes as the interview proceeded. Follow-up interviews to get clarification of some 
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information were done by either telephone or electronic mail with some KIs, and where 
possible a face-to-face meeting was rescheduled. This was particularly helpful after the 
initial analysis of the household data, where some findings needed to be clarified or a 
second opinion was deemed necessary.  
 
A few difficulties were experienced with the in-depth interviews. Firstly, because some 
aspects of the research involved a review of a policy initiated by the present government, 
there were some political overtones in the responses from some KIs, for example, where 
informants refuse to perceive as positive anything to do with government. The researcher 
in this case made all possible effort to keep the interview as objective as possible in order 
to avoid bias in the information gathered. This required a lot of probing. Secondly, 
sometimes there were practical difficulties with arranging interviews because KIs “tend to 
be ‘busy’ and often do not fulfil scheduled appointments” (Asingwire, 2007: 84). Hence, 
although there were not many interviews, they turned out to be the most difficult 
technique of data collection in the researcher’s experience. 
 
c) Secondary Data 
A review of relevant documents, some of them obtained through the KIs, was undertaken 
in order to capture information relevant to the research questions. An analysis of 
Uganda’s health policy was done in order to place the study of CHI in a proper context. 
Health sector policies, guidelines and sector performance reports were reviewed. Other 
key reports included the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey (2006) and the 
National Household Survey (2006), both of which provided crucial data for the 
background (context) information, but were also useful reference points during data 
interpretation and analysis. Documents specific to CHI were obtained from the UCBHFA 
secretariat and a few scheme documents. Newspaper articles relevant to the research 
questions were constantly but carefully reviewed as well and relevant aspects 
incorporated in the discussion of findings. The challenge faced particularly with regard to 
secondary data on CHI was that it was hard to come by and, some of it was largely 
contained in loose documents, making its use less credible. 
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3.8.3 Language Used 
The questionnaire was administered in Rukiga, which is the local language in the area of 
study. This is because the majority of the population in the study area have a low level of 
proficiency in the English language. All the research assistants as well as the principal 
researcher had a high level of proficiency in the local language, it being in fact their first 
language/dialect. Similarly, all FGDs were conducted and recorded in Rukiga and later 
the transcribed data was retranslated to English by the researcher herself. When 
interviewing the KIs, the researcher used the English language, since all of them were 
proficient in English. 
3.9 Data Cleaning/Editing 
During data collection, data cleaning and editing was done to ensure consistency in the 
data collected and to fill in the gaps in the data where possible before leaving the field. 
The research team met at the end of each day during data collection, to edit the day’s 
questionnaires. Particular emphasis was laid on completeness and consistency in the 
responses given for related questions. This on-going editing also allowed the researchers 
to identify areas for clarifying during subsequent interviews. At the end of the field work, 
the principal researcher re-edited all the questionnaires as a quality assurance measure 
before subjecting them to statistical analysis. In addition, the statistical data set was 
subjected to editing and cleaning in order to remove possible errors made during the data 
entry.  
3.10 Data Analysis 
3.10.1 Analysis of Quantitative Data 
Bivariate analysis was the major approach used for analysis, basing this on the 
descriptive design of the study. A computer assisted analysis was done using the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS evaluation version). A causal-comparative 
approach was used to establish the influence of household characteristics to membership 
of CHI schemes. One group of respondents comprised members of the health insurance 
schemes, while another comprised non-members of the scheme drawn from within the 
same geographical area (catchments) of an existing scheme (Kisiizi health insurance 
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scheme). Relationships between various population characteristics and access to basic 
health care through scheme membership were examined. Cross tabulations were used to 
compare households that are insured to households without insurance. Chi-square tests 
were done for selected variables to estimate the levels of significance of relationships 
between selected variables and enrolment in the CHI scheme. Other measures of 
association, namely, lambda and Crammers’ V were used to estimate the strength and 
direction of the relationship between key variables. These are non-parametric measures, 
which were chosen because the data was mostly nominal and categorical. Thus, these 
tests were deemed more appropriate. Household and community-level factors were 
examined to draw conclusions on what factors are likely to influence the viability of a 
CHI scheme in a rural context. 
3.10.2 Analysis of Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data analysis has been defined as a process, which entails an effort to identify 
themes formally and to construct hypotheses (propositional statements) as they are 
suggested by data and an attempt to demonstrate support for those themes and 
hypotheses (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975, cited in Tesch, 1990). Hence, for data from FGDs and 
KI interviews, thematic analysis was employed to identify emerging themes and sub-
themes based on their level of recurrence within the data collected and in line with the 
key research questions. The data analysis followed the following procedure (Tesch, 1990) 
i. Data was transcribed from the tapes (recorded during the individual interviews 
and FGDs) and the transcripts printed out. 
ii. All the transcripts were read through to get a sense of the whole data set. 
iii. One transcript was taken and analysed critically in relation to categories and 
themes emerging from the whole set. 
iv. Using colour coding, categories and themes were grouped together  
v. An organizing system (framework) was developed, based on the research 
questions and the data collected.  
vi. Using the framework as a guideline, the findings were discussed (using actual 
quotes) in relation to the previous literature/conceptual framework. 
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In order to ensure in-depth analysis, qualitative data analysis was completed, the results 
interpreted and a separate draft report written. The same procedure was followed for the 
quantitative data set before finally integrating the findings. This had the advantage of 
thoroughness in analysis, and ensuring that no aspects of the study findings were 
submerged in the other. Instead, it provided a deeper and more meaningful analysis and 
discussion of the thesis. 
3.10.3 Triangulation of Information 
Triangulation of information by data source was employed in order to improve on the 
reliability and richness of information gathered. Yin (2003a, b) argues that the most 
important advantage presented by triangulation (using multiple sources of evidence) is 
the development of converging lines of inquiry. Any finding or conclusion in a case study 
is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different 
sources of information, following a corroboratory mode. Hence, data collected through 
the household survey, the FGDs, KIs, and secondary sources was linked together in order 
to arrive at concrete conclusions on the viability of CHI in increasing access to health care 
for rural households. The study findings are presented in an integrated manner in order 
to enhance better analysis and discussion. 
3.11 Research Ethics 
Being ethical means conforming to accepted professional practices; as in any other field of 
study, ethics is also at the centre of any social science research. Strydom (in De Vos, 2002: 
63) defines ethics as follows: 
A set of moral principles that are suggested by an individual or group, are subsequently 
widely accepted, and offer rules and behavioural expectations about the most correct 
conduct towards experimental subjects and respondents, employers, sponsors, other 
researchers, assistants and students. Ethical guidelines also serve as standards and as the 
basis on which each researcher ought to evaluate his own conduct. 
 
It is generally agreed that it is unethical for researchers to harm anyone in the course of 
research, whether emotionally or physically. The ethical issues highlighted by various 
authors (Bailey, 1994; Babbie & Mouton, 2001; De Vos, 2002) include, informed consent 
(voluntary participation of respondents) and no harm to the participants, anonymity and 
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confidentiality, avoiding deception of participants, objectivity in analysis and report 
writing, and ethical publishing practices. During the execution of this study, these key 
ethical issues were observed. As a crucial step in conforming to research ethics, clearance 
was sought and obtained from the relevant body in the country. 
 
a) Ethical Clearance 
Official permission to carry out the research was granted by the Uganda National 
Council for Science and Technology (UNCST)18 after reviewing and approving the 
proposal (see Appendix A: 240). This letter also served as an introduction to the local 
district administration in Rukungiri district in order to gain entry into the community 
where the research was conducted. 
 
b) Informed Consent 
In the process of enlisting participants’ consent, all the study participants were informed 
of how they had been selected. In particular, it was explained to them that the selection 
was not based on any prior knowledge about them as individuals or as members of their 
respective households, but rather that they had been selected by chance to provide views 
that would represent the entire community. The study design also involved purposive 
sampling of key respondents and FGD participants, which implies that there was pre-
selection of respondents. Despite this, no respondents were coerced to participate in the 
study. The study objectives, the sample selection procedures and the role of the 
prospective respondents were clearly explained and consent sought from them. The 
interview proceeded only after and if the prospective respondent indicated their 
willingness to participate in the study. To encourage cooperation and consent, the 
researcher used the local council chairpersons of the areas as points of entry into the 
communities.  
 
 
 
                                                
18 UNCST is the government body responsible for approving all research to be conducted in the country 
and for granting ethical clearance for the proposed research. 
U
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 88
c) Anonymity/ Privacy and Confidentiality 
To minimize harm to the respondents, their identities were protected and the 
respondents were informed beforehand of this practice. To ensure confidentiality, codes 
were used to track the interviews and questionnaires, instead of the actual names of the 
respondents. For KIs, in instances where the responses needed to be recorded verbatim, 
consent was sought from the respondent on whether or not they would agree to have 
their responses published, as well as the use of a voice recorder during the interviews. 
For respondents who declined to have their voice recorded, no such device was used. 
 
d) No Deception to the Participants 
The researcher’s identity and the purpose of the research were clearly explained to the 
participants. This was made easier by the fact that no sensitive subject matter, procedure 
or method was involved. The respondents understood the nature of the research and how 
it would be used. To avoid any misinterpretation of the benefits of the research, it was 
made clear to the respondents that the study was not sanctioned by any particular 
government agency, and that thus there were no implicit expectations from the study, 
such as improvements or inauguration of health care projects in the area or more 
funding, as was the case with most government or corporate-sanctioned studies. The 
respondents understood that this research was mainly for academic purposes, and that 
the results could be used to improve service delivery in the future, if the responsible 
authorities chose to make use of the results. 
 
e) Actions and Competence of Researchers 
All the people involved in executing the study had the minimum qualification required 
to conduct research. The principal researcher was a PhD candidate under the continuous 
guidance of an academic supervisor. All the research assistants were university graduates 
in a social science or related discipline and had prior experience in research. They were 
mature enough to interview household heads, and their dress code was modest and fully 
aligned to the expectations of a rural community, where the study was conducted. 
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f) Analysis and Report Writing 
Objectivity was maintained during data analysis and reporting. The data collected is not 
falsified or changed in any way beyond the necessary editing. All sources of literature or 
information consulted were properly acknowledged. Limitations of the study related to 
the sample and the design have been clearly spelt out. The researcher has maintained 
originality and has avoided all forms of plagiarism. 
 
g) Publishing Practice 
Any publication resulting from this study will be ascribed proper authorship that reflects 
those who have significantly contributed to the research project.  
3.12 Limitations of the Study 
No single study can achieve total perfection. Hence, this study does have a number of 
limitations ranging from the design itself to data collection and analysis. The considered 
limitations and ways of minimizing their adverse effects on the study outcome are 
highlighted below. 
 
a) Study Design 
The main limitation of this study is associated with case study research in general, in 
other words, the degree of external generalisation of findings (Yin, 2003 a)19. The case 
study approach adopted implies that only one particular area and scheme was covered. 
The context in which the scheme was implemented as well as the multiplicity of other 
rural contexts in Uganda, may limit the extent to which the research findings can be 
generalized. A comparative survey of more CHI schemes could provide a basis for more 
concrete conclusions on the viability of CHI as a strategy in accessing health care. An 
attempt was made to refer to documented reports on other schemes in different parts of 
the country in order to gain an objective understanding and analysis of CHI in Uganda. 
Nonetheless, the study provides significant theoretical insights into CHI and access to 
health care. 
                                                
19 Yin (2003 a) distinguishes between internal generalization and external generalization. The former refers 
to the generalisation of a conclusion within the setting or group studied. The latter refers to generalisation 
beyond a particular setting or group.  
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b) Data Collection 
Although a household questionnaire was used to gather information on the key variables 
and characteristics of respondents, information pertaining to household income was not 
obtainable. This was because the study population was predominantly subsistent, with 
no monthly income or expenditure records. The information on household income would 
be essential to determine which income groups are more or less likely to join CHI. As a 
proxy, household assets ownership, such as land, radios, bicycles, motorcycles and motor 
vehicles, mobile telephones, farm animals and the type of dwelling, were used to estimate 
the socio-economic/welfare status of households. Such estimations have been used at 
national level surveys (UDHS, 2006: UBOS, 2007) and by individual researchers in 
different contexts (Schellenberg et al, 2003; Worrall et al, 2005; Chitama, 2007), yielding 
valid results.  
 
Some information, particularly that pertaining to the current financial status of the 
scheme under study, could not be easily obtained. This should have been crucial in 
determining the financial efficiency and sustainability of the scheme. However, it was 
possible to determine the cost recovery trends in terms of treatment cost as a percentage 
of the total amount of premiums collected, which helped the researcher to draw 
conclusions on the financial performance and sustainability of the scheme. 
 
d) Data Analysis 
The quantitative data analysis was mainly descriptive. An attempt was made to correlate 
variables but no predictions of cause-effect relationships can be claimed. This is because 
most of the variables used were nominal and these limited the use of parametric 
measures. However, this limitation was minimized by triangulating the survey findings 
with the information from the Focus Group Discussions, Key Informants and secondary 
sources. This strengthened the thesis on CHI and access to health care for rural 
households. 
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3.13 Summary 
The research methodology presented in this chapter provides a context for the 
presentation and discussion of findings in the following chapters. Essentially, the study 
employed a mixed methodology approach within a case study design. This allows for the 
triangulation and corroboration of research findings. While bivariate analysis using SPSS 
was used to analyse quantitative data, thematic and content analysis was used to analyse 
qualitative data. The findings are presented in an integrated manner with quantitative 
and qualitative findings being presented and discussed concurrently. The next four 
chapters (4, 5, 6 and 7) present the study findings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the level of access to health care in the study area, laying particular 
emphasis on access to free health care. The findings are linked to questions 17 to 37 
(Sections C and D of the questionnaire – Appendix B: 243). They respond to objective 1 of 
the study, which aimed to ascertain the facilitative/impeding factors affecting access to 
free health care in the rural areas in Uganda. The underlying assumption was that there 
are obstacles to accessing free health care and that these partly account for people’s 
enrolment in CHI, as one of the attempts to improve their access to health care. As stated 
in the previous chapter (Section 3.10.3: 86), the approach adopted for presenting the 
findings is triangulation, where findings from various data sources are integrated. The 
quantitative findings are presented and then compared and contrasted with findings 
from the qualitative and secondary data sources. Further, the findings are discussed in 
light of the theoretical underpinnings of the study as well as related literature. A 
summary of key findings is presented at the end of the chapter. 
4.1.1  Profile of Respondents 
First, a brief profile of all the respondents is presented in order to contextualise the 
findings. A more detailed profile will be presented and discussed in Chapter 5, which 
delineates the characteristics of households that enrol in CHI schemes or not. 
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Table 4:  Selected characteristics of household respondents  
(N=260) 
Profile n % 
Enrolment status 
Scheme-member 130 50 
Non-scheme-member 130 50 
Age of household head 
18-24 5 1.9 
25-29 31 11.9 
30-34 37 14.2 
35-39 47 18.1 
40-44 42 16.2 
45-49 33 12.7 
50 and above 65 25.0 
Sex of household head 
Male 219 84.2 
Female 41 15.8 
Marital status 
Single 8 3.1 
Married 216 83.1 
Separated/ divorced 6 2.3 
Widowed 30 11.5 
Highest level of education completed 
None 23 8.8 
Primary 138 53.1 
Secondary20 52 20.0 
High school21 6 2.3 
Vocational 11 4.2 
Tertiary level 30 11.5 
Main occupation 
Peasant farmer22 160 61.5 
Petty trader/Small scale enterprise 44 16.9 
Formal salaried employment23 26 10.0 
Others 24. 30 11.5 
 
Half of the respondents were members of the CHI scheme while the other half was non-
members. A quarter (25%) of all respondents was aged 50 years and older. According to 
the UDHS (2006), the population distribution in terms of the rural-urban divide is such 
that older adults are more likely to be found in the rural areas than in the urban areas 
                                                
20 The secondary level is also known as the ordinary level of education. It is the level immediately after the 
primary level, takes 4 years and involves introducing students to numerous arts and science subjects 
without much specialization. 
21 High school is also known as the advanced level of education. It is a two-year study period preceding the 
tertiary (University or college) level of education. 
22
 A peasant farmer is one whose primary focus is subsistence. He/she only sells excess produce after 
meeting the household’s basic food requirements.  
23 The specific categories reported under formal employment included: teaching service, health worker and 
political/public administration. 
24 The category ‘others’ mainly included pit-sawing, builder, tailor, casual labourer and others.  
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(UBOS & Macro International, 2007). Younger adults migrate to urban centres in search of 
jobs. 
 
With regard to sex, the majority of household heads are male (84.2%). This is explained 
by the fact that Uganda is a patriarchal society. Household-headship is automatically 
attributed to the man, “who was responsible for its existence, by constructing the house and by 
marrying the woman or women therein and thereby establishing the family” (Ssali, 2003: 188). 
As a result, he is the owner and head of the family. This pattern can only change in the 
absence of an adult male (husband) in the household. This explains the small number of 
female heads of households who in this study were commonly characterized by being 
widowed, separated or divorced. 
 
More than a half of all respondents (53.1%) had attained only a primary level of 
education, while only 11.5% had received tertiary education. This affects the nature of 
employment they can obtain, as well as their ability to access and understand up-to-date 
information on pertinent issues, such as innovations in health and wellbeing. Access to 
information in turn affects the ability to make informed decisions such as whether or not 
to join a CHI scheme. 
 
The main occupation of the majority of respondents (61.5%) was peasant farming. This 
also formed the major source of income for the households. Engagement in peasant 
farming implies an unstable and seasonal income, which makes it hard for such 
households to meet their basic needs, including health care. Only 10% of all respondents 
were engaged in formal salaried employment as teachers, health workers or local public 
administrators, among others. 
 
The study also involved conducting three Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with the 
community members. Their basic characteristics are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5:  Profile of participants in the Focus Group Discussions  
  Scheme-members Non-scheme-members Scheme-drop-outs  Total 
  
n n n n 
Sex  
Male 6 3 3 12 
Female 2 3 3 8 
Total 8 6 6 20 
Age  
Under 30 0 3 0 3 
30-34 2 0 1 3 
35-39 2 2 3 7 
40-44 2 0 2 4 
45 and above 2 1 0 3 
Total 8 6 6 20 
Education level  
None 0 0 0 0 
Primary 4 3 3 10 
Secondary 4 3 3 10 
Total 8 6 6 20 
 
Most of the participants in the three FGDs were male (12) and aged between 35 and 39 
years (7). None of the participants had attained a tertiary level of education. While this 
was partly deliberate in order to comply with the principle of homogeneity and free 
participation in FGDs (De Vos, 2002), it also reflects the pattern in the general population, 
where only a minority have attained tertiary level of education (Table 4: 93).  
 
Other sources of information were Key Informants (KIs) selected from the Public, Private-
Not-For-Profit (PNFP), Private-For-Profit (PFP) and the traditional sectors. Twelve KIs 
were interviewed. Their basic descriptions are summarised in Table 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 96
Table 6:  Twelve key informants interviewed 
Sector Designation of Persons Interviewed 
Public Sector (Government) 
(3 persons) 
• Senior Health Planner – Ministry of Health 
• Senior Health Educator – District Directorate of Health 
Services (DDHS), Rukungiri district 
• Health Centre III In-charge (Clinical officer): Kisiizi 
health centre, Rukungiri district 
PNFP Sector 
(6 persons) 
• Country Manager: Microcare 
• PHC Specialist: Microcare 
• National Coordinator: UCBHFA 
• Scheme-Manager: Kisiizi Health Insurance Scheme 
• Field worker: Kisiizi health insurance scheme 
• Hospital Administrator: Kisiizi hospital 
PFP Sector 
(2 persons) 
• Private Medical Practitioner (Accredited private 
insurance service provider) Rukungiri district. 
• Clinical Officer - (In-charge): Private clinic, Rubabo 
County, Rukungiri district 
Traditional Health Sector (1 person) • Executive Director: THETA 
 
The mix of KIs from all major sub-sectors in the health sector (Section 1.2.4: 9) 
strengthened the validity of the findings by avoiding the bias of self-reporting. 
Government has the overall stewardship of the health sector, although CHI schemes are 
currently being implemented almost exclusively through the PNFP sector. Other sub-
sectors like the PFP and the traditional sectors also influence access to health care, and 
therefore their views were deemed crucial for a balanced and objective analysis. 
4.1.2 Presentation and Discussion of Findings 
A number of factors influence access to health care, namely, geographical availability of 
services, financial affordability for the cost of the services, social factors such as social 
inclusiveness in accessing services, as well as people’s willingness to utilize the services 
(health seeking behaviour) (Andersen, 1995). As a precursor to access to health care, the 
study estimated the level of illness among the respondents, as well as their health seeking 
behaviour. The common sources of health care are presented, and the level of use of 
government’s free health services highlighted. The factors affecting access to 
government’s free health care are then examined. This forms a context for assessing the 
viability of CHI later in this report. The chapter also briefly examines the level of use of 
traditional healers. This is based on the assumption that a high usage of traditional 
healers may undermine the successful adoption of formal health care. 
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4.2 Level of Illness and Health Care Seeking Patterns  
The level of illness among the population will legitimize the need for health services. 
Conversely, health-seeking behaviour reflects the demand for health services by the 
population. Both of these factors are precursors for evaluating the level of access to health 
care.  
4.2.1 Level and Common Causes of Illness 
Respondents were asked if they had fallen sick during the six months preceding the 
survey. The cause of illness was also explored. The results are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7:  Level and cause of illness among respondents 
 
  
CHI enrolment  status  
Significance 
(p-Value) Lambda25 
Cramer’s 
V26 
Member Non-member Total 
n % n % n % 
Have you fallen sick in the last 6 months?    
Yes 62 47.7 74 57.4 136 52.3 
.136 .092(.302) .092 (.136) No 68 52.3 56 42.6 124 47.7 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Cause of illness    
Malaria 27 43.5 50 67.6 77 56.6 
.005* .242 (.023) .330 (.005*) 
Others1 23 37.1 13 17.6 36 26.5 
Respiratory Tract 
Infection 
5 8.1 9 12.2 14 10.3 
Accident 5 8.1 0 .0 5 3.7 
Diarrhoea 2 3.2 2 2.7 4 2.9 
Total 62 100.0 74 100.0 136 100.0 
1 Other conditions most commonly reported include ulcers, asthma, hypertension, headache, child delivery, urinary 
tract infections, routine HIV/AIDS check up and others. 
*The chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value in 
parentheses is based on chi-square tests 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
                                                
25 Lambda is a statistical test used to measure the Proportionate Reduction in Error (PRE) that is achieved 
when membership of a category of one variable is used to predict category membership on the other 
variable. The values range from 0 to 1, with 1 representing a perfect prediction of one variable by another 
(Field, 2000). 
26 Cramer’s V measures the strength of association between two categorical variables. The values range 
from zero to 1. The closer to 1 a value is, the stronger the association between the variables (Field, 2000). 
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The findings indicate a high level of illness, with more than a half of all respondents 
reporting an episode of illness in the six months preceding the survey. Similarly, 76% of 
all respondents reported that a member of their household had fallen sick during the 
same period (Table 25, Appendix E: 278). There were no significant differences in the 
prevalence and cause of illness of other household members between scheme-members 
and non-scheme-members. However, household respondents (who were mainly male) 
showed a different pattern, with non-members of the CHI scheme (57%) more likely to 
report an illness than scheme-members (48%). The most commonly reported cause of 
illness was malaria27 (56.6%). This was higher among non-scheme-members by 24%. The 
chi-square test (p=0.005) and other measures of association (Lambda: 0.242; Cramer’s V: 
0.330) indicate a significant though moderate relationship between the cause of illness 
and enrolment status. Qualitative information also suggested that malaria was less 
prevalent among scheme-members than among non-scheme-members. The scheme 
administration attributed the trend to the preventive measures being undertaken to 
reduce the incidence of common infections such as malaria and diarrhoea among the 
members.  
There are other preventive health care programs. For example, last year Microcare gave out 
subsidized ITNs [Insecticide Treated Nets]. We have also been promoting safe drinking 
water among the community members by providing water purification kits to member 
households at a subsidized cost. There is also ongoing health sensitization among the 
members (Scheme Manager, September 2007). 
 
The objective of the preventive health care programmes is to reduce disease episodes 
among scheme-members as part of a cost reduction strategy for the scheme. In a United 
Nations (UN) report, Innovations for Sustainable Development (UN, 2008), Microcare reveals 
that the preventive health care interventions are not only intended to reduce claim costs 
but also to overcome one of the difficulties associated with insurance, i.e. a lack of 
product tangibility. It is believed that when clients have received tangible items such as 
ITNs and jerry-cans with water purification tablets or benefited from health education 
sessions, they are more likely to feel that they have gained from the insurance program, 
even if they have not fallen ill and lodged an insurance claim. Hence, the scheme would 
                                                
27 Malaria is endemic in 95% of Uganda and it is the leading cause of morbidity and mortality. Rukungiri 
district is ranked among the areas with very high prevalence of malaria (UBOS, 2006). 
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remain relevant and attractive to the community. This is consistent with other arguments 
advanced for tangible demonstrations of benefits of insurance (Tabor, 2005). 
Notwithstanding the marketing intentions of the preventive health program, it can be 
deduced from this section that membership in a CHI scheme has the potential to reduce 
the incidence of morbidity.  
4.2.2 Health Care Seeking Patterns 
Respondents who reported an illness episode were asked to state if they had sought 
medical attention. The purpose of asking this question was to determine the level of 
utilization of formal health care, since the relevance of CHI hinged on this. The sources of 
health care for the last illness episode as well as the reasons for the choice of that 
particular source were also investigated. Table 8 indicates the health seeking patterns 
among respondents. 
 
Table 8: Healthcare-seeking patterns among respondents 
 CHI enrolment  status Significance 
(p-value) 
Lambda 
 
Cramer’s V 
Member Non-member Total 
n % n % n % 
Sought any form of treatment or health care for last illness episode    
Yes 61 98.4 69 93.2 130 95.6 
.146 - .125 (.146) No 1 1.6 5 6.8 6 4.4 
Total 62 100.0 74 100.0 136 100.0 
Source of care for last illness episode    
PNFP hospital 45 73.8 20 29.0 65 50.0 
.001* .410 (.001*) .489 (.000*) 
Private health facility 10 16.4 14 20.3 24 18.5 
Government health centre 4 6.6 21 30.4 25 19.2 
PNFP health  centre 1 1.6 6 8.7 7 5.4 
Other 0 .0 5 7.2 5 3.8 
Government hospital 1 1.6 3 4.3 4 3.1 
Total 61 100.0 69 100.0 130 100.0 
Reason for the choice of health care source    
Proximity 18 29.5 30 43.5 48 36.9 
.000* .492 (.000*) .613 (.000*) 
Insurance benefit 30 49.2 0 0 30 23.1 
Good quality care 10 16.4 18 26.1 28 21.5 
Cost of care 1 1.6 13 18.8 14 10.8 
Others 2 3.3 8 11.6 10 7.7 
Total 61 100.0 69 100.0 130 100.0 
*The chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level 
Approximate significance of the value in parentheses is based on chi-square tests 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
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a) Level of formal health care seeking 
Almost all of the people who fell sick sought formal health care, with only one scheme-
member and five non-scheme-members reporting that they did not seek medical 
attention. The figures do not show any significant differences in health seeking patterns 
between members and non-members of the CHI scheme. However, the qualitative 
investigation suggested a reduction in patient delay for the members of the insurance 
scheme: 
Scheme-members tend to report early for treatment since they know that they will not have 
to pay. This has even improved the management of conditions on the part of the health 
workers (Hospital Administrator, September 2007) 
 
The conditions the members and non-scheme-members report to hospital in are different. 
Members will report for medical attention when they are not badly off. Non-scheme-
members report with severe conditions because they wait at home – they have to first look 
for money or even hope that they can get better without seeking serious medical attention 
(Scheme Manager, September 2007) 
 
The key explanation is that membership in a CHI scheme reduces the burden of OOP 
payments for health care, which have been known to discourage health care seeking 
especially among the poor (Section 2.3.2: 34). Hence, while the study did not find 
significant differences in formal health care seeking between members and non-members 
of the CHI scheme (Table 8: 99), membership in CHI was often associated with timely 
treatment seeking behaviour, which is essential for the general health of the individual 
and the population. The findings are consistent with previous studies investigating CHI 
(Derriennic et al, 2005; Schneider & Hanson, 2006). Schneider and Hanson (2006) found 
that in Rwanda, insured persons reported less delay in care-seeking and were as a result 
less severely ill than the uninsured. 
 
b) Sources of health care for the last illness episode 
The PNFP hospital was the most common source of health care for those who reported an 
illness episode (50%). Other sources of care included the government health centre 
(19.2%) and the PFP health facility (18.5%). While the majority (73.8%) of scheme-
members sought care from the PNFP health facility (an expected finding since the scheme 
operates in the PNFP sector), the non-scheme-members’ choice was almost equally 
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divided between the government health centre (30.4%) and the PNFP hospital (29%). The 
major reasons given for the choice of health care included proximity (36.9%), insurance 
benefit (23.1%) and good quality care (21.5%). These factors have been reported in related 
studies on health seeking behaviour (Reinikka & Svensson, 2003, 2006; Lawson, 2004). 
The choice of the health care source as well as the factors considered for that choice are 
significantly associated with enrolment status (p=0.001, p=000 for source of care and 
reasons respectively). A detailed discussion on the factors that influence the choice of the 
health care source is presented in Section 4.5: 105 of this report. 
4.3 Geographical Access to Health Care 
Both the distance to the health facility and the means of transport available contribute to 
the opportunity cost of seeking health care. It is presumed that the probability of seeking 
formal health care would increase if the health services were nearer to the people 
(Amaghionyiodwe, 2008). Access to health services in turn partly determines the viability 
of health interventions including CHI. Even if the idea of CHI was acceptable, but the 
facility was not accessible; it would discourage many households from enrolling in such a 
scheme. Acceptable geographical access to health facilities is defined as living within a 5-
kilometre or a one hour walking distance from a health facility (Parker et al, 2006). Table 
9 shows the estimated distance and the common means of transport to the health facility 
among the respondents. 
 
Table 9:  Geographical access to any level of health facility 
  
CHI enrolment  status  
Member Non-member Total 
n % n % n % 
Distance to nearest health unit from your home? 
Less than 1 km 40 30.8 62 48.1 102 39.4 
1-2 km 44 33.8 32 24.8 76 29.3 
3-5km 44 33.8 30 23.3 74 28.6 
More than 5 km 2 1.5 6 3.9 8 2.7 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Means of transport to the health facility 
Foot 103 79.2 106 81.5 209 80.4 
Motor vehicle (public) 13 10.0 7 5.4 20 7.7 
Motorcycle 8 6.2 10 7.7 18 6.9 
Bicycle 5 3.8 6 4.6 11 4.2 
Others 1 .8 1 .8 2 .8 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
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Almost all respondents live within a 5-kilometre distance to the nearest health facility, 
with close to 40% living within a distance of less than 1 kilometre to the nearest health 
facility. This compares well with the national average, where 63% of the population live 
within a 5-kilometre distance to the nearest health facility (UBOS, 2006). The reduced 
distance is attributed to government’s recent developments in the health system, where 
health centres are being constructed in the communities, right from the parish to the 
constituency level. Although the distance to the health facility may have been reduced, it 
still has to be evaluated in terms of the quality of the roads and the means of transport 
available for the sick to travel to the health facility (Hardeman et al, 2004). The study 
findings indicate that the most common means of transport to the health facility is by 
walking (80.4%). This can pose challenges for the effective utilization of health care 
because it introduces other costs of travel time and energy on the part of the sick person. 
4.4 Usual and Preferred Source of Health Care 
While the majority of respondents (46.5%) indicated that the nearest health facility to 
their homes was a government HC-III, (Table 30, Appendix E: 278), the usual source of 
health care for most of them (63.5%) was a PNFP health facility (either a hospital or a 
health centre). The findings indicate low preference and utilization of government health 
facilities, as shown in Table 10. 
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Table 10:  Usual and preferred sources of health care for households 
 
  
CHI enrolment  status 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Lambda Cramer’s V Member Non-member Total 
n % n % n % 
Usual source of health care    
PNFP Hospital 99 76.2 38 29.2 137 52.7 
.000* .469 (.000*) .510 (.000*) 
Government health 
centre 
9 6.9 49 37.7 58 22.3 
Private clinic 8 6.2 24 18.5 32 12.3 
PNFP health  centre 14 10.8 14 10.8 28 10.8 
Government hospital 0 .0 5 3.8 5 1.9 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Preferred source of health care    
PNFP health  facility 113 86.9 96 73.8 209 80.4 
.003* .131 (.016) .212 (.003*) 
Private health facility 16 12.3 21 16.2 37 14.2 
Government health 
facility 
1 .8 12 9.2 13 5.0 
Private drug shop 0 .0 1 .8 1 .4 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
*The chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level 
Approximate significance of the value in parentheses is based on chi-square tests 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
The greatest majority of scheme-members (76.2%) seek care from the PNFP hospital, 
while more than a third of non-scheme-members (37.7%) usually seek care from a 
government health centre. The chi-square tests indicate a significant relationship between 
the usual source of health care and enrolment status (p=.000). The strong relationship is 
further indicated by the high value of both Lambda (0.469) and Cramer’s V (0.510). This 
question was pressed further to determine respondents’ health care preferences, since the 
usual source of health care might not be the preferred choice of health care for a 
household. In this regard, a significant majority of both scheme-members (86.9%) and 
non-scheme-members (73.8%) mentioned the PNFP health facility as their preferred 
source of health care. This is followed by the PFP health facility and the government 
health facility respectively. In contrast to the usual source of health care, the directional 
and symmetric tests (Lambda: 0.131; Cramer’s V: 0.212) do not indicate a strong 
relationship between the preferred source of health care and enrolment in the CHI 
scheme. This implies that there are no significant differences in provider-preferences 
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between members and non-members of CHI. Both categories have a very high preference 
for the PNFP health facility compared to the government health facility, as confirmed in 
the FGDs. 
Kisiizi hospital is a mission hospital. This is where you can get proper treatment. At least 
there is availability of equipment and other things to use. We go to government when we 
have no money to pay at Kisiizi... It is not because we want to go to government health 
centres (Non-scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
Although it is possible to link the high preference for the PNFP health facility to the 
absence of a government owned hospital in the area, other studies done in different parts 
of the country have consistently indicated that PNFP facilities at all levels are preferred to 
the government health facilities. For example, Reinikka & Svensson (2003, 2006), noted 
that PNFP and PFP health facilities provide better quality care than their government 
counterparts. The PNFP facilities were in turn more likely to provide pro-poor services 
and services with a public good element and to charge lower prices for services than for-
profit units. This would explain the high preference for PNFP health facilities among the 
population.  
 
Whereas 73.8% of non-scheme-members mentioned the PNFP health facility as their 
preferred source of health care, interestingly, more than a third of them indicated that 
they usually seek care from the government health facility. This confirms the earlier 
assumption that the usual source of health care for a household was not necessarily their 
preferred choice of care. Conversely, while it is possible to link the high utilization of 
hospital services by scheme-members (76.2%) to better access (Criel & Kegels, 1997), it 
may also signify an unnecessary use of tertiary level (hospital) services by virtue of the 
fact that they are insured. This can contribute to inefficient use of resources in the health 
system as a whole (Wiesmann & Jutting, 2000; Khetrapal, 2004). Wiesmann and Jutting 
(2000) have argued that if no referral is required for the use of higher-level services, many 
people will prefer to go directly to the hospital because they expect the quality of care to 
be superior there. Opinions from the FGDs, however, indicated that scheme-members 
might be willing to use lower level services that were in some instances closer to the 
households.  
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They should allow us to go to available nearby health centres so that we only go to Kisiizi if the 
health centres cannot handle the problem or if one needs admission or in case of complicated 
illnesses like those needing operations (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
The practice of seeking secondary level services was in this case mainly related to the 
design of the scheme, where currently only one provider (a hospital) was listed for use. 
Minor ailments that could have been handled at PHC level are reported at the hospital, 
undermining the efficient use of services and leading to overcrowding. In the end, this 
may affect the viability of the insurance scheme since over-use of services also has the 
potential to escalate costs.  
4.5 Factors that Influence the Choice of the Source of Health Care  
Responses with regard to the source of health care were cross-tabulated with reasons for 
the choice of that source by enrolment status of the respondent. For each source of health 
care, the reasons given by respondents for choosing it were examined. This was intended 
to streamline the inherent strengths in each type of health care provider, which in turn 
could be used to evaluate the system. Four key reasons were considered, namely, 
proximity, insurance benefit, good quality care and the cost of care. The insurance benefit 
was exclusive to the scheme-members and the PNFP health facility. Conversely, the cost 
of care was related to low cost or affordability in the government health care system. 
Table 11 shows the findings. 
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Table 11:  Reasons for the choice of health care for the last illness episode 
 
Source of Health 
care 
 
CHI enrolment  Status 
Reason 
Member Non-member Total 
f % f % f % 
PNFP health facility  
  
  
   
Proximity 8 17.4 11 42.3 19 26.4 
Good quality care 8 17.4 13 50 21 29.2 
Insurance benefit 30 65.2 0 0 30 41.7 
Others 0 0 2 7.7 2 2.8 
Total 46 100 26 100 72 100.0 
Private health facility 
  
  
  
  
Proximity 7 70 6 42.9 13 54.2 
Good quality care 1 10 2 14.3 3 12.5 
Cost of care 2 20 4 28.6 6 25.0 
Others 0 0 2 14.3 2 8.3 
Total 10 100 14 100 24 100.0 
Government health 
facility 
  
  
  
Proximity 3 60 12 50.0 15 51.7 
Cost of care 0 0 10 41.7 10 34.5 
Others 2 40 2 8.3 4 13.8 
Total 5 100 24 100 29 100.0 
Other 
  
  
  
Proximity 0 0 2 40 2 40.0 
Cost of care 0 0 1 20 1 20.0 
Others 0 0 2 40 2 40.0 
Total 0 0 5 100 5 100.0 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
Scheme-members cited the insurance benefit, proximity and good quality care as the 
reasons for visiting the PNFP health facility. The non-scheme-members who visited a 
similar facility cited good quality care and proximity as the key reasons. However, 
proximity was a key influence in choosing the government health facility for both 
scheme-members and non-scheme-members (60%, 50% respectively). A significant 
proportion of non-scheme-members (41.7%) also mentioned the cost of care as a key 
factor in seeking government health services. This was underscored in the qualitative 
data. 
There is no fear of the cost. When you go to a big hospital, they can give you a bill of even 
900,000 Uganda shillings (Ug.shs). So if you know that you do not have that money you 
try the government health centres. If they have drugs, they will give them to you. If they 
are not there, you go back home and buy them from shops or clinics. We go to government 
health centres because we do not have money to access a better alternative (Non-scheme-
members’ FGD, April 2008) 
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Thus, government health services can serve as a safety net for the poor since there will 
always be a category of the population who cannot afford private health care at all.  
 
Respondents who reportedly used PFPs cited proximity (54.2%), the cost of care (25%) 
and good quality services (12.5%) respectively as the key considerations. They reported 
that proximity and the cost of care were often better than those of PNFP health services. 
Furthermore, the quality of care in these (PFP) facilities was considered better than that 
offered by government health services. The qualitative findings also confirmed this: 
Kisiizi is far and there are costs associated with going there, especially transport…If you 
have an emergency, you go to the clinic because they are nearer and faster. At Kisiizi you 
can be delayed…When you calculate, you find that you are losing productive time. This 
also is forcing even scheme-members to seek care from private clinics. Instead of spending 
the whole day at Kisiizi, I would rather spend some money and get treatment from the 
clinic, go back home and do some productive work (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008). 
 
We go there (private clinics) because unlike government health centres, these clinics test 
the blood and tell you what you are suffering from. In case you are not responding to the 
treatment, they change and put you on other forms of treatment (Non-scheme-members’ 
FGD, April 2008) 
 
From the aforementioned, one could conclude that the most predominant consideration 
for the choice of a health care source was the quality of care. From qualitative data, it 
appears that good quality services were often interpreted to mean availability of health 
personnel, drugs, and diagnostic/laboratory services28. Quality was also frequently 
linked to the quick recovery of the patient. The PNFP hospital was thus preferred 
because, “they treat me and I recover faster. I therefore do not waste time first going to the 
government health centre’’ (Non-scheme-member, Nyarushanje sub-county, September 
2007). The findings confirm an earlier argument by some researchers (Alderman & Lavy, 
1996; Nabyonga et al, 2005) that people are willing to pay for services if they feel they are 
getting good services. However, this willingness to pay does not always mean an ability 
to pay (Whitehead et al, 2001; Deininger & Mpuga, 2004), which is why there are often 
differences between the preferred and the usual source of health care as shown in this 
study (Section 4.4: 102).  
                                                
28 Community perceptions of quality cannot be ignored since they have been shown to accord well with the 
technical evaluations of quality of care (Ensor & Cooper, 2004). 
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Another key consideration in the choice of the source of health care is proximity, which 
was prominently mentioned with regard to government health facilities. These findings 
indicate that, even though the government health system is credited with facilities that 
are closer to the people, households prefer to seek care from a source where they hope to 
get better services. Earlier studies on health care utilization (Akin & Hutchinson, 1999; 
Adhikari, 2006) have shown that sometimes the ill will bypass a free or subsidized public 
health facility in favour of an alternative source, which has better quality care. 
4.6 Level of Use of Government Health Services 
This study investigated a strategy that requires households to pay for health in the 
context of free health care by the government. The study therefore sought to estimate the 
level of utilization of government health services among rural households, as well as to 
identify the facilitative and impeding factors in accessing free health care in order to 
contextualize the discussion on CHI. Respondents were asked how often they utilized the 
government health facilities. Figure 8 summarises these findings.  
 
Figure 8:  Level of use of government health services  
(N=260) 
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Source: Field data, September 2007 
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Only 20% of all respondents said they always used the government health services, while 
a third of them rarely used these services. As expected, non-scheme-members were more 
likely to report a regular use of government health services (34.6%) than scheme-
members (7.7%). It is worth noting that, even among non-scheme-members there is a 
considerably low use of government health facilities, with 27% and 10.8% reporting that 
they rarely or never used the services respectively. This was also reflected in the 
subjective opinions of the respondents about the inadequacy of government health 
services: 
It is the helpless who go to government health centres. There are no services there (Non-
scheme-member, Kacence Parish, Nyakishenyi Sub-county, September 2007) 
 
Previous research has shown that utilization of public health services increased especially 
for the poor after the abolition of user fees in 2001 (Mpuga, 2002; Burnham et al, 2004; 
Deininger & Mpuga, 2004, Nabyonga et al, 2005; Meessen et al, 2006; Yates et al, 2006). 
However, other studies (World Bank, 2003; Burnham et al, 2004; Xu et al, 2005; Poirier, 
2006; Uganda, 2007a; Kyomugisha et al, 2008) indicate that this has not resulted in 
effective access to the services. Research by Burnham et al (2004), which reported an 
increase in utilization of outpatient services immediately after the introduction of free 
health care, interestingly also indicated a dramatic decrease in utilization after October 
2001 (just seven months into the era of free health care policy). The results are also 
consistent with those contained in two key government publications, namely, the NHS, 
2005/2006 (UBOS, 2006) and the Annual Health Sector Performance Report (AHSPR), 
2006/2007 (Uganda, 2007a), both of which reported that the majority of people were still 
seeking care from private service providers and that attendance in public health facilities 
had stagnated or even declined. This may signify disillusionment with the public health 
services. It also indicates that health care is actually not free, since the majority of 
households are not accessing the government provided services.  
 
The following sections examine the perceived opportunities and constraints in accessing 
Uganda’s free health care; as provided through the government health facilities. 
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4.6.1 Facilitative Factors (Opportunities) in Accessing Free Health Care 
All respondents, despite their level of utilization of government health services, were 
asked to identify what they perceived to be the facilitative factors in accessing 
government health services. Their responses are indicated in Table 12. 
 
Table 12:  Facilitative factors in the use of the government health services 
 
CHI enrolment  status 
Total Member Non-member 
n % n % n % 
What makes it easy 
to use the 
government health 
services? 
Free services 68 52.3 84 64.6 152 58.5 
Proximity  23 17.7 10 7.7 32 12.3 
Others+ 15 11.5 11 8.5 26 10.0 
Good quality services 4 3.1 7 5.4 11 4.2 
Nothing* 20 15.4 18 13.8 38 14.6 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
+Other factors mainly included: drugs for minor illnesses, lack of money to seek private health 
care, and lack of a viable alternative in an area. 
*Some respondents denied that there is anything ‘easy’ in accessing government health services and so they 
did not identify any facilitative factors.  
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
Two major issues were identified as positive opportunities/facilitative factors for 
accessing government health care, namely, free health care and proximity. Only 4.2% 
mentioned good quality care. The FGDs highlighted similar findings:  
Because the health centres are closer, sometimes I attempt to go there-when the sickness is not 
serious…sometimes they provide simple treatment for malaria and they also distribute 
condoms…there are other simple drugs like panadol [a pain killer], if it’s there, they give it to 
you. (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
Some KIs described the service as better than having nothing, arguing that when the 
drugs are available these services could help the poor.  
Government has the physical structures right from Health Centre II at parish level up to 
Health Centre IV. If you talk in terms of existence of structures, the households would be 
having access to health facilities. But there are serious problems that in effect render the 
services hard to access. Still the poor can fall back on these services whenever the drugs are 
available. (Private Medical Practitioner, Rukungiri district, November 2007) 
 
Coverage has continued to increase. We have had two Health Centre IIIs elevated to Health 
Centre IVs. Also an additional 10 Health Centre IIs were set up with the help of the central 
government and the local government resources (KI, DDHS, Rukungiri district, September 
2007) 
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The relatively wider coverage of health centres ideally provides an opportunity for easy 
access to health care for households. However, apart from the presence of physical 
structures that are relatively close to the people, some respondents indicated that the 
service delivery there was poor. For example, 15% of all respondents (Table 12: 110) did 
not acknowledge any strength in the government health services. This was partly shared 
by some KIs, as typified by a response from a public (government) health service 
provider: 
The current health policy has no strengths at all. The system appears to be breaking down. 
People are still not accessing the services promised by the free health care policy. (Personal 
Interview, April 2008) 
 
As reiterated in the above quotation, the actual implementation of the free health care 
policy has so far been met by serious obstacles, which inhibit effective access to health 
care by the population.  
4.6.2 Limitations in Accessing Free Health Care 
A number of limitations in accessing free health care were identified. Table 13 
summarizes the responses from the household survey. 
 
Table 13:  Inhibiting factors in accessing free health care 
 
CHI enrolment  status 
Total Member Non-Member 
f % f % f % 
Cause of 
difficulty in 
accessing 
government 
health 
services 
 
 
 
 
 
Unavailability of drugs 91 70.0 109 83.8 200 76.9 
Lack of equipment and other facilities 32 24.6 35 26.9 67 25.8 
Low availability of  health personnel  19 14.6 19 14.6 38 14.6 
Distance to the health facility 16 12.3 6 4.6 22 8.5 
Over-crowding  5 3.8 3 2.3 8 3.1 
Cost of care 7 5.4 1 0.8 8 3.1 
Long waiting hours 6 4.6 1 0.8 7 2.7 
Others 11 8.5 8 6.2 19 7.3 
Note: The percentages do not add up to 100 due to multiple responses. 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
a) Unavailability of drugs 
The most prominent among the reported limitations in accessing free government health 
services was the unavailability of drugs in the health facilities. Almost seventy-seven 
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percent (76.9%) of all respondents said it was difficult to utilize government health 
facilities because of a lack of drugs. The shortage of drugs was emphasized in the 
qualitative data as a serious setback to accessing free health care: 
…every time you go there [government health centre] you are told there are no drugs and if 
they are there, they are simple drugs, which cannot make you well. You have to buy drugs 
from somewhere else. If you cannot buy, you just go back home and wait for the illness to 
go or to die. If you can, you end up going to seek serious care somewhere else like at Kisiizi 
hospital (Non-scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
…recently I took my child there. She had a swollen eye, but they did not even give her a 
simple ointment to put in the eye. In fact, they did not tell us anything that we could do to 
help the child. They just told us there are no drugs. So if they cannot provide drugs why 
did they (government) put the health centres there? (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 
2008) 
 
The public health care is in essence not free. Patients are just given prescriptions to go and 
buy drugs. The patient does not consider that as free health care. They get disillusioned. 
(KI, MoH, April 2008) 
 
Most of the responses reflected the inadequate drug supply in the government health 
system. Although there was an attempt to increase drug supplies to health centres after 
the abolition of user fees (Nabyonga-Orem et al, 2008), it appears that the increase did not 
match the demand for the drugs, thus leading to frequent ‘stock-outs’. Frequent drug 
‘stock-outs’ have also been acknowledged by the MoH as a key challenge in the provision 
of health services. The AHSPR (2006/2007) indicates that nationally, only 34% of health 
units did not report a ‘stock-out’ of drugs. The report states that “this frequent stock-out of 
drugs is closely related to the stagnation/minimal improvement in a number of output indicators 
as medicines availability is a very important signal of quality of services to the community” 
(Uganda  2007: 35). A related study on the availability of drugs (AGHA, 2007) reported 
an acute shortage of drugs in most government health centres. One of the health centres 
covered by the above study lacked anti-malarial drugs on all three occasions during 
which the health centre was visited in a space of three months. And yet in Uganda, 
malaria is the leading cause of visits to health centres as well as hospitalization.  
 
b) Lack of diagnostic equipment and basic facilities 
The lack of diagnostic equipment and other basic facilities such as theatres and 
laboratories were also identified as key impediments in utilization of free government 
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health services. Almost twenty-five percent (24.6%) of scheme-members and 26.9% of 
non-scheme-members mentioned this as an inhibiting factor in access and utilization of 
the services. A number of KIs also confirmed this limitation: 
The health centres that should provide services are not fully functional. There are no theatres 
in most Health Centre IVs and where the theatres were set up, they have not been equipped 
so they cannot function. They are just physically there (KI, DDHS Rukungiri district, 
September 2007) 
 
There is the issue of not equipping the health units/centres. There are no storage facilities for 
drugs – assuming that the drugs were available. No basic equipment for diagnosing and 
treating patients. Not even a microscope is available. So what health service availability is 
that? (Public Health Service Provider, April 2008) 
 
Community members often referred to the lack of diagnostic equipment in the health 
centres as “treating what they do not know” and it came out strongly as one of the 
constraints to accessing care from government health facilities: 
 
…they do not even test you to find out the sickness you are suffering from. This patient 
and another and yet another are all given similar prescriptions as if you are all suffering 
from one condition. The problem is that they are treating what they do not know. This one 
is told to buy aspirin, another one aspirin and another one aspirin. Is it really true that we 
are all suffering from the same condition? (Non-scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
With an apparent shortage of basic facilities and equipment, the quality of health care in 
most government health facilities is compromised, and does not meet the users’ 
expectations. Properly functioning equipment is as important as the availability of and 
access to physical facilities (Parker et al, 2006). Xu et al (2005) similarly contend that a 
reduction in expenditure on fees can be offset by increases in payments for other services 
that are no longer available in the public sector. This would still constitute a serious 
obstacle to effective access to health care by rural households. 
 
c) Shortage of trained personnel 
Inadequate staffing of the health facilities was identified as another impediment to health 
care access. Respondents mentioned that they found it difficult to use public health 
facilities because the medical personnel were either not available or only available on 
certain days: 
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…the doctor is in most cases absent. I think he works on particular days and on others he 
does not come…during weekends and holidays, they do not work, as if people do not fall 
sick on those days…also on market days the health centres are closed... It is difficult to get 
attention from a government health centre (Scheme-dropouts’ FGD, April 2008). 
 
When you look at the health centre, what is available? A nursing aide or nursing assistant 
who is not able to deliver the services and yet…even if I am poor and government has said 
free health care, they should give me quality care (Executive Director, THETA, May 
2008) 
 
The DDHS office acknowledged that, although a number of health centres have been set 
up, they lack medical officers and other health staff. This was attributed to poor 
remuneration and the remoteness of some places.  
 Because of the rural nature of the area, it is difficult to attract and retain qualified staff, 
especially when coupled with poor remuneration (KI, DDHS, Rukungiri district, 
September 2007) 
 
Other cited human resource constraints in the public sector related to low commitment 
among the health personnel, semi-skilled personnel staffing the health centres, and 
inadequate staffing levels that led to work over-load for the few personnel at the health 
centres. 
I think the health workers are among the least paid civil servants in the country. That is 
why most of them will run private clinics and yet at the same time they are still working in 
the government health facilities. When a patient goes to the health centre, the doctor or 
nurse is absent. He or she is attending to private patients at the clinic because she is 
looking for a way of survival (PHC Specialist, Microcare, November 2007) 
 
The above staffing challenges are reflected in the AHSPR (2006/2007), which indicates 
that the proportion of approved positions filled by trained health workers is only 38.4%, 
with variations from 10.4% to 92.6% (Uganda, 2007a).  
 
From the above discussion, it appears that the free health care policy has been extremely 
difficult to implement and in its current universal access form, it could be an unrealistic 
target as reflected in the opinion of one of the KIs: 
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…the picture on paper is so impressive. When you read about our [Uganda’s] decentralized 
health system, you want to visit it, but when you reach on the ground, the situation is 
totally different. It is a paradox. At the end of the day, the poor person, who was promised 
free health services, does not have the service at all (Executive Director, THETA, May 
2008) 
 
The above opinions have also been reflected in the World Development Report (WDR) 
(2004), which, quoting Uganda’s case, observes that wide-scale public provision of health 
care does not always translate into substantial use of such health care (World Bank, 2003). 
The limitations in accessing free health care have also been highlighted in Uganda’s mass 
media, highlighting serious obstacles to access: 
It is true the government has set up health centres in almost every sub-county. But these 
are skeleton structures. They have no drugs, suffer shortage of trained staff and lack basic 
medical equipment. People don’t get cured by divine healing at the health centres. There 
must be drugs, medical staff and equipment to effect treatment. It is time government 
reviewed its national priorities with emphasis on health care (Editorial, Daily Monitor, 
Friday, December 28th 2007: 10) 
 
…many health units, especially in rural areas have been completed but remain non-
functional due to lack of equipment, workers and supplies like drugs. Of the 155 existing 
Health Centre IVs, only 40 are fully functioning, while 108 are equipped but lack staff. 
Experts have attributed the shortage of health workers to brain drain. South Africa alone 
has over 200 Ugandan doctors (Ouma29 2007: 6)  
 
With poorly equipped health centres and the best doctors leaving the country for greener 
pastures in Rwanda and other countries, VIPs have to travel abroad for treatment while 
ordinary Ugandans die (Nganda, 2008: 3)  
 
The paradox is that, although the use of health services by the poor was reported to have 
increased since the removal of user fees (Deininger & Mpuga, 2004; Nabyonga et al, 
2005); it has also been acknowledged that OOP expenses have increased, thus requiring 
poor patients to buy drugs from the private sector or go directly to the private sector 
when needing attention (Burnham et al, 2004; Xu et al, 2005; Poirier, 2006). Thus, the 
majority of the rural people still have to make OOP payments for the services, which is a 
big constraint to obtaining health care.  
 
                                                
29 Reports for the New Vision, a government owned newspaper, which makes its critique of a government 
policy even more significant. 
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4.7 Level of Use of Informal Health Care 
The level of use of informal health care and particularly traditional healing was included 
in the investigation because it was assumed that high levels of use of this kind of care 
would influence the community’s buy-in of insurance. In other words, if households 
considered traditional healing to be a valuable substitute for modern medical care, then 
they would not enrol in CHI (De Allegri et al, 2006a). Informal health care in Uganda 
takes the form of traditional healers, herbalists, self-medication and traditional birth 
attendants among others. This study focused on traditional healing. Respondents were 
thus asked whether people in their community used traditional healers, and what 
motivated these people to opt for this source of health care. The results are indicated in 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9:  Perceived level of use of traditional healers 
 
Source: Field data, September 2007  
 
The findings indicated minimal use of traditional healers. The practice is perceived to be 
limited to a few people in the community. More than 80% of all respondents believed that 
the use of traditional healers was a rare practice in their particular community, a finding 
that is related to that of Tabuti (2004). Notwithstanding this, the use of traditional healers 
and/or herbalists was attributed mainly to the failure of the formal health care to 
diagnose and treat the illness, as well as to historical links with traditional healing at the 
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individual household level. KIs explained that those who sought care from traditional 
healers did so together with the use of modern medicine: 
Traditional health care is used because of limited accessibility to formal health care, but also 
the two sources of care tend to serve different purposes. People go to traditional healers to 
consult, seek advice and treatment. On the other hand, they do not consider consultation in 
a health centre as health care. They go to seek treatment and get drugs. Once they don’t 
find drugs, they don’t count it as health care… (Executive Director, THETA, May 2008) 
 
Normally, the first source of health care sought is biomedical care. When the illness 
persists and/or is thought not to have been properly diagnosed, then alternative care 
from the traditional healers is sought. This finding concurs with other research done on 
traditional healing in Uganda (Ndyomugyenyi, et al, 1998; Tabuti, 2004). For example, 
Tabuti (2004) established that people tended to use biomedical care more than traditional 
medicine, despite the reportedly higher levels of accessibility to traditional healers 
(Sekaya et al, 2004). 
 
Generally, the study found that traditional healing as an alternative source of health care 
does not significantly affect the utilization of formal health care and therefore has less of 
an influence on the viability of CHI as a means of accessing health care. In this particular 
community, traditional healing is still viewed in a negative light, and therefore it is 
possible that people who seek this alternative source of care would not openly 
acknowledge it. 
4.8 Summary of Key Findings 
The following are considered the most significant findings in this chapter: 
 
• Level of Illness 
More than a half (52.3%) of all respondents reported an illness episode during the 
6 months preceding the survey. The need to increase the level of access to health 
care is hence quite apparent and legitimate. It is worthwhile to note that more non-
scheme-members (57%) than scheme-members (48%) reported an illness episode. 
This suggests that membership in the CHI scheme has a positive impact on 
reducing morbidity at household level (Section 4.2.1: 97). 
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• Cause of Illness 
Malaria is the leading cause of illness among the population studied (56.6%). The 
study indicates a significant relationship between the cause of illness and the 
status of enrolment in CHI (P=0.005). Malaria as the cause of illness is 24% higher 
among non-scheme-members than among scheme-members. The findings suggest 
that enrolment in CHI has a positive effect on the reduction of malaria prevalence 
at household level (Section 4.2.1: 97). 
 
• Health Seeking Patterns 
There is a high adoption of formal health care. More than 90% of the respondents 
who had fallen sick sought care from a formal health facility. The PNFP health 
facility (hospital) was the most frequently visited health facility by those who 
reported an illness. The high utilization of private health facilities is consistent 
with other findings (Burnham et al, 2004; Xu et al, 2005; Poirier, 2006) that the 
introduction of free health care in Uganda has not resulted in a stoppage or a 
significant reduction in OOP payments for health care by households. The 
apparent low utilization of government health facilities (19.2%) can be attributed 
to constraints to effective access to health care even among rural households. 
(Section 4.2.2: 99). 
 
• Source of Health Care and Enrolment in Community Health Insurance 
There is a significant relationship between the source of health care and enrolment 
in CHI (p=0.001). While most scheme-members visited the PNFP hospital (73.8%), 
the non-scheme-members visited the government (30.4%), PNFP (29%) or the PFP 
(20%) health facility almost evenly. The issues considered in the choice of the 
source of health care are the insurance benefit (which substantially reduces the 
cost of obtaining health care), proximity and the quality of care. Proximity, which 
is mostly associated with the government health facilities, is a significant 
opportunity for accessing health care by the households, although this is greatly 
compromised by the perceived low quality of care in these facilities (Section 4.2.2: 
99). 
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• Health care Preferences 
The study clearly demonstrates a low preference for government health care by 
rural households (5%). 80.4% of the households surveyed would prefer to use the 
PNFP health facility. The gaps between the preferred and the usual sources of 
health care indicate that households are not accessing the kind of health care they 
would wish to get. The financial cost associated with obtaining care from the 
private sector (PNFP and PFP) is a deterrent to effective health care utilization. 
CHI significantly reduces this cost through its prepayment mechanism (Section 4.4-
4.5: 102). 
 
• Level of Use of Government Health care  
The level of use of government health care services is low, with only 20% of all 
respondents indicating that they ‘always’ use the services. Conversely, 35% of the 
respondents said they rarely use the government health facilities. Even among the 
non-scheme-members, regular use of government health facilities is low (35%). 
The findings confirm those of others, who have pointed out a persistent low use of 
free health care (UBOS, 2006; Uganda, 2007a). Since private service providers 
charge fees for services, the findings imply that the cost of care still poses a 
significant barrier to health care access and utilization (Section 4.6: 108). 
 
• Facilitative and Impeding Factors in Accessing Government Health 
Services 
The major facilitative factors in accessing government health services as identified 
by the respondents include free provision of services and proximity. The key 
constraints in accessing the services include limited availability of drugs, 
equipment and trained personnel among others (Section 4.6.1-2: 110). 
 
• Use of Traditional Health Care 
Use of traditional healing is limited to a few people in the community in which the 
study was undertaken. Eighty percent (80%) of the respondents indicated that the 
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practice is rare in their community. The reasons thought to influence the use of 
traditional healers include the perceived failure of the western medicine to deal 
with a given health problem and historical inclination or inherited practices in 
particular households (Section 4.7: 116). 
 
It can be concluded that there is still a dire need for health services due to high levels of 
illness in the community. Whereas the free health care policy ideally presents the most 
equitable way of meeting this need (McIntyre et al, 2005), and while currently its greatest 
opportunity lies in the relative proximity of health care structures within the 
communities, there are still several challenges in accessing a proper quality of care. The 
constraints that led to the failure of the system in the country in the 1990’s (Ablo & 
Reinikka, 1998 cited in Deininger & Mpuga, 2004) appear to have persisted. As argued by 
some (Gumber, 2001; Khetrapal, 2004), it is unlikely that the free health care policy will 
lead to effective access to quality health care by the population in the short and medium 
term. Since the majority of Ugandans still have to pay in order to access health care, it is 
reasonable to examine alternative means of reducing financial barriers to health care by 
the households. In Chapter one (Section 1.3: 17) and Chapter two (Section 2.5.3: 55), the 
researcher advanced arguments for considering CHI as an alternative strategy for 
increasing access to health care. In Chapter 5, the profiles of households enrolling or not 
enrolling in CHI in Uganda are examined.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WHO ENROLS IN COMMUNITY HEALTH INSURANCE? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the level of access to health care in Uganda, paying 
particular attention to the provisioning of free health care. The facilitative and impeding 
factors in accessing free health care were highlighted. The overriding conclusion was that 
there are significant obstacles to accessing free health care and that a majority of people in 
Uganda still have to make OOP payments for health care services from private providers. 
It is within the private sector, specifically the PNFP sector, that CHI has been initiated as 
one of the alternative mechanisms of improving access to health care. While some people 
have joined such schemes, others have not. This chapter attempts to delineate the 
characteristics of those who join CHI and those who do not, based on their socio-
economic profiles. The findings presented in this chapter are linked to questions 1-16 
(Sections B and C), and questions 76-80 (Section I) of the household questionnaire 
(Appendix B: 241). They correspond to objective 2 of the study (Section 1.5.2: 22), which 
sets out to analyse the socio-economic profiles of households enrolling or not enrolling in 
CHI. The major assumption underlying this objective was that there are socio-economic 
differences between those who enrol in CHI and those who do not. The objective partly 
addresses the question of social inclusion and equity in access to health care, which Ruger 
(2006: 27) refers to as “the moral foundation of health insurance”. Equity is widely recognized 
as one of the key policy objectives of health care systems (Wagstaff & Doorslaer, 1998; 
Whitehead et al, 2001; Gwatkin et al, 2004). Thus, if the socio-economic differences 
between those who enrol in CHI and those who not can be proved significant, then CHI 
would be said to attract a particular category of people, in which case it would not be a 
viable mechanism for improving access to health care.  
5.2 Demographic Characteristics and Enrolment in Community Health 
Insurance 
According to the behavioural model of health services (Andersen, 1968, 1995), 
demographic characteristics serve as predisposing factors in access and utilization of 
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health services by households. In view of this, the study investigated a number of 
demographic characteristics, including age, sex, marital status and family size. Table 14 
indicates the age, sex and marital status of the respondents, with regard to their status of 
enrolment in the CHI scheme. The aim is to identify whether there are differences 
between members and non-members of CHI, based on such characteristics. 
 
Table 14:  Age, sex, marital status and type of marriage and enrolment in CHI  
 
 
CHI enrolment  status 
Total Significance 
(p-value) Lambda Cramer’s V 
Member Non member 
n % n % n % 
Age of household head    
18-24 2 1.5 3 2.3 5 1.9 
.286 .154(.096) .169(.286) 
25-29 14 10.8 17 13.1 31 11.9 
30-34 15 11.5 22 16.9 37 14.2 
35-39 27 20.8 20 15.4 47 18.1 
40-44 19 14.6 23 17.7 42 16.2 
45-49 14 10.8 19 14.6 33 12.7 
50 and above 39 30.0 26 20.0 65 25.0 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Sex of household head    
Male 108 83.1 111 85.4 219 84.2 
.610 .023 (.839) .032(.610) Female 22 16.9 19 14.6 41 15.8 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Marital Status    
Single 5 3.8 3 2.3 8 3.1 
.725 .031(.788) .071(.725) 
Married 107 82.3 109 83.8 216 83.1 
Separated/ 
divorced 
2 1.5 4 3.1 6 2.3 
Widowed 16 12.3 14 10.8 30 11.5 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Type of marriage    
Monogamous 100 93.5 93 85.3 193 89.4 
.053 .065(.614) .132(.053) Polygamous 7 6.5 16 14.7 23 10.6 
Total 107 100.0 109 100.0 216 100.0 
Approximate significance of the value in parentheses, based on chi-square tests 
Source: Field data September 2007 
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5.2.1 Age of Household Head 
The majority of respondents were below 45 years (62.3%) with only 37.7% aged 45 years 
or older. This trend is manifested among both members and non-members of the CHI 
scheme. This corresponds to the general structure of Uganda’s population, where the 
majority are below the age of 35 (UBOS & Macro International, 2007).  It is however, 
noteworthy that 25% of all respondents were aged 50 years and above, reflecting the 
rural- urban differentials in the age structure in the general population i.e. older adult-
headed households are more common in the rural areas. 
 
The percentage of household heads aged 50 years and older is higher among scheme-
members (30%) than non-scheme-members (20%). Though not statistically significant, the 
difference may imply that the scheme attracts the households that are headed by older 
adults rather than households headed by younger adults. This opinion was shared by 
some KIs: 
The relatively older people are associated with big households. Apart from their own 
children, they take care of other children who have been orphaned especially by HIV/AIDS. 
They therefore have a higher risk of illness within a household. Once they have understood 
the benefits of the scheme, they are more easily convinced to join than a young adult with 
relatively fewer responsibilities. (Scheme Manager, Kisiizi health insurance scheme, 
September 2007) 
 
Other authors (Okello & Feely, 2004; Dong et al, 2006; Bhat & Jain, 2006) have pointed out 
that there is indeed a relationship between age and enrolment in a health insurance 
scheme. For example, Okello & Feely (2004) found that in the Nkoranza scheme in Ghana, 
a larger number of older women (above 35) enrolled in the scheme than their younger 
counterparts. Bhat & Jain (2006) attempt to explain this relationship by relating age to 
maturity and therefore to more understanding and management of risk: 
In higher age groups, people have more probability of purchasing insurance…. Age 
signifies more risk and maybe more maturity to understand risk and to try to minimize it 
by purchasing health insurance. (Bhat & Jain, 2006: 20) 
 
A recent study of enrolment in two CHI schemes in Uganda quotes one of the young 
adult non-scheme-members interviewed as giving this reason for not joining the scheme: 
‘I wasn’t bothered since I am young and not likely to fall sick’ (Basaza et al, 2007: 9). In 
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contrast, a study done in Burkina Faso, West Africa (Dong et al, 2003) linked higher age 
(>50) to less willingness to pay for CHI30. Although the relationship between age and 
enrolment in CHI schemes does not appear to be statistically significant in the current 
study (p=0.286), the scheme seems to be extending health care to households that are in 
relatively greater need of care by attracting even households that are headed by older 
adults. This is to some extent a sign of the potential of CHI to contribute towards equity 
in access to health care. 
5.2.2 Sex of Household Head 
The majority of household heads are male (84.2%). As indicated in Section 4.1:94, in 
Uganda, household headship is vested with the man. Female headship of households is 
regarded as deviant (Ssali, 2003), and is therefore a rare occurrence. It occurs due to the 
death of a male spouse, divorce or separation, and in a few cases, where a woman has 
never been married.  
 
With regard to enrolment in CHI, there are only 2% more female-headed households 
among scheme-members than among non-scheme-members (Table 14: 122). The chi-
square test as well as other measures of association do not show any significant 
relationship between the sex of the household head and enrolment in CHI schemes 
(P=0.610), thus implying that the sex of the household head is not an adequate predictor 
of  enrolment in a CHI scheme. In a study of prospective CHI in Ethiopia, Asfaw and Von 
Braun (2004) similarly report no significant differences between male and female-headed 
households in respect of their willingness to pay for CHI.  
 
Female-headed households have been categorized among the most vulnerable groups in 
society (Uganda, 2000; UBOS & Macro International, 2007). Thus, the assumption was 
that they are less represented in CHI enrolment. The fact that the sex of the household 
head was not a significant predictor of enrolment could imply that CHI has the potential 
to attract to some extent the vulnerable groups in society. However, this study did not set 
out to analyse the effect of gender on enrolment in CHI schemes. As a result, households 
                                                
30 The study was done before implementation of the CHI scheme; the actual difference was in how much 
the young and the old were willing to pay for insurance. This could explain the differences in results.  
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were taken as a single unit without considering the intra-household decision-making 
processes concerning whether or not to enrol in a CHI scheme. It is however, pertinent 
that future studies on predictors of enrolment in CHI delineate the role of gender in 
making the decision to join a CHI scheme.  
5.2.3 Marital status 
A high number of the total respondents were married (83.1%), while 11.5% of all scheme 
and non-scheme-members were widowed. This can be attributed to the fact that the unit 
of analysis was the household and that the primary respondent was the household head. 
This was against the background that most CHI schemes enrol households, rather than 
individuals. However, some aspects in the pattern of marital status with regard to 
enrolment are worth noting. For example, the descriptive statistics show slightly more 
widowed respondents among scheme-members (12.3%) than among non-scheme-
members (10.8%), although the results are not significant (p=0.725). This finding is 
supported by studies done in other areas where CHI schemes exist (Okello & Feely, 2004; 
Chitama, 2007). For example, an evaluation of the Nkoranza scheme in Ghana (Okello & 
Feely, 2004) showed no significant relationship between marital status and membership 
to a CHI scheme.  
 
Widowhood is commonly associated with economic and social vulnerability (Uganda, 
2000), and therefore one would expect to find a negative relationship between 
widowhood and enrolment in the CHI scheme. As stated in earlier sections of this 
chapter, the CHI scheme could have the potential to enrol people from different socio-
economic groups, contributing to equity in access to health care. However, a firm 
conclusion cannot be reached without considering other facets of household socio-
economic status, such as wealth. This is examined further in Section 5.4: 135 of this 
chapter. 
5.2.4 Type of Marriage 
The two categories of marriage considered in this study were monogamous and 
polygamous marriages. Monogamy is a type of marriage where the man has one woman 
and they are living together. In contrast, polygamy is a type of marriage where the man 
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has more than one wife. The husband, and all the wives and their children may be living 
together and constituting one household, or each wife and her children may be living in a 
separate household, with the man visiting each household periodically. Within either 
context, polygamy has implications for the size of the family and consequently for the 
resources available to the man who is the head and therefore ideally responsible for the 
welfare of all the members of his household or households. This study sought to 
determine the predominant marriage type in the community and to examine any 
associations with enrolment in the CHI scheme. 
 
The majority of scheme-members and non-scheme-members (89.4%) reported that they 
were in monogamous marriage relationships. The findings however show that the 
proportion of polygamous relationships among non-scheme-members (15%) is more than 
double that (7%) among scheme-members. This may imply that households in a 
polygamous context are less likely to enrol in a CHI scheme. The trend may be explained 
by the scheme policy, which sets strict definitions of a household for a polygamous 
context: each household is considered an independent entity, irrespective of the fact that 
two or more households may share the same head. The head would therefore have to 
register those entities separately. This increases the amount of premiums payable, 
making it more expensive to enrol in CHI. Despite these theoretical explanations, the chi-
square tests and other measures of association (Lambda and Cramer’s V) showed no 
significant relationship between the type of marriage and enrolment (P=0.053). The 
plausible explanation is that within both categories, the majority of respondents were in 
monogamous marriages, so there would not be a marked difference between scheme-
members and non-scheme-members. 
 
Other socio-demographic characteristics examined, namely, household size, and 
structure and their relationship with enrolment in CHI are presented in Table 15. 
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Table 15:  Household size, number of children born, age of oldest child at home and 
enrolment in CHI  
 
 CHI enrolment  status 
Total Significance 
(p-value) Lambda 
Cramer’s 
V 
Member Non-member 
n % n % n % 
House hold size    
1-2 11 8.5 12 9.2 23 8.8 
.041* .185(.061) .196(.041)* 
3-4 25 19.2 36 27.7 61 23.5 
5-6 35 26.9 47 36.2 82 31.5 
7-8 37 28.5 23 17.7 60 23.1 
9 and above 22 16.9 12 9.2 34 13.1 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Number of children born    
None 7 5.4 6 4.6 13 5.0 
.236 .123(.031)* .162(.236) 
1-2 20 15.4 36 27.7 56 21.5 
3-4 42 32.3 37 28.5 79 30.4 
5-6 31 23.8 30 23.1 61 23.5 
7-8 21 16.2 16 12.3 37 14.2 
9 and above 9 6.9 5 3.8 14 5.4 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Age of oldest child at home    
Less than 1 year 0 .0 7 5.6 7 2.8 
.039* .137(.079) .217(.039)* 
1-4 years 10 8.1 8 6.4 18 7.2 
5-9 years 14 11.3 21 16.8 35 14.1 
10-14 years 22 17.7 24 19.2 46 18.5 
15-19 years 32 25.8 34 27.2 66 26.5 
20 and above 46 37.1 31 24.8 77 30.9 
Total 124a 100.0 125a 100.0 249a 100.0 
a The question considered all children in a household and not necessarily one’s own biological children. 
This explains the variations in subtotals and total  
*The chi square statistic is significant at the 0.05 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value in 
parentheses, based on chi-square tests 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
5.2.5 Household Size 
Household sizes range from 1 to more than 9 members. More scheme-members (45.4%) 
have larger households (7 or more people) than non-scheme-members (27%). The chi-
square tests indicate a significant (though moderate) relationship between household size 
and enrolment (p=0.041). It appears that households with larger families tend to enrol in 
the scheme. Some plausible explanation was extracted from qualitative data where 
respondents associated large family size with enrolment in CHI: 
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Big households normally join the scheme. If you are say three people in a home, you join the 
society because if all of you fall sick at the same time you can still get treatment a lot easier 
than when you are not in the scheme (Non-scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
In most cases when a household has many children, and they are poor, they try to join the 
scheme. You realize that you’d rather sell a goat and pay a premium than wait for a child to 
fall sick and you sell your land after the hospital has billed you more than you have at the 
moment (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008). 
 
In addition to the high risk of sickness in a large family, which the households seem to 
acknowledge, the average cost of premium per household member seems to favour the 
larger households. For example, a one-member household pays the same amount of 
premium as a household with four members (i.e. Ug shs.24000: Approx. US$ 15 per year) 
(Microcare, no date). Similarly, a household with five members pays the same amount as 
one with eight members. This implies that the cost per person reduces with the increase 
in household size, thereby favouring the larger households.  
 
Previous studies (Gumber, 2001; Schneider & Diop, 2001; Asfaw & Von Braun, 2004; 
Okello & Feely, 2004; Bhat & Jain, 2006) do not seem to have a consensus as far as the 
relationship between household size and enrolment in CHI is concerned. In the SEWA 
program in India (Gumber, 2001; Bhat & Jain, 2006), enrolment tended to decline with 
increase in household size. Similarly, an evaluation of the Lacor hospital health plan in 
Northern Uganda found that a large household size of more than 3 people was negatively 
correlated with enrolment (Okello & Feely, 2004). Conversely, in Rwanda (Schneider & 
Diop, 2001), larger households (of more than five members) had a greater probability of 
enrolling in CHIs than smaller households. In the Nkoranza scheme in Ghana (Okello & 
Feely, 2004), no significant association was found between household size and enrolment.  
 
Asfaw and Von Braun (2004) have related the positive association between large 
household size and enrolment in CHI to the concept of rational decision-making. They 
argue that the schemes are particularly attractive to larger households because of the high 
risk of illness. However, the conflicting results in the studies cited reveal that the 
relationship is determined more by the design of the schemes than by household size per 
se. For example, in Lacor (Northern Uganda), Nkoranza (Ghana), and the Indian cases, a 
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premium was charged per individual person in the household, making it more expensive 
for larger households to enrol. In Rwanda, and in the current study’s context, households 
are categorized according to their sizes and those who fall in the same category pay the 
same amount of premium irrespective of the intra-category variations in the number of 
people, as indicated earlier in this section.  
 
The attraction of larger households in CHI is a positive indicator with regard to equity of 
access to health care. This is because of the high risk of illness in such households. 
However, if households with fewer members are less attracted to the scheme, it negates 
the principle of cross-subsidization, which is crucial for the success of the scheme. The 
absence of redistribution of both financial and health risks from households with more 
dependants to those with fewer dependants could weaken the viability of CHI in such 
contexts. 
5.2.6 Number of Children  
Ninety-five (95%) percent of all respondents have children, with the majority (54%) 
reporting 3 to 6 children. Only 5.4% of all respondents had 9 or more children. As 
happened in the case of household size, the proportion of households with 3 or more 
children is higher among scheme-members (79.2%) than among non-scheme-members 
(67.7%), which implies that CHI schemes have the potential to attract those households 
that are considered more vulnerable to poverty (Uganda, 2000). This finding is similar to 
that of studies done in other contexts (cf. Bhat & Jain, 2006).  
 
With regard to age structure, almost a third of all respondents (31%) had a child31 aged 20 
years and older, still under their care. The age of the youngest child for the majority of 
respondents ranged between 1 and 4 years (40.2%). Members of the CHI scheme were 
more likely to have a child aged 20 years and older (37.1%) than non-scheme-members 
(24.8%). Statistical tests indicate a significant (p= 0.039), though moderate (Lambda: 0.137; 
Cramer’s V: 0.217) relationship between the age of the oldest child at home and 
enrolment. This is related to the pattern in the age of the household head (Section 5.2.1: 
                                                
31  The word ‘child’ in this context refers to all children still under the respondent’s care irrespective of 
whether or not they are their biological children. 
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123). Another possible explanation is that, although older children may still be dependent 
on their parents for their wellbeing, they also have the potential to contribute to labour 
productivity particularly in the context of subsistence farming. Hence, the age structure 
at household level may influence a household’s decision and ability to enrol in a CHI 
scheme.  
5.3 Socio-economic Characteristics and Enrolment in Community Health 
Insurance  
Socio-economic characteristics such as religious affiliation, occupation, major source  of 
income and education level form part of the social structure and determine one’s status in 
society, one’s ability to cope with problems that arise and one’s ability to command the 
resources that are needed to deal with these problems (Andersen, 1968, 1995). The 
relationship between these characteristics and enrolment was therefore investigated. 
Table 16 shows the cross-tabulations between religious affiliation, occupation, and the 
major source of income on the one hand and enrolment in the CHI scheme on the other 
hand. 
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Table 16:  Religious affiliation, occupation, major source of income and enrolment 
in CHI  
 
 CHI enrolment  status 
Total Significance 
(p-value) Lambda 
Cramer’s 
V 
Member Non- member 
n % n % n % 
Religious affiliation    
Protestant 53 40.8 56 43.1 109 41.9 
.544 .023(.774) .109(.544) 
Roman Catholic 69 53.1 69 53.1 138 53.1 
Muslim 2 1.5 0 .0 2 .8 
Pentecostal 5 3.8 5 3.8 10 3.8 
others 1 .8 0 .0 1 .4 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Occupation of household head    
Peasant farmer 80 61.5 80 61.5 160 61.5 
.824 .039(.731) .090(.834) 
Petty trader/Small 
scale enterprise 
21 16.2 23 17.7 44 16.9 
Formal salaried 
employment 
13 10.1 13 10.0 26 10.0 
Others. 16 12.3 14 10.8 30 11.5 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Occupation of spouse    
Peasant farmer 85 79.4 83 75.5 168 77.4 
.277 .047(.702) .171(.277) 
Petty trader/Small 
scale enterprise 
11 10.3 12 10.9 23 10.6 
Formal salaried 
employment 
5 4.7 7 6.4 12 5.6 
Others. 6 5.6 8 7.3 14 6.5 
Total 107 100.0 110 100.0 217 100.0 
Major source of household income    
Peasant farming 74 56.9 72 55.4 146 56.2 
.251 .077(.316) .174(.251) 
Commercial farming 9 6.9 2 1.5 11 4.2 
Small business 22 16.9 23 17.7 45 17.3 
Former salaried 
employment 
14 10.8 15 11.5 29 11.2 
Grants from relatives 2 1.5 2 1.5 4 1.5 
Others 9 6.9 16 12.3 25 9.6 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Approximate significance of the value in parentheses, based on chi-square tests 
Source: Field data September 2007 
 
5.3.1 Religious Affiliation 
The majority of respondents were Catholics (53.1%). Protestants (41.9%) and Pentecostals 
(3.8%) constituted the most common non-Catholic categories of the respondents, 
although there are other minority affiliations. The trend in religious affiliation in the 
study area is therefore not different from that at the national level (Section 1.2.1: 2). While 
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religious affiliation may influence the uptake of western medicine (Dong et al, 2006), in 
this study, it does not seem to be a significant determinant of enrolment in the CHI 
scheme. The relative proportion of respondents affiliated to the different religions is 
almost evenly distributed among scheme-members and non-scheme-members.  
 
There seems to be little consensus in the literature concerning the influence of religion on 
enrolment. In the Bwamanda health plan in the DRC (Criel et al, 1999), no association 
was found between religious affiliation and enrolment despite the fact that the scheme is 
a Catholic mission establishment. Conversely, an evaluation of Lacor hospital health plan 
in Northern Uganda found that religion was associated with membership in the scheme. 
“Being a protestant or a member of another non-catholic religious group decreased the odds of 
enrolling in the plan” (Okello & Feely, 2004: 13). The authors argue that this is because the 
health service provider is a Catholic mission. The current study shows no such 
association. Despite the major service provider, Kisiizi hospital, being a Protestant 
mission, the majority who enrol in the CHI scheme are Catholics. The community’s 
strong attachment to the current health service provider seems to be related to its long 
history of providing ‘better’ quality health services (Musau, 1999; Basaza & Namara, 
2003) rather than to religious nuances.  
5.3.2 Occupation of Household Head and Major Source of Income 
As expected for a rural area, a significant majority of respondents were peasant farmers 
(61.5%) and this too is the main source of household income. Income is earned through 
the sale of extra food crops after harvest. Other occupations include petty trade (16.9%) 
and others (casual labour, pit sawing, building, etc) with only 10% of respondents 
engaged in formal employment (i.e. teaching, other civil service and health sector 
worker). The implication from the findings is that the majority of the households have 
very unstable sources of income, fluctuating with the harvest seasons of the year. This 
does not favour emergency spending such as OOP payment for health care.  
 
There is a similar trend in occupation for both members and non-members of the scheme. 
However, the proportion of salaried workers is slightly higher (11.6%) among members 
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than among non-members (10%) of the CHI scheme. Overall, the statistical tests (chi-
square, Lambda and Cramer’s V) show no significant association between occupation, 
source of income and enrolment in the CHI scheme. This may be explained by the fact 
that this is a rural community, where the predominant occupation and source of income 
for members and non-members of the scheme is subsistence farming. The slight 
variations in salaried employment between two categories of respondents do not seem to 
be a significant distinguishing feature between scheme-members and non-scheme-
members.  
5.3.3 Level of Education 
Education was investigated because it affects many aspects of life, including individual 
demographic and health behaviour (Andersen, 1995; Ensor & Cooper, 2004; UBOS & 
Macro International, 2007). Education and other factors such as occupation are some of 
the traditional measures used to assess social structure, a concept used to denote: 
…a broad array of factors that determines the status of a person in the community, his or 
her ability to cope with presenting problems and commanding the resources to deal with 
these problems (Andersen, 1995: 2). 
 
Hence, the underlying assumption is that better educated persons are more likely to enrol 
in a CHI scheme, since they are presumed to have the resources to pay for insurance. 
However, if higher education level translates into relatively higher incomes, then 
households whose heads are better educated may not be attracted to the scheme since 
they can afford OOP payment for health care. Against this background, the study 
examined the characteristics of households, with regard to the highest level of education 
attained by the household head and his or her spouse across the two categories of 
respondents (scheme-members and non-scheme-members). The results are presented in 
Table 17. 
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Table 17:  Education level and enrolment in CHI  
 
 CHI enrolment  status 
Total 
Significance 
(p-value) 
Lambda 
Cramer’s 
V Member Non-member 
n % n % n % 
 
Highest level of education completed 
   
None 12 9.2 11 8.5 23 8.8 
.526 .085(.426) .127(.526) 
Primary 67 51.5 71 54.6 138 53.1 
Secondary 23 17.7 29 22.3 52 20.0 
High school 4 3.1 2 1.5 6 2.3 
Vocational 8 6.2 3 2.3 11 4.2 
Tertiary level 16 12.3 14 10.8 30 11.5 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
 
Highest Level of education of spouse 
   
None 8 7.2 12 10.7 20 9.0 
.571 .081(.197) .131(.571) 
Primary 67 60.4 69 61.6 136 61.0 
Secondary 25 22.5 18 16.1 43 19.3 
high school 3 2.7 1 .9 4 1.8 
Vocational 1 .9 1 .9 2 .9 
Tertiary level 7 6.3 11 9.8 18 8.1 
Total 111 100.0 112 100.0 223 100.0 
Note: Approximate significance of the value in parentheses, based on chi-square tests 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
Fifty three percent (53.1%) of all household heads and 61% of their spouses had attained a 
primary level of education. Only 11.5% of household heads and 8.1% of the spouses had a 
tertiary level of education. With the majority of respondents having no more than a 
primary level of education, there is limited access to formal employment, which would in 
turn provide some relatively stable source of income for the households. The percentage 
of respondents with no education level attained at all is similar among scheme-members 
and non-scheme-members. Whereas the proportion of respondents who attained either a 
primary or secondary (ordinary) level of education is slightly higher among non-scheme-
members (54.6%, 22.3% respectively) than among scheme-members (51.5%, 17.7%), the 
percentage of respondents who attained either advanced, vocational or tertiary levels of 
education is higher among members than among non-members of the scheme. This 
would seem to suggest that the scheme is more likely to attract people with a relatively 
higher level of education. When subjected to statistical tests, however, no significant 
relationship was found between the level of education and enrolment (p=0.505, Lambda: 
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0.085, Cramer’s V: 0.127). The overriding view was that education is not a significant 
predictor of enrolment as summed up in a typical response from the FGDs: 
 Education status does not really count. It is not the educated who join the scheme. That 
scheme is for everybody. It is not even the sickly who join the scheme. In fact if you are 
falling sick frequently they chase you out. The society is open to everybody. (Non-scheme-
members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
The findings are consistent with those of some other authors (Criel et al, 1999; Gumber, 
2001; Chitama, 2007) showing that, especially in a rural setting, education is not a 
significant predictor of enrolment in CHI schemes. However, caution has to be taken not 
to generalize such findings since in other contexts, education level does affect enrolment. 
Particularly in studies that draw samples from heterogeneous communities (such as rural 
and urban areas), differences in educational attainment seem to have a significant effect 
on the decision to enrol in CHI (Okello & Feely, 2004; De Allegri et al, 2006a). Higher 
education levels have been linked to better access to information and therefore better 
decision-making (Bhat & Jain, 2006; Dong et al, 2006), and better appreciation of risk 
pooling and prepayment (Okello & Feely, 2004).  
 
Thus, it is clear that the level of education is not a significant distinguishing feature 
between members and non-members of CHI in the study area. The majority of household 
heads and their spouses in either category had lower levels of education and were 
subsequently engaged in peasant farming. It can thus be concluded that the CHI scheme 
is to some extent managing to enrol poor households and not necessarily the minority 
rural elites who are engaged in salaried employment. 
5.4 Wealth Profile 
Ownership of household assets, such as land, radios, bicycles, motorcycles and motor 
vehicles, mobile telephones and farm animals, as well as the type of dwelling, was used 
to estimate the socio-economic/welfare status of households. The assessment of socio-
economic status using a wealth profile instead of the level of income and expenditure has 
been successfully applied in various studies (Schellenberg et al, 2003; Worrall et al, 2005; 
Chitama, 2007). The justification is that in a rural setting with insignificant levels of 
salaried employment or other regular sources of income, it is not realistic to estimate 
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regular income and expenditure or levels of wealth and poverty in monetary terms. 
Instead, assets that can be easily observed or asked about are used. The work of 
Schellenberg et al (2003) and Worrall et al (2005) indicate that the results of such 
asset/wealth profiles are discriminating enough to reveal inequalities in health 
indicators. In this study, asset ownership is cross-tabulated with the status of enrolment 
to analyse the influence of household wealth profile (if any) to enrolment in the CHI 
scheme. Table 18 shows the cross-tabulation between the type of house, land ownership 
and enrolment in CHI. 
 
Table 18:  Type of house, land ownership and enrolment in CHI  
 
 CHI enrolment  status  
Significance 
(p-value) Lambda 
Cramer’s 
V 
Member Non-member Total 
n % n % n % 
Type of house    
Semi-permanent (Iron 
roofed 
110 84.6 104 80.0 214 82.3 
.174 .054(.069) .116(.174) 
Permanent (Brick and 
concrete) 
15 11.5 15 11.5 30 11.5 
Mud and Wattle 5 3.8 11 8.5 16 6.2 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Land ownership    
Nil 0 .0 7 5.4 7 2.7 
.020* .154(.071) .212(.020)* 
Less than 1 acre32 49 37.7 61 46.9 110 42.3 
2 -4 acres 67 51.5 48 36.9 115 44.2 
More than 5 acres 11 8.5 10 7.7 21 8.1 
More than 10 acres 3 2.3 4 3.1 7 2.7 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
*The chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.05 confidence level 
Note: Approximate significance of the value in parentheses, based on chi-square tests 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
5.4.1 Type of house 
The most common type of house for both members and non-members of the health 
insurance scheme was a semi-permanent iron roofed house (82.3%). The proportion of 
households with an iron-roofed house is slightly higher (84.6%) among scheme-members 
than among non-scheme-members (80%). Conversely, the number of non-scheme-
                                                
32 1 acre is equal to approximately 0.164 hectares. 
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members living in a mud and wattle house (which is the lowest quality house among the 
categories listed) (8.5%) is more than double that of scheme-members (3.8%). Since the 
type of house is a proxy indicator of the level of household income, it may imply some 
level of influence of household income on enrolment. The chi-square test, however, did 
not show a significant relationship between the type of house and enrolment (p=0.174). 
This could be attributed to the relatively low number of respondents who lived in a mud 
and wattle house, while, in contrast, the other two types of houses (semi-permanent and 
permanent) are almost evenly distributed among members and non-members of the CHI 
scheme.  
5.4.2 Land Ownership 
Land ownership is a significant indicator of household wealth status in the rural 
community. This has been highlighted in the WDR (2002) which recognises the fact that 
most of the world’s poor earn their living from agriculture. Since the major source of 
livelihood in the rural parts of Uganda is subsistence farming, landlessness or limited 
land ownership makes a household particularly vulnerable to poverty and destitution. 
Land shortage in southwestern Uganda is a historical factor (Carswell, 2002) that 
contributes to persistent poverty. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of 
households (44.2%) reported having only 2 to 4 acres of land. This indicates that most 
households are not able to grow sufficient food or cash crops. This has serious 
implications for their ability to have sufficient incomes to purchase their basic 
requirements, including health care. While the percentage of scheme-members and non-
scheme-members who reported having one acre of land or less is almost the same, more 
scheme-members (48.5%), than non-scheme-members (35.4%) reported ownership of at 
least 2 to 4 acres of land. The chi-square tests indicated a significant relationship between 
land ownership and status of enrolment (p=0.020), reflecting some socio-economic 
differences between the members and non-members of the CHI scheme.  
5.4.3 Ownership of Household Assets and Farm Animals 
Another set of variables used to position a household’s wealth profile or socio-economic 
status was ownership of basic household assets such as a radio, bicycle, cellular 
telephone, motorcycle or motor vehicle, as well as ownership of farm animals. Ownership 
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of a radio can be a measure of access to the mass media, while telephone ownership may 
indicate access to an efficient means of communication (UBOS & Macro International, 
2007); but the latter is also currently considered a luxury, particularly in the rural areas, 
where it is still a rare good. Ownership of a means of transport (bicycle, motorcycle and 
motor vehicle) can be an indicator of the household’s level of access to public services and 
markets as well as exposure to developments in other areas (UBOS & Macro International 
2007: 18). Ownership of farm animals such as cattle, goats, sheep, pigs or poultry indicate 
the assets a household possesses that could be used to meet household demands. Table 19 
shows the level of ownership of household assets and farm animals across the two 
respondent categories. 
 
Table 19:  Ownership of household assets and farm animals and enrolment in CHI  
 
 
CHI enrolment  Status 
Total Member Non member 
f % f % f % 
Household Assets 
Radio 112 86.2 100 76.9 212 81.5 
Bicycle 61 46.9 50 38.5 111 42.7 
Cellular telephone 48 36.9 34 26.2 82 31.5 
Motor cycle 8 6.2 3 2.3 11 4.2 
Motor vehicle 2 1.5 3 2.3 5 1.9 
Television set 1 0.8 1 0.8 2 0.8 
Ownership of animals 
 Goats/Sheep 103 79.2% 69 53.1% 172 66.2% 
Poultry subsistence 51 39.2% 45 34.6% 96 36.9% 
Cattle 40 30.8 24 18.5 64 24.6 
None 14 10.8% 34 26.2% 48 18.5% 
Other 10 7.7 9 6.9 19 7.3 
Note: ‘f’ represents the number of responses. The figures do not add up to 100% because multiple responses 
were allowed. 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
a) Ownership of household assets 
The most commonly owned household asset is a radio, though the percentage of non-
scheme-members with a radio is slightly less (76.9%) than that of scheme-members 
(86.2%). Similarly, less non-scheme-members than scheme-members reported owning a 
bicycle (38.5%, 46.9% respectively), a cellular telephone (26.2%, 36.9% respectively) or a 
motor cycle (2.3%, 6.2% respectively). Conversely, out of only five respondents who 
owned motor vehicles, three were non-scheme-members. The results show that there is 
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some degree of difference in the wealth profiles of members and non-members of CHI, 
with the former likely to be in a relatively better economic status than the non-scheme-
members, notwithstanding the fact that across the board, the majority of households are 
engaged in subsistent livelihoods.  
 
b) Ownership of farm animals 
There seems to be a similar trend with regard to ownership of farm animals, with less 
non-scheme-members reporting ownership of all types of farm animals than scheme-
members. Alternatively, the percentages of non-scheme-members who do not own a 
single farm animal (20%) is almost double that of scheme-members (10.8%). Farm animals 
can be converted into cash income in times of financial need. Thus, a rural household that 
does not own any farm animal is in a more vulnerable situation in times of emergency 
financial need. Previous studies on health and poverty have shown that, in case of 
hospitalization, rural (poor) households would be forced to sell some of their household 
property in order to meet the cost of illness (Russell, 1996; Derriennic et al, 2005). In the 
absence of any domestic animals that can be quickly turned into cash, households would 
be forced to sell their most valuable asset, land (Musau, 1999), which would worsen their 
vulnerability to poverty and limit their access to health care.  
 
Similar trends in enrolment have been reported in other studies. For example, in Rwanda, 
Schneider and Diop (2001) found that, while prepayment schemes reached the poor, the 
destitute did not join the schemes. Similarly, in Gulu district (Uganda), households in the 
third and fourth wealth quartile were more likely to join the scheme than those in the 
lower wealth quartiles (Okello & Feely, 2004)33. 
 
It is apparent that households with the least wealth (assets) are less likely to enrol in CHI 
schemes. Participation in health insurance is not cost free but requires a minimum of 
income, which the most socio-economically disadvantaged households usually do not 
have. Some authors (Jutting, 2004) have advocated direct targeting of such households 
                                                
33 Lacor hospital health plan in Gulu district is urban based and recruitment into the scheme is based on 
formal employment and cooperative societies (Okello & Feely, 2004), thus disfavouring the unemployed 
people.  
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and individuals with subsidies in order to increase their chances of benefiting from CHI 
schemes. 
5.5 Summary of Key Findings 
The key findings from the assessment of profiles of those who enrol (scheme-members) 
and those who do not (non-scheme-members) are diagrammatically presented in the 
figure below. The figure is based on basic differences observed in descriptive statistics.  
 
Figure 10:  Key characteristics of scheme-members and non-scheme-members 
 
 
    Scheme-member Non-scheme-member 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: HH: household 
 
The figure attempts to delineate differences in the profiles of households that enrol in 
CHI and those that do not. Most socio-demographic characteristics such as the sex of the 
household head, marital status, number of children, religious affiliation, level of 
education, occupation, and major source of income revealed no significant differences 
between members and non-members of the CHI scheme. This suggests that the scheme 
has the potential to attract households from different socio-economic backgrounds.  
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Three characteristics showed a statistically significant relationship to enrolment, namely, 
household size (p=0.041), age of oldest child at home (p=0.039), and land ownership 
(p=0.020). The positive association between land ownership and enrolment in CHI, for 
example, could signify exclusion of the most vulnerable households. This is because land 
represents a major source of livelihood and supports key economic activities in the rural 
setting. Other facets of the wealth index such as ownership of household assets (radio, 
bicycle, motorcycle and cellular telephone) and farm animals (goats, sheep, cattle, 
poultry) also tended to be more represented among the scheme-members compared to 
non-scheme-members (Section 5.4: 135). Hence, the results show some inequalities in 
enrolment, with the scheme appearing to attract those in a relatively better socio-
economic status in the community. The results are consistent with the argument that, 
although CHI schemes are largely able to enrol people from low socio-economic 
categories, the poorest of the poor are left out (Schneider & Diop, 2001; Tabor, 2005).  
 
Chapter six examines the design of the CHI scheme, highlighting the implications of 
specific design aspects for the viability of the scheme. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DESIGN OF THE COMMUNITY HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 examined the profiles of households, highlighting the relationships between 
household socio-economic characteristics and enrolment in CHI schemes. It concluded 
that, although there are no significant socio-economic differences between those who 
enrol in CHI and those who do not, the most vulnerable segments of the rural population 
are excluded from participation. However, socio-economic characteristics of households 
do not act in isolation to influence enrolment in CHI, and in turn its viability. As argued 
in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.2: 49), design characteristics can significantly affect the viability 
of CHI schemes just as they can also affect large scale public health programs. This 
chapter describes the design features of the CHI scheme, and examines how these may 
influence its viability within the context of a rural community. The chapter presents the 
findings related to study objective number three, which seeks to examine the scheme 
design features. The first Section (6.2) of this chapter gives an overview of the 
organisational model adopted by Kisiizi health insurance scheme, highlighting the 
management structure and linkages to other grassroots organisations. The following 
sections examine the specific aspects of the scheme design with regard to risk pooling, 
revenue collection and purchasing/provision of services. The chapter concludes with an 
evaluation matrix showing the key strengths and weaknesses of the design aspects.  
6.2  Organisational Model 
CHI schemes adopt different designs depending on the context within which they are 
operating, the initiators of the scheme, and the best practices from other areas. Three 
common models are mentioned in the literature, namely, the provider-based model, the 
insurer model and the linked model (See Section 2.5.2.1: 49 for a discussion of the 
different models of CHI).  
 
Kisiizi health insurance scheme has transformed from a provider-based model to an 
insurer model. When the scheme started in 1996, it was owned and managed by the 
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hospital, which was at the same time the health service provider. The scheme was being 
run as a project in the wider establishment of the hospital. The hospital received the 
premiums and bore the losses and/or liabilities of the scheme. In 2003, the hospital 
passed on the ownership and management of the scheme to Microcare, an independent 
insurance company. This transformed the design of the scheme to an insurer model. The 
current model could be graphically represented as follows: 
 
Figure 11:  Current organisational model of Kisiizi health insurance scheme 
  
      Premium payment 
 
 
                                                                           Provision of services 
                     Provider payment  
 
 
 
 
The organization (in this case, Microcare) manages all the key functions of the scheme, 
including pooling of resources and purchasing of services. Premiums are paid to the 
organization, the members receive services from the mandated provider, and the 
provider (in this case the hospital) bills the organisation at the end of each month. 
According to the hospital administration, a number of factors motivated the change in the 
design of the scheme. Significant among them was that the hospital, not being an expert 
in insurance, lacked the capacity to manage the scheme. As a result, losses were reported: 
We were making losses and we had to incur them ourselves. Secondly, there was reduced 
financial support from external donors and it became difficult to run the scheme, so we 
decided to bring in someone who could manage it better. (Hospital Administrator, 
Kisiizi hospital, October 2007) 
 
The perceived advantages of an insurer model include better management of the scheme, 
since it is part of the wider operations of the insurance company (Tabor, 2005). Risks can 
Health service provider 
• Service Provision 
 
Scheme-members 
 
 
NGO: Microcare 
•  Pooling of resources 
• Purchasing of 
services 
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be reinsured34. In addition, the hospital management is freed from the responsibility of 
routine management of the scheme to concentrate on its primary task of providing health 
services. It was also argued that having an insurance company run the scheme meant that 
it could be supported with profit made from its commercial insurance activities in the 
urban centres.  
We are running that scheme as a not-for-profit scheme. Our primary goal is to increase the 
rural poor’s access to health services. So we use the profits we make from the commercial 
insurance schemes to subsidize the CHI schemes. Currently the administration costs are 
subsidized in this way, until the scheme has become self-sustaining. (Country Manager, 
Microcare, September 2007) 
  
Scheme policy documents that were reviewed do not spell out the nature of the scheme. 
However, KIs from Microcare maintained that the scheme operates as a not-for-profit 
project. This view was shared by the hospital administration at Kisiizi: 
At first we approached Microcare for financial support to continue running the scheme but 
we later realized they were interested in running the scheme as part of their projects. We 
did not see any conflict of interest and so far they are handling the scheme as a community 
based intervention and not really as a commercial undertaking. (Hospital Administrator, 
Kisiizi hospital, September 2007) 
 
Hence, in principle, Kisiizi health insurance is a community-based health insurance 
scheme despite the fact that it is being operated by a private health insurance company. 
The organizational model appears to be suitable in its current form, considering the fact 
that insurance is a new concept in Uganda, and therefore there is a need for it to be 
propagated by an organization that has some level of expertise in the sector. The model 
adopted has been supported in the CHI literature as a form of vertical bridging linkage 
(Bennett, 1998), which underscores the role of NGOs and other institutions in building 
the capacity of CHI schemes in technical areas, such as financial, administration and 
general management of the schemes. This can boost their sustainability, as the capacity at 
community level is built progressively. The positive role of private organisations, 
particularly, NGOs has also been linked to the apparent success of CHI schemes in 
Rwanda where the CHI initiatives were based on partnerships between local 
administrators, grassroots associations, NGOs and micro-finance schemes (Busingye, 
                                                
34 Reinsurance is a process whereby an insurance company enters into a contract with a third party to 
protect the insurance company against losses. The contract provides for the third party to pay for the loss 
sustained by the insurance company when the company makes payment on the original contract. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 145
2008). Similarly, in India, the success of the SEWA program has been partly attributed to 
the fact that the organisation already had experience in financial services and insurance 
management (Jutting, 2001). Hence an insurer model of CHI may strengthen the 
successful adoption of CHI. As indicated in Chapter 7 (Figure 14: 166 & Figure 17: 182), 
positive trends in enrolment and cost recovery appear to have coincided with the change 
in the model of the scheme, from a provider model to an insurer one. However, the CHI 
schemes have to be cautious of the dependency syndrome that could result from top-
down, non-participatory management, which may threaten the very goal of sustainability 
of such schemes.  
6.2.1. Management Structure 
There is a centralized structure of management, with Microcare running the scheme 
directly. At branch level, the scheme is coordinated by a manager who oversees the day-
to-day running of the scheme and reports to the Director at the country office. Other staff 
at the branch office include a field officer whose task is mainly community mobilization 
and sensitization; a registered nurse who receives and crosschecks claim forms from the 
patients; a data entrant who enters all membership information into the database and 
crosschecks identification documents; and other support staff. The hospital 
administration and the community are only represented in meetings in order to get 
consensus on issues of interest but they have no direct powers to influence decision 
making with regard to the scheme. As reiterated in the FGDs, community participation is 
through the engozi leaders who represent the various enrolled groups:  
The chairpersons of community groups put in a lot of effort but they are not facilitated at 
all. They act as our ambassadors in the regular meetings…They act as channels of 
information. They take information from the community to the scheme and from the scheme 
to the community. (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
There was little evidence to suggest that the community representatives have any powers 
to influence decision making with regard to the scheme policy. However, their active 
involvement has the potential to stimulate increased usage of CHI and it was indeed 
identified as an avenue for legitimizing the viability of CHI. 
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6.2.2 Relationship of CHI to Other Grassroots Organizations 
It has been argued that community solidarity, extra-community networks, vertical civil 
society links and other inter-societal relations at local level affect the viability of CHI 
(Mladovsky & Mossialos, 2008). Two types of linkages were examined in this study, 
namely, linkages of CHI to mutual aid groups and its linkages to microfinance. The 
former are believed to augment solidarity and the ethic of mutual aid that is inherent in 
CHI. The latter provide opportunities for enhancing the revenue collection function of the 
health insurance scheme. 
 
a) Linkages to Mutual Aid Groups 
According to various authors (Musau, 1999; Hsiao, 2001; Jutting, 2001; Chirmulay & 
Devadasan, 2006), mutual associations provide a good environment for CHI to be 
established and sustained, since they share common features, particularly in the sense of 
collective action. They are a form of social capital in the sense that they promote social 
cohesion and solidarity. In the area of study, these associations take various forms, 
including burial groups where households pool resources that are used to provide 
support during bereavement. Stretcher groups are those that jointly own a stretcher (a 
form of local ‘ambulance’ made out of local materials, which is used to carry a sick person 
to hospital) so that in case a member is sick, she/he can be transported to the health 
facility. Savings and credit associations engage in local savings and loans at group level. 
Other groups revolve around religious associations, such as mothers’ unions. Other 
associations include the local institutions, such as micro-finance associations, dairy 
farmers’ associations and tea or coffee growers’ associations. The study sought to 
establish whether there was any relationship between mutual aid groups and enrolment 
in CHI. Respondents’ membership of mutual aid groups is indicated in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12:  Respondents' membership of mutual aid groups  
(N=260)  
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Source: Field data, September, 2007 
Almost all respondents belonged to at least one mutual aid group (excluding CHI). Only 
6.2% of the respondents, all of whom were non-scheme-members, indicated that they did 
not belong to any local association. The motivation to join local mutual help groups was 
mostly linked to the need for mutual assistance in times of emergencies: 
… if I am in a zonal group35, I know that if I die, my family will not suffer meeting burial 
expenses. They will be assisted. People who come for burial will get something to eat. It 
just works like the insurance scheme – once you are a member of those groups, you feel a 
bit secure because you are not alone in case of trouble. In case you cannot walk to hospital, 
there will be people to carry you. (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
It is apparent that the community appreciates the ethic of solidarity and mutual aid. 
However, the slight differences in membership to these groups between CHI members 
and non-members support the view that CHI thrives in an environment of trust and 
solidarity. It can be argued that households with a higher level of mutual association are 
more easily attracted to CHI than those that do not easily associate. This could imply that 
people who are already pooling resources and sharing risks in mutual aid groups can 
easily understand the principle of risk sharing and planning for future uncertainties that 
underlie health insurance. This finding is supported by a study in China (Zhang et al, 
                                                
35
  A zonal group is a village-specific group that associates to achieve a common objective 
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2006), where a significant association was demonstrated between indicators of social 
capital (i.e. degrees of trust and reciprocity) and farmers’ willingness to join CHF 
schemes. Other authors (Hsiao, 2001) have linked levels of trust and reciprocity with 
willingness to pay for CHI schemes to the fact that individuals with higher levels of 
solidarity are more ready to accept the cross-subsidization that is implicit in the CHI 
mechanism. However, it is possible that people who are not in mutual aid groups are 
those who are very poor, who barely have a means of livelihood and who therefore 
would not even be able to afford the meagre contributions to the mutual aid groups. Such 
a category of people would simply not be able to afford the cost of insurance. The chi-
square tests indicated a moderately significant relationship between enrolment and 
membership in a mutual aid group (p=0.004). 
 
The mutual aid groups have the potential to contribute positively to the viability of CHI. 
Firstly; they provide a platform for mobilization and sensitization about CHI with the use 
of minimal resources. Secondly, some degree of social cohesion is generated through such 
groups and this can further strengthen the effective adoption of CHI: 
In our work, we have supported some groups in the communities and what I have observed 
is that if a community is the same – that is they are united, share similar values and beliefs, 
these groups can be effective. That means also that community health insurance can work 
in that setting unlike among the urban poor where you find that people have very varied 
interests. (Executive Director, THETA, May 2008) 
 
The majority of these community groups have their own internal rules and regulations, 
although this may not be documented due to the informal nature of the groups. In 
addition, a number of such groups are formed for mutual assistance, and therefore 
involve an element of resource pooling and risk sharing. Thus, the idea of health 
insurance, if properly explained, would not be completely strange to community 
members. This view was shared by a number of KIs: 
The mutual help groups have existed in these communities since time immemorial. They 
have not died out and they are voluntary. If people can voluntarily come together to plan 
for their burial, why can’t they plan for their health? All they need is for the idea to be sold 
to them and you let them own it and manage their affairs. (National Coordinator, 
UCBHFA, October 2007) 
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The local community groups such as burial associations, savings and credit associations, 
which are spread throughout the communities, provide effective avenues for mobilization and 
sensitization about community health insurance. (KI, DDHS, Rukungiri, September 
2007) 
 
As indicated earlier in this section, almost all community members are attached to one or 
more groups. Other groups such as savings and credit societies, revolving fund groups, 
dairy farmers associations, and a number of other interest groups, which characterise 
rural communities in Uganda, provide an opportunity for the promotion of CHI. 
 
b) Linkages to Microfinance 
As in a number of developing economies (Gumber, 2001), microfinance (micro-credit and 
micro-saving) schemes are being promoted in Uganda as part of the broader poverty 
reduction strategy. One of the most recently launched poverty eradication programme by 
the government, Prosperity for All (NRM manifesto, 2005) works through the microfinance 
associations as the major engine for rural development. Individuals are advised to form 
groups through which they can access low interest loans for self-help projects. Because of 
this initiative, there has been a proliferation of microfinance institutions at the grassroots 
level. Most of these operate as village banks, offering loans and savings facilities. In the 
area of study, two major institutions were prominent, namely, Rubabo people’s bank and 
Uganda Microfinance Institution, which has a branch in the hospital premises, next door 
to the Microcare offices. The health insurance scheme management sees the availability 
and use of microfinance facilities as a means to reduce poverty, a view that has been 
supported in literature (Diop & Butera, 2005); it also promotes the idea of saving for 
health. In such cases, instead of the households paying directly to the insurance scheme, 
they pay through the microfinance institutions. With this in mind, the researcher sought 
to establish the extent of membership in the microfinance associations and to identify any 
linkages with enrolment in CHI schemes. Figure 13 shows respondents’ membership to 
any local microfinance association.  
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Figure 13:  Respondents' membership of any local microfinance association  
(N=260)  
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Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
Scheme-members are more likely to be members of a microfinance association than non-
scheme-members (50.8% and 33.1% respectively). This is consistent with the pattern in 
Tanzania’s community health fund (CHF), where membership of micro-credit 
associations was a significant predictor of enrolment in the CHF (Chitama, 2007). This 
may imply that people who enrol in the CHI scheme have a higher propensity to save. 
Conversely, it could imply that households that have easier access to micro-credit 
(possibly due to ownership of some form of collateral) can also easily enrol in CHI. Some 
authors (Preker et al, 2002) have also argued that establishing and strengthening links 
with formal financing networks is one way of constructing bridging social capital 
(Mladovsky & Mossialos, 2008) essential for the viability of CHI schemes. Making 
microfinance more available could have positive implications for the viability of CHI. 
6.3. Risk/Resource Pooling 
Pooling refers to the accumulation of prepaid health care revenues on behalf of a 
population (Kutzin, 2001); or the extent to which contributions are accumulated and 
managed in order to spread the risk of payment of health care among all members of a 
pool, instead of requiring that people pay individually for their health care (Carrin, et al, 
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2005). The process of resource and/or risk pooling may involve enrolment of groups, 
households or individuals. This section examines the enrolment procedures for Kisiizi 
health insurance, highlighting its implications for the viability of the scheme. 
6.3.1 Enrolment Procedure 
Kisiizi health insurance scheme enrols pre-existing groups in the community, such as the 
engozi (stretcher) groups, burial groups (to assist during bereavement), zonal groups, 
women’s groups and various associations including teachers and farmers associations. 
The sub-unit for registration is the household. This means that, even if an individual were 
part of an existing group, he/she would not be enrolled in the scheme (unless that 
individual can be defined as a complete household). For a group to be registered it 
should comprise at least 20 households, and 50% of these should have paid at the time of 
registration. The underlying principle for group enrolment is to reduce adverse selection.  
Health insurance principles have this belief that at least the first 20% of those registering 
are not healthy. By insisting on the 50%, we attempt to ensure that both the healthy and 
the non-healthy join the scheme. Otherwise, it would be a sickness association. (Scheme 
Manager, September 2007) 
 
Other advantages of group enrolment identified by the respondents were that, with 
regard to administration, groups are easier to manage, since they already have their 
internal rules, regulations and local sanctions. For example, at community level, if a 
member does not contribute towards burial expenses for the neighbour, he/she will be  
abandoned by the whole neighbourhood when faced with a similar disaster. The groups 
are also easier to mobilize than individuals and in addition serve as channels for 
information sharing: 
The community already has avenues for mobilization and sensitization. The mutual help 
groups can be utilized to promote and strengthen community health insurance. (KI, 
DDHS, Rukungiri district, September 2007) 
 
If a member fails to pay, the group can pool resources and pay for him or her. He can then 
refund the money later. The scheme does not have to engage in such administrative details 
with individual households. (Scheme Manager, September 2007) 
 
The recruitment procedure has no big problem. We mobilize ourselves in groups and we 
choose our own members. We only contact the scheme for registration; so most of the 
internal organisation is done by the group members, which is convenient for the scheme. 
(Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
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As reflected in the quotations, group enrolment is not only beneficial to the members but 
also cost-effective with regard to scheme administration. This kind of design 
characteristic has been identified as one of the ways of promoting the success of CHI 
(Dong et al, 2003; De Allegri et al, 2006b; Poletti et al, 2007). It is believed that group 
enrolment not only reduces adverse selection but also protects the interests of vulnerable 
persons such as the aged, women and the poor, whose chances of participation are 
enhanced more through group rather than individual enrolment. However, community 
members also reported difficulties with group enrolment. For example, the delay in 
mobilizing the required number of households can prevent some households from 
enrolling in the scheme: 
The scheme requires that households cluster themselves in a group of at least 2536 
households. This has blocked some of us from joining at the time we wanted to. We 
mobilized 19 households in the village but we could not be registered. Other households 
already belonged to other groups. We have to wait until we raise the remaining number. In 
the meantime, others lose interest and fall out. (Non-member, Ndago parish, 
Nyarushanje Sub-county, September 2007) 
 
Sometimes a member is not able to renew registration in time. Later when they want to 
pay, they are told that registration for that group has closed. We think they should soften 
on that so that whenever someone gets money, they can renew their registration even as 
individual households. (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
Despite some level of ill will of group enrolment in the community, it is considered a 
strong tool against adverse selection. This is especially true in a rural community with 
high levels of sickness and poverty. Hence, this study considers this design feature a best 
practice in enhancing the viability of CHI in Uganda. 
6.4. Revenue Collection 
Revenue collection is the process by which financial contributions are determined and 
obtained from subscribing entities or other sources. This section describes the premium 
setting procedures and current levels, the modes of payment, and co-payments by the 
members of the health insurance scheme. 
                                                
36 The scheme policy stipulates at least 20 households in a group. The misinformation about the scheme- 
design could be attributed to low levels of sensitization, which in turn may contribute to low enrolment 
levels. 
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6.4.1 Premium Setting and Levels  
Premiums can be either community rated or income rated. Community rating refers to a 
policy in which the premiums are related to the risk of the group in totality. The 
premiums will not vary according to age, sex, health risk, occupation or other profiles 
(Criel & Kegels, 1997; Devadasan, 2006). The premium is determined by the collective 
experience of all insured people in a particular community. Income rated premiums are 
varied according to household income (sliding scale setting).  Income rating has been 
recommended as a fairer way of promoting equity in insurance (Dong et al, 2005), since 
poorer households do not have to pay the same amount as wealthier ones. In the case 
studied, the amount of the premium is community rated, with differences based only on 
the size of the household. The bigger the household, the higher the amount paid, as 
indicated in Table 20.  
 
Table 20:  Current premium rates for the insurance scheme 
 
Family size Annual premium (Ug shs) 
1-4 persons 24,000/= 
5-8 persons 32,000/= 
9-12 persons 40,000/= 
Any additional person  8,000/= 
Exchange rate: US$ 1=1700 Ug shs (September 2007) 
Source: Microcare health (Kisiizi) scheme policy (no date) 
 
As indicated in the above table, the amount of the premium increases with household 
size. However, households with an unequal number of people may in fact pay the same 
amount of premium, if they fall within the same size-category. This implies that the net 
payment made by larger households is less than that made by smaller households. Some 
authors (Criel & Kegels, 1997) have argued that community rated premiums discourage 
low risk individuals from purchasing insurance, while encouraging those who are at high 
risk of falling ill. This may be true to some degree in the case studied. The large 
households had a higher probability of enrolling in the scheme than the relatively smaller 
households, partly because they are favoured by the premium design (Section 5.2.5: 127). 
This adverse selection can threaten the viability of CHI. 
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In contrast, community rated premiums are consistent with the principle of simplicity of 
contract inherent in CHI, as argued by Tabor (2005). They remove the need to assess 
individual or household risk profiles, and reduce scepticism and suspicion among 
community members too. This kind of simplicity and non-discriminatory premium 
setting seems to be appreciated by scheme-members: 
The good thing about the scheme is that once you fall sick, the monetary assistance you get 
is not pegged on your contribution to the scheme. They cover the full cost even if it is 
300,000 Ug.shs. (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
In a rural community with relatively low levels of education and exposure, it may 
become difficult for given households to understand why they are paying different 
premiums even when they have the same household size. If this happens, it could lead to 
low membership and/or high drop-out rates. It has also been argued that community 
rated premiums reduce the scope for manipulation and contribute to low transaction 
costs for the scheme (Khetrapal, 2004), all of which contribute to the scheme’s viability. 
Hence, the design of a scheme in terms of premium setting can have a bearing on its 
viability.  
6.4.2 Periodicity and Mode of Payment 
The premium is paid annually (i.e. every 12 months). Initially, it used to be paid 
quarterly. This was extended to annual payments in order to minimize the administrative 
costs of collecting premiums and processing group renewals. It was also envisaged that 
the longer period would give households enough time to mobilize resources for payment. 
The scheme does not allow instalments and neither does it allow in-kind payments, as 
has been reported to happen in some similar schemes (Hope, 2003). While some 
respondents regarded annual premiums as suitable, others felt they were economically 
burdensome, especially to poorer households: 
The mode of payment is okay. At first they used to pay per quarter but that had its own 
problems. People were always on tension for the next payment and those collecting the 
money were overworked. Now they pay per year. Both administratively and on the part of 
the people paying the premium, I think it is convenient. (Hospital administrator, Kisiizi 
hospital, October, 2007) 
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At least they should pay once a year so that people are not on tension of raising money all 
the time.37 (Non-scheme-members’ FGD, April, 2008) 
 
At first we used to make quarterly payments but when they changed to annual payments, 
the money became too much…we find it hard. (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
 From the above quotations, it is evident that there are still mixed feelings about the mode 
and timing of payments. While it is administratively convenient, the lump sum payment 
could prevent some households from enrolling in the scheme. This perception was 
observed among the members of a CHI scheme in Burkina Faso, who preferred to spread 
their payments over a longer period of time in several instalments (De Allegri et al, 
2006b). A number of enrolled groups have devised locally managed ways of saving for 
health insurance; for instance, member households may deposit a given amount of 
money into a small pool every month so that at the time of payment (in a year’s time), 
some money is available and households just need to top up in order to come up with the 
required amount for renewal of registration in the CHI scheme. This kind of arrangement 
has been reported to have aided poorer households in Rwanda to enrol in CHI (Jutting, 
2001). Thus, there is clearly a need to consider increasing the flexibility in how often the 
payments are made.  
 
Some KIs also felt that flexibility in the mode of payment, particularly with regard to in-
kind payments, is a reasonable way of enhancing the viability of CHI, given the fact that 
most rural households lack effective access to markets to turn their produce and assets 
into cash: 
The issue of monetarizing poverty is a big challenge…people may have no money but they 
have their chickens, goats, and other agricultural produce…and that is where the 
traditional healing system beats the western one. The traditional healers are a bit flexible. 
They will ask you to bring what you have. The community health insurance should be 
linked to a relevant economic activity. It should not be monetarized in a rural community. 
(Executive Director, THETA, May 2008)  
 
When asked why in-kind payments such as agricultural produce are not allowed, despite 
the fact that this is a subsistence community, the scheme manager explained that it would 
                                                
37 The view represents a misinformation about aspects of the design of the scheme since in fact the premium 
is currently paid annually. 
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create difficulties in valuing, storage and marketing of produce in order to convert it into 
the needed cash. Since the health service providers do not accept in-kind payments, it is 
not considered an appropriate mode of payment from the community. Instead, 
households are encouraged to sell their extra produce and pay cash to the insurance 
scheme.  
 
Generally, making premium payments flexible in a subsistent community can help to 
enhance the relevance and viability of CHI, a view that has been supported in the 
literature (Hope, 2003; Chirmulay & Devadasan, 2006). 
6.4.3 Co-payments 
Co-payment is the fee paid on every visit to the health facility in addition to the insurance 
premium. The rationale for co-payment is to reduce unnecessary use of services, for 
example, through reporting of minor conditions that could have been handled at PHC 
level. The current rates are indicated in Table 21. 
 
Table 21:  Co-payments/registration fees for hospital visits 
Enrolment status Fees 
 In-patient Out-patient Weekend/Holiday 
(outpatient) 
Scheme-Member 5000/= 1000/= 2000/= 
Non-scheme-member 20,000/= 2000/= 4000/= 
Exchange rate: US$ 1=1700 Ug. shs (September 2007) 
Source: Microcare health (Kisiizi) scheme policy (no date); Kisiizi hospital administrator, 2007 
 
It was noted in the study that the co-payment is set below the general payment made by 
the non-members of the scheme. Respondents did not criticize the co-payment rates but 
rather perceived it to be fair, given the amount of money they would otherwise have paid 
without insurance. However, others did not perceive it as being different from what the 
non-scheme members were paying: 
You just pay 1000/= for registration if you are an out-patient and 5000/= if you are 
admitted. That is all. Sometimes you don’t even know what the total bill was – the scheme 
takes care of that. It is really helpful. (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 157
The difference in payment especially for out-patients is not so significant. The scheme-
member pays 1000/=, the non-member pays 2500/=38. There are no other benefits such as 
faster treatment for the scheme-members so that the non-members can be enticed to join. So 
some people will base themselves on such arguments to justify their not joining the scheme. 
(Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
Co-payments have been highlighted in CHI literature as an important tool to prevent 
over-use of services and moral hazard (Criel & Kegels, 1997; Atim, 1998; Bennett, 2004). 
However, high co-payments may deter people from utilising the health services. In 
China, average co-payments have been set at 80% of the fees (Wang et al, 2005), which 
recreates a financial barrier posed by OOP payments even if the premiums are kept low. 
Thus, the application of co-payments as a tool against moral hazard needs to be applied 
with caution, or it will negate the benefits of CHI. 
6.5 Purchasing of Services/Service delivery 
Purchasing and service delivery are processes by which pooled contributions are used to 
pay providers to deliver a set of health interventions to the members of a scheme. It 
involves not only the benefits package but also the provider arrangements through which 
the package is delivered.  
6.5.1 Benefits Package 
The benefits package refers to the range of services that scheme-members can access from 
the hospital in exchange for premiums. The degree of risk protection offered by a CHI 
scheme depends upon the extent to which the benefits package covers a comprehensive 
range of services, particularly those that are of high cost (Bennett, 2004), as well as the 
relevance of the covered services to the community in which the scheme is operating 
(Mladovsky & Mossialos, 2008). The current study thus examined the range of services 
covered, the exclusions, and the extent of community participation in determining the 
package.   
 
                                                
38 This represents some misconceptions about co-payment, since the amount of money indicated for the 
non-scheme-members does not include the cost of drugs, which definitely increases the total cost paid by 
the non-scheme-member at the end of the hospital visit.  
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Currently, the main services covered under the Kisiizi health insurance scheme include 
casualty and out-patient care, in-patient services, surgery, maternity, prescribed drugs, 
dental and optical consultation among others (the full list of covered services is indicated 
in Appendix G: 281). The scheme covers most of the common causes of illness and 
hospitalization, as spelt out in the UNMHCP (Appendix H: 282), making it relevant to the 
community’s needs. Chronic conditions, referral and self and alcohol/drug induced 
accidents are not included in the benefits package. Previously, chronic conditions were 
covered, but these were later dropped in order to cut costs. Although this may be 
considered rational management in insurance principles, it has negatively affected the 
acceptability of the scheme among community members:  
The assistance from the scheme is very good apart from one thing – the exclusion of some 
sicknesses. In fact, we estimate that half of the people could have dropped out due to these 
exclusions. Others have been reluctant to join because of this discrimination against some 
sicknesses… The excluded sicknesses such as pressure, diabetes and asthma disturb people 
so much…It seems the scheme targets the less costly illnesses or those unlikely to happen 
such as accidents so that they can pay less money. (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
Some conditions such as pregnancy39 and accidents are excluded and yet these are big 
problems. This is a big weakness in the scheme’s design. It does not attract membership. 
(Non-scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
If they continue excluding some illnesses, more people may become disinterested and drop 
out. If the scheme was started to help the sick, then why do they say that this or that 
sickness is not covered? (Scheme-drop-outs’ FGD, April, 2008) 
 
Some KIs shared similar sentiments about the unfairness of exclusions: 
The benefits package is unfair. Chronic conditions are excluded and yet they pose 
significant problems to the people. The explanation given is that they take a lot of money 
from the scheme – which is true but the community will not look at it that way. And so it 
seems as if the scheme is not being helpful to the people with the most pressing health 
needs. (Hospital administrator, Kisiizi hospital, October 2007) 
 
It is clear from all the quotations that exclusions are a significant disincentive to 
membership. They negatively affect the acceptability of the scheme within the 
community, hence weakening its ability to maintain sustained growth. The scheme 
                                                
39 In the original scheme design, normal delivery was excluded from the benefits package but currently it is 
covered. However, the perception of exclusions remains prevalent in the community due to inadequate 
sensitization. This in turn threatens the viability of the scheme. 
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management explained that chronic conditions such as diabetes, hypertension, asthma, 
epilepsy, ulcers and sickle cell disease require constant treatment, and that this was 
draining the scheme’s financial resources. The options were to increase the premium in 
order to cover such conditions for a few people or to retain reasonable premiums and 
cover the most common causes of illness in the community. 
We held a meeting with all the groups (members) and explained the dilemma. It was 
becoming difficult to recover treatment costs from the premiums basically due to coverage 
of chronic conditions. The members reached consensus that these conditions should be 
excluded. (Scheme-manager, September 2007)  
 
There exists a trade-off between exclusions and affordability of benefits. Firstly, 
exclusions in a CHI scheme create uncertainty at the time of illness, since the patient does 
not know what the diagnosis will be when he goes to hospital and whether or not it will 
be covered by the scheme. From a public health perspective, exclusions do not provide 
protection for patients that are most vulnerable, such as the chronically ill (Devadasan et 
al, 2007). However, an all-inclusive package would imply increases in the premiums 
(Dong et al, 2003, 2004), which would make the scheme unaffordable to the majority of 
the population. Even in the national health system, a basic package that is believed to be 
cost-effective is offered vis-à-vis an all-inclusive health care package (Uganda, 1999). 
 
From this discussion, it is clear that the benefits package, though relatively 
comprehensive, is not fully appreciated by the community members and that it is one 
aspect of the scheme design that can affect the viability of CHI in a rural setting. There is 
need for continued dialogue with the community members in order to reach consensus 
on what should in fact constitute the benefits package, if the acceptability of the scheme is 
to be improved. 
6.5.2 Provider Options 
Health care for the scheme-members is purchased from one provider, namely, Kisiizi 
hospital. There is no referral required from lower level health centres. All members, 
irrespective of their area of residence, have to seek care from this hospital. Apart from the 
fact that the hospital was the original host and manager of the scheme, it is also one of 
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only two hospitals in the district. Further, it enjoys good will and a historically positive 
perception of its quality of care among community members: 
Kisiizi has expert doctors. If they treat you, you can even spend a whole year without 
falling sick again. Secondly, they have very effective drugs, so even if your condition is 
severe, you are sure you are in the right place. (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
The quality of care at the health facility is so crucial for the success of the scheme. If health 
workers are not giving attention to patients, there is no way you will convince someone to 
pay for such a scheme. (Private health practitioner, Rukungiri district, April 2008) 
 
Community members are attracted to the insurance scheme partly because of the choice 
of the service provider. The positive relationship between service provider options and 
sustainable membership in CHI has also been reported in Senegal, where the NGO 
hospital in the Thies region made the scheme attractive to the target population (Atim, 
1998; Jutting, 2001). Thus, the choice of providers has a strong influence on the viability of 
CHI. It is relatively easier to market a scheme that is linked to facilities believed to 
provide better quality services than otherwise.  
 
However, the study highlights growing dissatisfaction with the arrangement of a single 
provider of health care for scheme-members. This is partly related to the long distance 
and difficulties in transport to access the health facility, as well as to the waiting time at 
the hospital, which comes from overcrowding, as depicted in the opinions of the FGD 
participants. 
The way the scheme works is good but there are very limited providers. If they can allow 
members to seek care from lower level centres for the less severe sicknesses and only go to 
Kisiizi when the sickness is serious, it would cut on transport costs and also reduce 
overcrowding. (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
…if members go somewhere else like in a clinic, they pay for themselves yet sometimes it’s 
inevitable, so why would you have joined the scheme. (Non-scheme-members’ FGD, 
April 2008)  
 
The fact that all scheme-members have to report to Kisiizi hospital, irrespective of how 
far they have to travel to get there, is a big constraint to the viability of the scheme. 
Although Kisiizi hospital has a reputation for good quality care, which gives strength to 
the scheme, members would find it much easier if there were other options where they 
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could report in case of illness. The scheme is also not networked with other providers or 
schemes in other parts of the country. Therefore, if a member fell sick and is in another 
part of the country at the time, he would not be able to access benefits, even if he 
presented his insurance card. This is partly explained by the few existing schemes, which 
makes networking difficult at this stage. The scheme management argued that it has been 
difficult to identify other providers in the area because they do not meet the required 
minimum standards. 
We realize that the distance to the health service provider may discourage some people from 
joining the scheme. We have tried to identify providers who we can work with but it is 
difficult. Those who have structures have no adequate staff or the staffs employed are not 
qualified at all. The rural households may think that whoever is found at the health centre 
is a doctor or clinical officer, but we scrutinize the whole setup. One of the private clinics 
that seem popular has an absentee doctor who comes only during the weekend. It is useless 
for people to pay money and you send them to a health facility where they will get half-
baked services. (PHC Specialist, Microcare, November 2007) 
 
Accordingly, the lack of quality service providers, which undermines the government 
health care system, is also likely to affect the viability of CHI.  
6.6 Summary of Key Findings 
The design of the CHI scheme was reviewed in this chapter, drawing out the key aspects 
that are likely to influence the viability of the scheme. The positive and negative aspects 
of the design of the CHI scheme are summarized in the matrix below (Table 22).
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Table 22:  Evaluation of the design aspects of Kisiizi health insurance scheme 
 
Design aspect Strength Limitation 
Organisational  
design  
Insurer model 
(Section 6.2: 142) 
• Separation of pooling, purchasing and service 
delivery functions may enhance efficiency. 
• It is possible to reinsure risks through the bigger 
organisation (Microcare). 
• The model supports ‘vertical bridging’ (Bennett, 
1998) which has the potential to build local capacity. 
• There is less active participation of the 
community members due to the top-down 
approach to management. 
Linkages to 
grassroots 
organisations: 
• Mutual help 
groups 
• Microfinance 
(Section 6.2.2: 146) 
• CHI has effectively made use of the existing mutual 
aid groups in the community. 
• The higher level of membership to mutual aid 
groups provides an opportunity for mobilization and 
marketing of the scheme. 
• Establishing linkages with local microfinance 
associations is one way of enhancing social capital 
networks essential for the viability of CHI scheme. 
• Some non-scheme-members (6.2%) were also 
not members of mutual help groups. This 
indicates a form of vulnerability that needs to 
be addressed through health care subsidies. 
• The linkage with local microfinance 
associations is not well developed. However, 
taking that route could also pose a challenge 
due to financial risk implications involved in 
loans. 
Risk/Resource 
Pooling: Mode of 
enrolment 
 (Section 6.3: 150) 
• Group enrolment minimizes adverse selection. 
• It encourages mutual help and cross-subsidization. 
• It enhances community participation, ownership and 
the sustainability of the scheme. 
• The 20-member group minimum makes it 
difficult for smaller groups that would like to 
enrol. 
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Design aspect Strength Limitation 
Revenue 
collection: 
Premium setting 
and payment 
(Section 6.4: 152) 
 
• Prepayment minimizes barriers to health care access 
posed by OOP payments. 
• Premium is community rated and not risk/income 
rated, and this makes it more acceptable to the 
community (reduces tension within the community). 
• The premium rates favour larger households, which 
are in most need of subsidized health care. 
• The collection of funds is through the engozi group 
leaders, which is administratively efficient/cost-
effective. 
• Flat rate premiums are easier to calculate and 
manage. 
• Annual lump sum payments reduce the 
administrative costs of collecting and processing 
premiums for the scheme. 
• Instituting co-payments is a conventional tool 
against unnecessary use of services (Atim, 1998; 
Bennett, 2004). It is deliberately set below the market 
price in order to keep the scheme attractive and 
avoid creating another form of OOP payment for the 
users. 
• Flat rate premiums disfavour equity in financial 
contribution. 
• The favouring of larger households can result in 
the creation of a higher-risk pool, leading to 
over-use of services and faster depletion of the 
scheme’s resources, which threatens its 
sustainability. 
• The sanction of a waiting period after delayed 
premium payment is seen by the scheme-
members as too restrictive and a form of 
punishment. 
• No instalment payments are allowed, which 
disadvantages the poorer households. 
• No in-kind payments are allowed, yet this is a 
subsistent community. This could contribute to 
lower enrolment levels. 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 164
Design aspect Strength Limitation 
Purchasing and 
provision of 
services: 
 Benefits Package  
(Section 6.5.1: 157) 
• This is comprehensive and includes high risk, high 
cost services, particularly in-patient care. 
• It is aligned to the national minimum health care 
package, and it largely responds to the health needs 
of the community. 
• Chronic conditions are covered in emergency in-
patient care, which enables access to high cost health 
care. 
• The rationale for exclusions is not totally 
understood by the community. This has 
affected the marketability of the scheme. 
• The exclusion of chronic illnesses disadvantages 
a particular group of vulnerable people who 
have a greater need of health care. 
Provider options 
(Section 6.5.2: 159) 
• A popular provider was selected for service delivery. 
• The provider enjoys a positive image in the 
community and is well-known for providing better 
quality services. 
• Hospital-based services introduce the inefficient 
use of health resources in the broader health 
system. 
• There is only one provider option, which 
retains the cost of distance and time on some 
users, which in turn may be an obstacle to 
enrolment and effective access to services. 
Source: Based on field data, 2007-2008 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PERFORMANCE OF KISIIZI HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters (5 & 6), the household socio-economic profiles of 
members and non-members of CHI as well as the design features of the scheme 
were discussed. Their implications for the viability of CHI were highlighted. This 
chapter examines the performance of CHI in Uganda, drawing from the case of 
Kisiizi health insurance scheme. It builds on the findings of the previous chapters 
in assessing the viability of CHI. This particular scheme is considered 
appropriate for analysis, given that it has existed for over 10 years and that it was 
the first to be established in the country (Section 1.3: 17). The chapter begins by 
highlighting the levels of enrolment, giving both the reasons for enrolment and 
the constraints to enrolment. The scheme’s viability with regard to equity, 
financial efficiency, and sustainability is examined. Finally, the community’s 
perceptions of the viability of the CHI scheme are investigated. A summary of 
key findings is given at the end of the chapter. 
7.2 Enrolment Levels  
The findings indicate a high level of awareness of the CHI scheme among the 
sampled population (95.4%) (Refer to Figure 22-Appendix F: 280). This finding is 
interesting given the fact that there is no deliberate strategy in place to educate 
the community about CHI. Derriennic et al (2005), indicate that this may inhibit 
the growth of enrolment. The level of enrolment is a major indicator of the 
viability of CHI. Whatever potential it may theoretically have, if a scheme does 
not depict a sustained growth in membership, its viability will be questionable. 
High enrolment levels will not only increase the amount of resources collected 
through premiums and therefore contribute to financial sustainability 
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(Wiesmann & Jutting, 2000), but they will also increase the risk pool and levels of 
cross-subsidization where the healthy subsidize the less healthy and those with 
better incomes subsidize the poor. If the pool (membership) remains small, it 
could easily be characterized by a particular category of people such as the poor 
or only the sick. This adverse selection makes it hard for a CHI scheme to be 
viable. Hence, the study examined trends in enrolment as well as the reasons for 
and constraints to enrolment. 
7.2.1 Trends in Enrolment 
The study attempted to establish trends in enrolment over the years, using the 
available data from the scheme’s records. Figure 14 shows the trends. 
 
Figure 14:  Trends in enrolment in the CHI scheme 
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Source: Data extracted from Kisiizi Health insurance scheme data base. September 2007 
 
As is evident in Figure 14, the enrolment level has been growing, though the total 
membership is still low in relation to the target population of the area. Available 
information from the hospital records showed, for example, that for the year 
2006-2007, scheme-members comprised about 30% (8,554) of the general out-
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patient cases40 (29,902). Similarly, 3,958 out of 10,583 in-patient cases (34%) 
belonged to the scheme (Kisiizi hospital annual report, 2006-2007). This implies 
that, on average, scheme-membership covers only about a third of the target 
population. Nevertheless, the positive trends in enrolment levels are indicative of 
the potential of the CHI scheme to realize sustained growth. 
7.2.2 Reasons for Enrolment 
Scheme-members were asked to state the most important reason for enrolling in 
the CHI scheme. This was aimed at establishing their level of appreciation of the 
scheme, expected benefits from the scheme and their ability to interpret the 
primary purpose of insurance. These are crucial driving factors for the successful 
adoption of the CHI strategy (De Allegri et al, 2006b, c). The findings are 
presented in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15:  Major reasons for enrolment in the CHI scheme  
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Source: Field data, September, 2007 
                                                
40 This excludes antenatal services, child immunisation, family planning services, eye clinic, 
physiotherapy and dental services. 
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As indicated in Figure 15, almost a half of all the scheme-members interviewed 
indicated that they joined the scheme because they believed that it provides 
easier access to health care. This was confirmed through the qualitative data: 
…there are complicated illnesses, which private clinics cannot handle. They refer 
you to Kisiizi. It is not easy to get help from elsewhere. Or if you get an accident, 
you’ll have to go to Kisiizi. If you go there without insurance you pay something 
like 300,000 Ug.shs which we do not have. So if you are in the scheme it helps a 
lot (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
I lost my 2 year old son to malaria because I could not raise money to take him to 
hospital. Very many people were dying at that time due to lack of money to seek 
medical attention. When they (scheme staff) explained to us the way the scheme 
works, I decided to join (Scheme-member, Kahoko Parish, Nyakishenyi Sub-
county, September 2007) 
 
Other key reasons for enrolment included financial protection against the cost of 
illness (16.2%), frequent illness (15.4%), access to better quality care (13.8%), and 
mutual assistance (10.8%). Financial protection against the cost of illness was 
mainly interpreted in terms of the ability of a household to access medical care 
without being forced to sell a household asset such as land, bicycle or other 
assets. This protects the household from being plunged deeper into poverty.  
Why I love the scheme is that when you go to Kisiizi hospital and you are 
admitted, they give you all the care and treatment, give you a bill  of say 300,000 
Ug.shs and the scheme pays that money. You just go home without any financial 
burden (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
The identification of frequent illness as a major reason for enrolment (15.4%) 
indicates that households or individuals are able to estimate risk and base their 
decisions on that. This was also highlighted in the FGDS: 
I have a big family and am poor. I do not always have money to access medical 
care whenever needed. The scheme allows me to pay before so that I can go to 
hospital whenever need arises. That helps me a lot (Scheme-member, Ndago 
parish, Nyarushanje Sub-county, September 2007) 
 
Without the scheme, such families would constantly have to make OOP 
payments for every illness episode in the household. As members of the scheme, 
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however, they pay once, and they and their families are able to access medical 
care for the whole year (i.e. the registration period). On the one hand, attracting 
high risk cases (adverse selection), such as those who are most likely to fall sick, 
negatively affects the sustainability and profitability of an insurance scheme, 
since the collected premiums would quickly be used up. On the other hand, 
however, providing services to those with the greatest need is the cardinal goal 
of any health system. To minimize the effect of adverse selection, the scheme 
thus adopts enrolment by groups rather than by individuals in order to ensure 
that both the healthy and non-healthy, the poor and the relatively well-off join 
the scheme and share risks. 
7.2.3 Constraints to Enrolment 
Constraints to enrolment at household level were investigated with a view of 
finding out what might impede the success of CHI. Respondents who had never 
registered in a CHI scheme were asked to state their reasons for not enrolling in 
the scheme. The findings are presented in Table 23.  
 
Table 23:  Reasons for not enrolling in a CHI scheme 
 n % 
Reasons for not 
enrolling in CHI  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Unaffordable Premium  53 43.8% 
Inadequate understanding of how the scheme 
operates 
33 27.3% 
Other competing expenditures 8 6.6% 
Enrolment requirements (Group dynamics) 6 5.0% 
Inappropriate mode of payment 6 5.0% 
No major health problems  4 3.3% 
Have access to free health care 4 3.3% 
Other 7 5.9% 
Total 121 100.0% 
Note: 9 of the 130 non-scheme-members interviewed had once joined the scheme so they did not 
answer this question. 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
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Two major factors were identified as impeding enrolment at household level, 
namely, the cost of premium (inability to pay) and inadequate understanding of 
how the scheme operates. The majority of the respondents (44%) cited 
unaffordable premiums (more precisely, their inability to pay premiums) as the 
primary reason for not enrolling in the scheme.  
Those who cannot afford premiums cannot join. I can even be without any 
dependant at home but still fail to pay the money due to poverty. (Non-scheme-
members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
They should reduce the amount of money paid to the scheme so that every 
household can afford to pay. We know that the scheme is helpful but not everyone 
can afford that money. If there is a way it can be reduced, many people would join 
the scheme. (Non-scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
Inability to pay premiums has been consistently highlighted in literature as one 
of the threats to the viability of CHI (Jutting, 2001; De Allegri, 2006b; Basaza et al, 
2007; Ndiaye et al, 2007; Kyomugisha et al, 2008), with some arguing that there 
will always be households that are too poor to afford premiums no matter how 
subsidised or flexible they are (De Allegri et al, 2006b).  
 
Whereas almost all respondents were aware of the existence of a CHI scheme in 
their area (Figure 22- Appendix F: 280), almost a third of the non-scheme-
members had not enrolled due to a lack of adequate understanding of how the 
scheme operates. This is not surprising, given the fact that no systematic strategy 
is in place to sensitize, educate and mobilize the community to join the CHI 
scheme. Qualitative data confirmed these findings: 
There is a lack of proper marketing. For anything to be embraced, you need to 
educate the public and promote the idea. The scheme promoters do less of this, so 
it may be difficult for all people to understand the good there is in the scheme. 
Even in our community itself, there is little sensitization. They should talk about 
it on radio or select local leaders to go from village to village. In our village, they 
once brought a member of parliament, who is also a doctor, to talk about the 
scheme, and many people have joined as a result. (Scheme-members’ FGD, 
April 2008) 
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The community is not well sensitized about insurance. If people knew what 
benefits insurance holds for them, no one would be left out. People cannot 
continue to rely solely on the government health system because it still has so 
many problems. Drugs are not always available. (KI, DDHS, Rukungiri 
district, September 2007) 
 
While some have argued that knowledge alone is not enough to influence 
enrolment (Criel & Waelkens, 2003), the lack of or inadequacy of knowledge has 
a significant impact on the decision to enrol in CHI. De Allegri et al (2006a) posit 
that poor knowledge of scheme components may foster sentiments of scepticism. 
A deliberate investment in community awareness and education programs is 
recommended to realise sustainable growth of CHI (Tabor, 2005; Bhat & Jain, 
2006). 
 
Other respondents (3.3%) said they had no major health problem to necessitate 
joining the scheme, with some stating that they had dropped out because neither 
they nor their household fell sick during the period they were in the scheme. 
This perception was also apparent in the FGDs: 
Whether you are sick or not you keep paying money every quarter. At least if they 
were paying once a year …In fact I know of a man who drunk a lot of ‘waragi’ 
(local gin) so that he could at least fall sick and benefit from his money. He said 
he always helps others and never falls sick. (Non-scheme-members’ FGD, 
April 2008) 
 
Some people just try to ‘over-reason’ everything. They say ‘what if I pay and I 
don’t fall sick for a whole year’…there are others who will say they have fewer 
chances of falling sick so it is not necessary to join the scheme. But once a problem 
strikes and they are charged so much money at Kisiizi, that’s when they begin to 
realize that their reasoning was faulty. That is when you see some trying to join 
and yet it is not a season for registration or there is no ready group to register 
with. (Scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
This indicates some level of misconceptions about insurance as a concept, which 
needs to be constantly addressed if the viability of CHI is to be strengthened. 
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A few respondents mentioned difficulties with group enrolment, other 
competing expenditures, unfavourable modes (lump sum) of payment of 
premiums, exclusions from the benefits package, and distance to the health 
facility.  
I wanted to join but my group could not afford to collect money from all the 
members and yet they wanted the whole group to join at once. I tried to join with 
another engozi group but found they had finished registering their group. If they 
allow us to join at household or individual level, perhaps I would join. (Non-
scheme-member, Kacence parish, Nyakishenyi, September 2007) 
 
I was a member of the scheme but when I got dental problems, they refused to pay 
for me. Also pregnancy and normal delivery was not covered. I saw that I was not 
benefiting, so I dropped out. (Non-scheme-member, Kacence parish, 
Nyakishenyi sub-county, September 2007) 
 
Even when you’ve been a member for say 3 years, the moment you delay payment, 
they kick you out. They do not accept arrears or instalments. (Non-scheme-
member, Ibanda parish, Nyarushanje sub-county, September 2007) 
 
The responses indicate anomalies related to the design of the scheme. As 
examined in Chapter 6, the design of the scheme can influence its viability. The 
cost of rigidly applying design features and rules needs to be weighed in terms 
of the impact on enrolment as well as the general sustainability of the scheme. 
 
Surprisingly, access to free health care was not a major cause for lack of 
enrolment in the scheme (3.3%). This reiterates the recurring argument that the 
majority of Uganda’s population is paying for health care despite the free health 
care policy; furthermore, it validates the need to consider additional strategies to 
increase access to health care.  
7.3 Contribution of CHI to Equity  
One of the indicators suggested for measuring the viability of CHI is equity 
(Atim, 1998). Equity refers to the provision of services according to need. It has 
connotations of fair and just distribution of health resources (Donaldson & 
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Gerard, 1993). Equity is usually contrasted with equality, which is concerned 
with everyone having an equal share of services irrespective of variations in 
need. Equity in insurance is concerned with extension of coverage to the most 
vulnerable groups in order to assist them to access services while at the same 
time protecting them from the adverse impacts of health care costs. Equity may 
be indicated by the percentage of the population covered by the scheme and the 
distribution of enrolment across socio-economic categories (Carrin et al, 2005; 
Polonsky et al, 2009). There are two major dimensions of equity, namely, 
horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity focuses on equal 
treatment of equals or equal treatment for equal need. According to Donaldson & 
Gerard (1993) and Green (1999) horizontal has the following features:  
• Equal expenditure for equal need  
• Equal utilization for equal need e.g. equal length of stay per health 
condition  
• Equal access for equal need e.g. equal waiting time for treatment for 
patients with similar conditions (provides individuals with equal 
opportunities to use needed health services).  
• Equal health/reduced inequalities in health e.g. equal age and sex 
adjusted standardized mortality ratios across health regions. 
 
Conversely, vertical equity addresses the extent to which individuals who are 
unequal in society are treated differently. Individuals or households with 
different ability to pay should make appropriately dissimilar payments for 
health care, with higher income individuals or households paying more than 
those with a lower income level (McIntyre et al, 2005). According to Donaldson & 
Gerard (1993) and Green (1999), vertical equity criteria include: 
• Unequal treatment for unequal need e.g. unequal treatment of those with 
treatable trivial versus serious conditions 
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• Progressive financing based on ability to pay e.g. progressive income tax 
rates and mainly income tax financed. 
7.3.1 Horizontal Equity 
In this study, the focus of horizontal equity is on equal opportunity to access 
health care for those with equal needs. The variables used to assess the level of 
horizontal equity included: the distribution of enrolment at household and 
community levels, and the benefits package. 
 
7.3.1.1 Equity in Enrolment  
Various authors (Atim, 1998; De Allegri et al, 2006a, b) argue that the unit of 
enrolment can lead to either social exclusion or inclusion, and that it therefore 
has a strong bearing on equity of access to health care. Kisiizi health insurance 
scheme enrols groups, and the unit of enrolment in the group is the household. 
Persons are not allowed to register as individuals. Group enrolment enables 
pooling and transfer of resources to persons with the greatest need. Those who 
would not have managed their health care costs as individual households are 
able to share costs with group members. Although every group member 
contributes to the costs, services are accessed only by those who fall sick and 
need medical attention. This kind of risk pooling is an indicator that the scheme 
makes significant contribution to equity of access to health care. Carrin et al 2001 
(cited in Carrin et al, 2005) share a similar argument. The obligation to enrol 
entire households and not individual members of households ensures that every 
member has a relatively equal opportunity to access health services when in 
need.  
 
a) Enrolment at Household Level 
At household level, equity is manifested in the opportunity, which every 
member of the household has, to access health care at the time of need. The study 
attempted to establish any inequalities in enrolment by asking respondents to 
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state how many members of their households are enrolled in the CHI scheme, 
who is not enrolled and why. Table 24 shows the findings.  
 
Table 24:  Distribution of enrolment at household level  
  n % 
How many members of your 
household are not enrolled in CHI? 
None 99 76.2% 
1 13 10.0% 
1-3 11 8.5% 
4-7 7 5.4% 
Total 130 100.0% 
Among your household members, 
who is not enrolled in CHI? 
Other relatives/dependants 10 32.3% 
Children above 18 years 9 29.0% 
Children 6-17 8 25.8% 
Children below 5 years 3 9.7% 
Spouse 1 3.2% 
Total 31 100.0% 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
A significant majority of scheme-members indicated that all their household 
members were enrolled in the scheme. Among those who reported having some 
members of their household not enrolled, the category, ‘other dependants’ and 
children above 18 years of age made up the majority of excluded members. Only 
one respondent mentioned that her spouse was not enrolled in the scheme. The 
other category among those least excluded are children aged five and below. 
Among the most frequently cited reasons for not enrolling some members of a 
household were that they had no direct responsibility over those members, and 
that certain members were away from home for significant periods in a year. The 
former applied mostly to distant relatives and workers in the household, while 
the latter applied to students who study away from home and only are at home 
during the holidays. As there is currently only one prescribed provider, it is not 
helpful to have such children/dependants enrolled in the scheme.  
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Research (Uganda, 2006; UBOS & Macro International, 2007) has shown that, 
particularly in developing countries, women and children bear a heavier burden 
of ill health and that, despite this, they are the most disadvantaged with regard 
to access to health care. This is primarily because they do not control household 
resources and therefore are rarely able to make OOP payments for health. The 
fact that the CHI scheme in this case enrols whole households implies that a 
woman does not have to wait for the husband to release funds in order for her to 
seek medical attention, since financial access is secured beforehand, as reiterated 
by some KIs: 
In a community where women are the housekeepers while men go to drink 
(alcohol) or work outside the home, it is not unusual for a child to die at home 
while they are waiting for the husband to come and give money to take the child to 
hospital. With community health insurance, a woman does not have to wait for 
the husband, as long as she has the card to prove the child’s registration 
(National Coordinator, UCBHFA, October 2007)  
 
From the above findings, it can be deduced that CHI has largely promoted 
equitable access to health care at household level. Children and adults, male and 
female members have a relatively equal opportunity to secure access to health 
care once they are members of the scheme. Other factors, however, such as 
difficulties in transport (especially for women and children), may limit the 
chances of accessing timely medical attention. CHI reduces the gap by 
minimizing the financial burden. A similar finding is reported by Polonsky et al 
(2009), who found in relation to Armenian CHI schemes that these have 
significantly led to increased access to health services for women, children and 
the elderly, groups that are considered more vulnerable to ill health. 
 
b)  Enrolment at Community Level 
Socio-economic differences in enrolment were examined in much detail in 
Chapter five of this thesis. The findings showed some differences in 
demographic characteristics of households which are enrolled and those which 
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are not. However, for most variables such as age, sex, marital status and the type 
of marriage, the difference was not statistically significant, implying an equity-
neutral situation. Large household size was found to be strongly and positively 
associated with enrolment in CHI. Furthermore; households with a child aged 18 
and older were more likely to be CHI members than those whose oldest child 
was below 18 years. Since large households are associated with more frequent 
illness, and therefore with a greater need for health care, the findings suggest 
that CHI in this particular context is contributing to horizontal equity in access to 
health care at community level.  
 
However, in terms of the wealth index, the findings indicate some socio-
economic differences in enrolment. One of the most valuable assets, land, 
showed a positive correlation with enrolment in CHI. It is likely that the 
households with less land, or the landless, who in most cases constitute the most 
vulnerable, are excluded from CHI. While most study participants suggested that 
other factors are relatively stronger predictors of enrolment than household 
income and wealth, they at the same time concur that there is a group of 
households who are not able to join the scheme because of a lack of any source of 
livelihood.  
The indigents would be the most worthy target group but they do not have any 
source of livelihood so they cannot join. You have to have some money to pay 
premiums. Government should come in to help such people. Also the rich did not 
join because insurance was new and they have money to access services any time 
they need them. (National Coordinator, UCBHFA, October 2007) 
 
Most people who enrol are the poor, though the poorest of the poor miss out. They 
are not even in the community groups. On the other hand, the well-to-do say they 
can afford treatment costs when they fall sick. So there are not many civil 
servants in the scheme. It is mostly the non-working class who join. (Scheme-
Manager, September 2007) 
 
Hence, there appear to be two extreme minorities who are not able to benefit 
from CHI; the first are the indigents because they cannot afford any level of 
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premium however subsidized it may be; and the second are the rich who are 
confident of meeting the cost of health care on an OOP basis. It should be 
appreciated that no single health financing mechanism can achieve total equity. 
Even in the free health care system, it has been noted that the poorest of the poor 
have little or no access to health care (Donaldson & Gerard, 1993; McIntyre et al, 
2005). 
 
7.3.1.2 Benefits Package 
The benefits covered should reflect the most pressing health needs of the 
community if the health insurance scheme is to promote equity (Wiesmann & 
Jutting, 2000). The underlying principle is that those who are in most need of 
health care should in fact be accessing the required services. The study analysed 
the benefits package by comparing it against Uganda’s minimum health care 
package. In Uganda, the top 5 conditions that contribute highest to morbidity 
and mortality (particularly premature death) include malaria, acute respiratory 
tract infections, diarrhoea diseases, peri-natal and maternal conditions, 
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (Uganda, 1999, 2000, 2005). A critical look at the 
scheme’s benefits package indicates that some of these critical conditions are not 
addressed (HIV/AIDS and chronic conditions such as asthma and tuberculosis).  
 
As indicated earlier (Section 6.5.1: 157), the exclusion of chronic conditions 
disadvantages the people who are most in need of health care. The scheme 
administration explained that, although chronic conditions were excluded from 
the benefits package, hospitalisation resulting from such conditions is covered: 
What the scheme does not cover is regular medication and check up. But if a 
patient is admitted due to an attack of such a condition as diabetes, hypertension 
and other such conditions, the scheme covers the costs. (PHC specialist, Micro 
care, November, 2007) 
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With regard to HIV/AIDS, antiretroviral drugs are excluded, since they fall in 
the category of long-term treatment, which is considered too expensive for a CHI 
scheme. The exclusion of chronic conditions weakens the scheme’s contribution 
to equity in access to health care since the people most in need of health care 
once again do not have an equal opportunity to access it. However, every 
insurance scheme has limitations and the services covered have to be weighed 
against the services most needed by the community as a whole. 
7.3.2 Vertical Equity 
Vertical equity is reviewed in terms of contribution to health care costs according 
to ability to pay and is assessed with regard to premium setting and levels. 
 
7.3.2.1 Premium Setting  
Premium settings and levels were discussed in much detail in Section 6.4.1: 153. 
This section gives a critique of the design of the premium settings with regard to 
equity. Some authors (Atim, 1998; Criel et al, 1998; Dong et al, 2005) contend that 
flat fee premiums (which are common with community rating) disfavour the 
poor. They argue that a sliding scale, where households or individuals pay 
according to their levels of income and ability to pay, should be adopted if equity 
is to be achieved.  
 
The scheme studied adopts community rated, flat premiums. They are not 
differentiated according to the ability of the household to pay. This would 
appear to contradict the equity principle. Community rated premiums have been 
defended based on the simplicity of the contract inherent in most CHI schemes 
and the complexity of assessing income differentials in a rural poor context 
(Tabor, 2005). Sliding scale premiums are furthermore vulnerable to abuse, since 
it is difficult to categorize people into different income groups and to decide who 
will pay which amount.  
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Despite the debates in respect of setting premiums, the study findings indicate 
that larger households, which are considered more vulnerable to poverty and 
disease, are more represented in the scheme than smaller ones. A critical 
evaluation of the premiums actually indicates that the marginal cost for 
insurance decreases with household size. This may suggest that, despite the lack 
of outright income rated premiums, the scheme is able to contribute to vertical 
equity through other mechanisms, such as enrolment of households and groups. 
 
Another key aspect of vertical equity is the issue of exemption mechanisms and 
subsidies for the most poor (Jutting, 2004; Dong et al, 2005; Poletti et al, 2007; 
Kyomugisha et al, 2008). Kisiizi health insurance scheme currently has no 
strategy for exemptions or subsidies to the poor. The only defined vulnerable 
category is a group of AIDS orphans under Hope Ministries41, whose members are 
enrolled in the scheme with support from external donors. This is not an 
initiative of the scheme but of the hospital, which is the local organisation 
responsible for the group. Arrangements under which clearly defined vulnerable 
groups are exempted from payment have been reported elsewhere. For example, 
in Rwanda, the genocide survivors are exempted from premium payment 
(Musango et al, 2006). In other cases, NGOs collect premiums for indigents such 
as the disabled and the orphans, which gives these a chance to join CHI (Jutting, 
2001) as one way of promoting equity in access to health care. The greatest 
concern in this case is the sustainability of such exemptions in case donor 
funding ceases.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
41  The Hope Ministries are a charitable project run by Kisiizi hospital with funding from donors 
commonly known as friends of Kisiizi. 
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7.3.2.2 Perceptions of Current Premium Levels 
In order to get a balanced view on premium rates, the survey attempted to 
determine the perceptions of scheme-members about the current premium rates. 
Respondents were asked to rate the current premiums. Their perceptions are 
indicated in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16:  Respondents' perceptions of the current premiums 
(N=130) 
 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
Half of the scheme-members interviewed consider the current premium rates to 
be reasonable. The basis of their perception has mainly to do with the range of 
benefits they obtain or hope to obtain from the scheme. Thirty-five (35%) percent 
stated that the premium is affordable, while only 15% indicated that it is 
expensive. However, these findings need to be considered in view of other 
factors, such as the reasons given by non-scheme-members for not enrolling. The 
fact that unaffordable premiums were highlighted as one of the factors for non-
membership (Table 23: 169) shows that premium rates have not fully addressed 
equity issues at community level.  
7.4 Financial Efficiency  
The aspect of financial efficiency investigated was the extent of cost recovery. 
Cost recovery refers to the relationship between the amount of money collected 
14.6%
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primarily through premiums, and the amount spent. According to the UCBHFA 
guidelines, a scheme is considered viable if it covers more than 60% of its costs or 
user fees. This serves as one of the indicators of financial efficiency, and thus of 
the sustainability of the scheme. Using the scheme’s available financial records, 
this study established that cost recovery has been fluctuating over the years, 
although there are indications of consistent improvement since 2004. The trends 
in cost recovery for the last 7 years are presented in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17:  Trends in cost recovery for the CHI scheme (2001-2007) 
 
 
Source: Data extracted from Kisiizi Health insurance scheme, data base, September 2007 
 
While there was excellent performance in cost recovery between 2001 and 2003, 
the percentage reduced by a half in 2004, implying that the total cost of treatment 
was almost double the amount of money collected through premiums. One of the 
reasons given for the escalating costs during this period was the malaria 
epidemic that hit the area, which increased the number of scheme-members 
seeking medical treatment. This has been linked to covariant risks (Wiesmann & 
Jutting, 2000), where a person’s risk of needing care is dependent on his or her 
neighbour’s health, especially in situations of natural disasters or epidemics.  
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Fraud and adverse selection were also identified as a challenge for cost recovery. 
Households with a chronically ill member were mostly joining the scheme after 
realizing the financial protection offered by the scheme.  
Adverse selection was a problem despite the measures taken against it; people 
were still finding a way around it by conniving with the group leaders. We found 
we were spending a big portion of money on chronic illnesses until we decided to 
let the patient cover routine check up and medication and the scheme to cover 
patients in a crisis, i.e. when they are hospitalized. (Scheme manager, 
September 2007) 
 
In 2005, about 25 million Uganda shillings were spent on 300 visits for the 
chronically ill. On the other hand, we spent only 10 million on malaria, which 
was the leading cause of illness and admission among the members. So, which is 
cost-effective – look after a few members at the expense of the majority or 
compromise on chronic illnesses? We discussed this with the members and agreed 
to reduce the benefit due to chronic conditions. The other option was to increase 
premiums, which was not acceptable to the members. (PHC Specialist, 
Microcare, November 2007) 
 
Other threats to cost recovery raised by KIs were possible over-prescription by 
the service provider: 
Sometimes there is over-prescription. Different medical officers (practitioners) 
follow their own treatment protocols. It is rare to find practitioners following a 
particular treatment protocol even when the guidelines are in place. This is not 
only in one particular health facility. I think it is a general problem in Uganda 
(PHC Specialist, Microcare, November 2007) 
 
According to the scheme management, there are efforts to reduce such practices 
through joint meetings and on-going dialogue. Provider-induced demand in 
health insurance schemes is not a new phenomenon (Jakab & Krishnan, 2001; 
Jutting, 2001). It is normally linked to the provider-payment mechanism and 
particularly the fee-for-service approach, which gives the provider an incentive 
to supply unnecessary and expensive treatment. 
 
In order to improve cost recovery, the scheme has embarked on preventive 
health care measures to reduce the prevalence of disease in the community, 
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particularly among scheme members, so that, in the end, there is a reduction in 
treatment expenditures (Section 4.2: 97). The scheme management also explained 
that, instead of increasing premiums, they have tried to encourage more groups 
to enrol so that there is a wider base for collection of premiums. This appears to 
be bearing fruit, since the figures show that cost recovery for the scheme has had 
an upward trend since 2004, with remarkable performance in 2007 (140%). This is 
consistent with a positive trend in enrolment levels during the same period (see 
Figure 14: 166). The study observes that, with sustained growth in membership, 
full cost recovery is achievable, hence strengthening the viability of the scheme. 
It should be noted, however, that calculation of cost recovery in this scheme, just 
as has been observed in most other CHI schemes (Derriennic et al, 2005), 
excludes administration and other operational costs. Currently, these costs are 
covered through donor contributions. If there is no viable donor, such costs 
could threaten the financial viability of the schemes even when there is 100% 
treatment cost recovery. 
7.5 Sustainability 
Aspects of sustainability examined include financial performance, administrative 
and managerial capacity (with specific reference to available skilled manpower, 
the level of community participation and the legal and institutional framework). 
Previous assessment reports have questioned the financial viability and long-
term sustainability of CHI schemes in the absence of external donor funding and 
underwriting (Magezi, et al, cited in Derriennic et al, 2005). As shown in Section 
7.4, there is a positive trend in the recovery of treatment costs as a percentage of 
premiums. However, there is still heavy reliance on external assistance for other 
costs of the scheme. For example, in 2007, though there was a 140% treatment 
cost recovery, the total premiums covered only 52% of the annual budget. The 
remaining 48% was covered through external sources (Kisiizi Health Insurance, 
Annual Report, 2007). If total cost recovery was to be realized, it would imply an 
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increase in premiums. Given the low household incomes in the rural areas, the 
premiums may not be increased beyond a certain level as otherwise the majority 
of households would be excluded from the scheme. However, placing limitations 
on the benefits package may render the scheme irrelevant to the health needs of 
the people it is supposed to serve. Nevertheless, it is fair to state that so far the 
trends are a good indicator of the sustainability of the scheme. Judging the 
sustainability of CHI schemes based on donor dependency is unfair. As 
proposed by Carrin (2003), financial viability is not necessarily equal to self-
financing. Several other partners, such as local and central governments, NGOs 
and official donors, can contribute to the scheme’s resources, thereby 
strengthening the sustainability of CHI schemes. Even governments (in low and 
middle income countries) continue to depend on donor funding to sustain their 
systems.  
 
With regard to administrative and managerial capacity, there are still serious 
challenges. The concept of health insurance generally and CHI in particular, is 
relatively new in Uganda, and therefore there are hardly any people with 
specialised training in managing such schemes. Data obtained from the 
UCBHFA, indicates that none of the current scheme managers has any prior 
training in managing such schemes. The persons employed as managers are 
solicited from any field of social development and/or the health profession. This 
lack of qualified human resources to manage and promote the schemes may 
threaten the sustainability of the schemes or at the very least slow down their 
growth, as has been argued elsewhere (Ndiaye et al, 2007).  
 
Another important aspect of sustainability is beneficiary participation. 
Wiesmann & Jutting (2000) contend that, if members can identify themselves 
with ‘their‘ schemes because they control the funds and have decision making 
power, they will be less likely to make unnecessary use of health care services 
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(moral hazard). In other words, beneficiaries need to be actively involved in the 
planning, decision making and to some extent management of an intervention. 
This is important in the event that the major promoter or external assistance is 
withdrawn. The activities and/or results of such an intervention would then be 
sustained at least at some minimal level. In this regard, Kisiizi health insurance 
scheme has registered some degree of community (beneficiary) participation in 
its operations. Group leaders who attend regular planning meetings with the 
scheme administration represent all registered groups. Information from KIs 
suggests some level of joint decision-making: 
We do not take decisions without consulting and agreeing with the members. The 
group leaders represent the people, but we also have an annual general meeting 
where all the members attend and key decisions are made there. (PHC specialist, 
Microcare, November 2007) 
 
We explain to them to help them understand the implications of say exclusion or 
inclusion of a service on the benefits package. They can then decide what or which 
direction they would want the scheme to take. (Scheme-manager, September 
2007) 
 
The groups also play an active role in mobilization, information sharing and 
marketing for the scheme. Each group has an executive committee that is 
responsible for mobilizing members for regular meetings and other joint 
activities. They also act as channels of communication from the scheme 
management to the beneficiaries and vice versa. This enhances positive feedback 
in the management of the scheme. The committee members work on a voluntary 
basis. This is important for sustainability, since it has minimal budgetary 
implications for the scheme. If new members have to be sensitized or old 
members re-sensitized, the groups act as the focal point in arranging the 
community sensitization meetings. Another key role played by the beneficiaries 
is to collect premiums at community or group level. The group leadership is 
responsible for collecting premiums and remitting these to the scheme. Each 
group has leverage on the mode of collecting the premiums, but ultimately has to 
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make sure that the full amount is remitted to the scheme before the expiry of the 
period of coverage. This has the advantage of reducing the administrative costs 
of the scheme. Conversely, it promotes a sense of ownership of the scheme by the 
beneficiaries, thereby contributing to the scheme’s sustainability. 
 
The viability of CHI partly depends on outside determinants that can hardly be 
influenced by the scheme, for example, a country’s legal and policy framework 
(Wiesmann & Jutting, 2000). The legal and institutional setup includes laws and 
regulations that facilitate or impede the development of CHIs, internal rules and 
regulations within individual CHI schemes, as well as promoting institutions 
within the CHI environment. The study notes that CHI schemes in Uganda are 
currently being implemented without a policy framework or guidelines at 
national level. The current national health policy makes mention of CHI as a 
possible financing option, but it has not been officially adopted and therefore 
there are no guidelines for implementation. As a result, all schemes are 
implemented on an ad hoc basis. A key informant from the MoH equated their 
current operations to that of other mutual help groups in the communities: 
The community health insurance schemes are currently operating as ‘engozi’ or 
burial groups do. There is no policy and no single set of guidelines. The national 
health insurance bill to be tabled in parliament soon caters for them. After this, I 
think some national guidelines can be put in place. (KI, MoH, Personal 
interview, April 2008) 
 
This is a serious limitation to the promotion of CHI, the community’s acceptance 
of it, and its sustainability.  
7.6 Perceptions of Community Health Insurance 
The study sought to determine the perception of CHI from different stakeholders 
particularly with regard to its viability in increasing access to health care for 
rural households. Such perceptions signify in part the degree of community buy-
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in42 (Derriennic et al, 2005) which is considered an integral part of the current 
viability and future sustainability of CHI (Franco et al, 2004). Figure 18 shows 
respondents’ perceptions about the viability of CHI in Uganda. 
 
Figure 18:  Is CHI a viable means of increasing access to health care?  
(N=260) 
 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
Almost all respondents believe that CHI is a viable means of increasing access to 
health care. As communities recognise the benefits of CHI, their decision to enrol 
will likely be positive. 
 
7.6.1 Reasons for the perceived viability of community health insurance 
The reasons given for considering CHI as a viable means of increasing access to 
health care ranged from its ability to offer financial protection to households and 
faster access to medical attention to equity in access to health care particularly at 
household level. The responses are summarized in Figure 19. 
                                                
42 This term refers to the value the community places on the health scheme, and the consequent 
acceptance of the intervention.  
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Figure 19:  Reasons why CHI is considered viable  
(N=260)  
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Source: Field data, September 2007 
 
The reasons for considering CHI as a viable strategy mainly revolved around the 
scheme’s actual benefits to households. The most significant basis on which CHI 
is considered viable is that it offers financial protection against the cost of illness. 
This means that a household does not have to spend an excessive portion of their 
income in order to gain access to health care. In addition, households are less 
likely to engage in impoverishing risk-coping strategies, such as borrowing from 
money lenders or selling productive assets in order to meet the cost of illness 
(Tabor, 2005). Scheme-members often related how they had ultimately benefited 
financially from enrolling in CHI. 
Before I joined the scheme, I used to spend about 200,000 Ug.shs per year on 
health. But now I pay only 40,000 Ug.shs per year for my whole family. I am able 
to save and have even bought land of more than 300,000 Ug.shs. (Scheme 
member, Kahoko parish, Nyakishenyi Sub-county) 
 
Patients are now able to seek treatment without having to wait to sell their goat or 
chicken. People used to die in their homes because they feared the cost. The impact 
can even be seen in the reduction of ‘bad debts’ by the hospital. (Hospital 
Administrator, Kisiizi hospital, October 2007) 
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Interestingly, even non-scheme-members acknowledge the strengths of CHI in 
securing financial protection against the cost of illness. For example, 69% of non-
scheme-members believe that the scheme offers financial protection against the 
cost of illness. This perception was supported by qualitative data: 
When scheme-members fall sick, they pay much less. If you have no money and 
you are not in the scheme, you get a lot of difficulties in case of a serious sickness. 
(Non-scheme-members’ FGD, April 2007) 
 
The findings underscore the relationship between catastrophic health spending 
and household poverty. As implied in the quotations above, CHI can be effective 
in minimizing the risk of households being plunged deeper into poverty due to 
high and frequent health care costs. This is consistent with what various authors 
have raised as a key strength of CHI (Hsiao, 2001; Jakab & Krishnan, 2001; 
Jutting, 2001; Poletti et al, 2007). 
 
Another defining factor for considering CHI as viable was the direct benefit of 
faster access to health care. This was intertwined with the reduction of OOP 
payments and consequently less delay in seeking care. Respondents reported 
that scheme-members are more likely to seek early treatment than non-scheme-
members, as discussed earlier in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.2: 99).  
It is mostly those in the scheme who rush to hospital when they are sick. Others 
first wait to see if the illness will go away without going to the hospital. If it does 
not, then they are forced to go. (scheme-member, Ndago parish, Nyarushanje 
Sub-county, September 2007) 
 
Those who are not members of the insurance scheme die even when they are not 
supposed to die, because they delay to go to hospital. The scheme makes it easier to 
seek treatment. (Scheme-member, Kahoko parish, Nyakishenyi Sub-county) 
 
Increased access to health care because of CHI has been reported in various 
countries where such schemes operate, including Bangladesh (Preker et al, 2002), 
India (Ranson, 2002), Senegal (Jutting, 2004) and Rwanda (Musango et al, 2006), 
among others.  
Un
ive
sit
y o
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
 191
Another aspect perceived to be an indicator of the viability of CHI among 
community members is its potential to ease provision of health care to whole 
households. Technically, this is related to equity of access to health care, which 
was discussed in more detail in Section 7.3: 172. Respondents pointed out that 
the ability to extend health care to the whole household was a major indicator of 
the viability of CHI. 
If you are say 3 people in a home, you join the scheme because in case all of you 
fall sick at the same time, you can still get treatment a lot more easily than when 
you are not a member. (Non-scheme-members’ FGD, April 2008) 
 
It [CHI] reduces denial of access to health care for women and children. The 
scheme enrols the whole family. Once a man has paid, the card can be presented 
by the woman or child or whoever appears on the card and they will receive 
services. They no longer have to wait for the man to release money or to decide 
whether or not to sell an asset in order to take the patient to hospital. In my view, 
CHI has contributed to equity in that sense. (Hospital administrator, Kisiizi 
hospital, October 2007) 
 
Generally, it is mainly because of the observed benefits that the community 
judges CHI to be a viable strategy in increasing access to health care for rural 
households. However, the difficulties in its adoption are also acknowledged, as 
discussed in the following section. 
 
7.6.2 Perceived hindrances to the viability of community health insurance 
The most commonly mentioned hindrances to the viability of CHI were 
unaffordable premiums (28.6%) and inadequate understanding of the concept or 
some aspects of CHI (25.7%) as indicated in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20:  Reasons why CHI may not be viable  
(N=260) 
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Source: Field data, September, 2007 
 
While some respondents argued that the costs of premiums are too high (28.6%), 
others attributed the inability to pay to widespread poverty (17%) and not to the 
costs of premiums per se. This too was reflected in the qualitative data from the 
FGDs:   
We have low incomes, limited land, which is tired and unproductive. So there is 
generally no money in the community. And yet there are also many other 
competing expenditures such as school fees. Hence, although the scheme is good, 
sometimes it becomes difficult for us to stay in the scheme. (Scheme-members’ 
FGD, April 2008) 
 
Some respondents argued that poverty should in fact be the reason for joining 
the scheme: 
Poverty is not a big issue because what the people spend on alcohol consumption 
in a year is much more than what they have to pay for insurance or in the hospital 
People just need to be sensitized about the importance of planning for health. 
(Non-member, Kahoko parish, Nyakishenyi Sub-county) 
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The issue of priority setting and moral judgement, as reflected in the above 
quotation, has come up elsewhere in the community’s discussions of obstacles to 
the adoption of CHI. For example, in Guinea-Conakry, FGD members referred to 
“those who drink more in a day than the annual premium’ and ‘those who do not realize 
the importance of safeguarding their health” (Criel & Waelkens, 2003: 1212), as some 
of the explanations for their inability to enrol in CHI schemes, which in turn 
threatens the viability of such schemes. However, a lack of financial resources at 
household level to meet the cost of premiums does still pose a significant threat 
to its successful adoption. This is largely attributed to widespread and absolute 
poverty. As Jutting (2001) argues, if people are struggling for survival every day, 
they are less likely to pay premiums in advance in order to use services at a later 
point in time. 
 
Other factors perceived as threats to the viability of CHI included the design 
features of the scheme, particularly the need for group enrolment, the exclusions 
from the benefits package, and the limited provider options. It is interesting to 
note that, for non-scheme-members, the most significant threat to the viability of 
CHI are conceptual problems (31.6%), and yet previously, the majority of them 
(44%) had listed unaffordable premiums as the cause for their lack of enrolment 
(Table 23: 169). This may imply that poverty and ignorance have a negative 
synergetic impact on the viability of CHI. Promoting an adequate understanding 
of CHI could serve as a first step towards making a positive impact on enrolment 
and enhancing the adoption of CHI even in a poor rural setting. 
 
Overall, the community has a positive perception of CHI as a concept, although 
the limitations in its adoption are also acknowledged. 
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7.7 Summary of Key Findings 
The performance of CHI was reviewed in this chapter with specific reference to 
Kisiizi health insurance scheme. The key findings include the following: 
 
Enrolment levels 
• The scheme exhibits a steady upward trend in enrolment and membership 
levels from 1,107 households (5,310 members) in 2001 to 3,976 households, 
with 20,624 members in 2007. The membership represents about a third of 
the target population in the hospital’s catchment area. The study also 
shows that, for example, for the year ending 2006, 30% of the total out-
patients and 34% of in-patients were scheme-members, underscoring the 
contribution of CHI to access to health care. Sustained growth and 
retention of membership indicates that the scheme is in fact acceptable to 
the community (Tabor, 2005), which has a positive influence on its 
viability (Section 7.2: 165). 
 
• Key reasons for enrolment in the scheme include ease of access to health 
care (43.8%), financial protection against the cost of illness (16.2%), and 
high frequency of illness at household level (15.4%). These reasons reflect 
people’s ability to interpret the primary purpose of insurance, and the 
benefits of better access to health care. They also represent community buy-
in, which is an integral part of the current viability and future 
sustainability of CHI (Franco et al, 2004) (Section 7.2.2: 167).  
 
• The major constraints to enrolment include unaffordable premiums 
(43.8%) and inadequate understanding of the scheme (27.3%), among 
others. Notably, access to free health care, which would be an intuitive 
factor for lack of enrolment in CHI, is not a prominent reason (3.3%). 
However, the inherent design of the scheme, particularly with regard to 
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limited provider options (service provisioning) is a limitation to 
enrolment. The costs of travelling long distances to the health facility and 
the prevalence of long waiting times at the facility lessen the attractiveness 
of the scheme. The restrictive provider options are partly attributed to the 
limited distribution of ‘quality’ health service providers in the area. 
Hence, the lack of quality service providers, which undermines the 
government health care system, is also likely to affect the viability of CHI 
(Section 7.2.3: 169). 
 
Contribution of CHI to equity in access to health care   
• Over 75% of scheme-members have all their household members enrolled 
in the CHI scheme. However, the scheme has not fully achieved equity in 
enrolment at community level, since there are some indicators of socio-
economic differences in enrolment. Qualitative data showed that the most 
vulnerable groups are not able to enrol in CHI without some form of 
subsidy (Section 7.3: 172). 
 
Financial efficiency 
• The scheme exhibits a steady upward trend in treatment cost recovery 
since 2004 (from 65% to 140% in 2007). According to the UCBHFA 
guidelines, this scheme would thus be considered financially viable. 
However, the study notes that only treatment costs are included in the 
calculation of cost recovery. Administrative and other operational costs 
could escalate and render the scheme inefficient in the absence of viable 
external financial support (Section 7.4: 181). 
 
Sustainability 
• So far, the trends in cost recovery are a good indicator of the scheme’s 
financial sustainability (140% in 2007). Kisiizi health insurance scheme has 
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also registered some degree of community (beneficiary) participation in its 
operations. Group leaders who attend regular planning meetings with the 
scheme administration represent all registered groups. This is an 
important aspect of sustainability because, in the event that the major 
promoter or external assistance is withdrawn, the activities and/or results 
of such an intervention would be sustained at least at some minimal level 
(Wiesmann & Jutting, 2000) (Section 7.5: 184) 
 
• One of the key threats to sustainability identified by the study is the 
apparent lack of a policy framework or guidelines at national level for the 
effective promotion and operations of the schemes. Secondly, there are 
gaps in managerial capacity due to a lack of personnel with specialized 
training and prior experience in managing such projects. This may slow 
down the growth of CHI (Section 7.5: 184).  
 
Perceptions of the viability of community health insurance 
• The community has a positive perception of CHI, with 92% of both 
members and non-members of the scheme considering CHI as a viable 
means of increasing access to health care for the rural households. They 
identify two key strengths in CHI, namely, financial protection against the 
cost of illness (66.1%) and faster access to medical care (24.3%). This 
represents a crucial step in promoting the strategy and strengthening the 
membership base. Threats to the viability of CHI identified by the study 
participants include inability to pay premiums, lack of proper 
understanding of insurance concepts, and scheme design features – 
particularly exclusions from the benefits package, limited provider 
options and group enrolment (Section 7.6: 187).  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 197
Generally, aspects of community health insurance reviewed in this chapter with 
regard to enrolment levels and trends, contribution to equity, efficiency and 
sustainability indicate that CHI has potential for growth and sustainability. In 
the final chapter, a general summary of findings is given, as well as key 
conclusions, emerging issues and recommendations drawn from the study. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The study investigated the viability of CHI as a means of increasing access to 
health care for rural households in Uganda. This was against the background 
that health care is a basic need and right and that, despite this, households 
especially in the rural parts of Uganda are still lacking effective access to health 
care. Previous interventions such as health user fees were abolished due to their 
adverse effects on access to health care, and a new policy of free health care was 
introduced. However, the study findings indicate that the majority of the 
population is unable to access this free health care due to various problems. CHI 
has emerged in this context as one of the strategies to improve access to health 
care. In this concluding chapter, a review of the key findings is provided and the 
main conclusions presented in the subsequent section. Furthermore, a concise 
overview of key emerging issues is presented. Lastly, this chapter provides some 
policy implications and recommendations, based on key conclusions from the 
study and suggests areas for further research in the field of CHI and access to 
health care. 
8.2 Summary of Findings  
The following are the key findings pertaining to each specific objective of the 
study.  
 
Objective 1: To ascertain the facilitating or impeding factors affecting access to 
free health care in the rural areas of Uganda 
• There is a high level of illness in the community. Fifty-two percent (52.3%) 
of all respondents reported an illness episode during the 6 months 
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preceding the survey. More non-scheme-members (57%) than scheme-
members (48%) reported an illness episode (Section 4.2.1: 97). 
 
• Malaria is the leading cause of illness among the population studied 
(56.6%). There is a significant relationship between the cause of illness and 
the status of enrolment in CHI (p=0.005). Malaria as the cause of illness is 
24% higher among non-scheme members compared to scheme-members 
(Section 4.2.1: 97).  
 
• The PNFP health facility (hospital) was the most frequently visited health 
facility. Only 5% of the households prefer to use the government health 
facilities, while 80.4% would prefer to use the PNFP health facility (Section 
4.4: 102).  
 
• The level of use of government health care services is low, with only 20% of 
all respondents indicating that they ‘always’ use these services (Section 4.6: 
108). 
 
• The major facilitative factors in accessing government health services as 
identified by the respondents include free provision of services and 
proximity (Section 4.6.1: 110).  
 
• The key constraints in accessing the free government services include 
limited availability of drugs, equipment and trained personnel among 
others (Section 4.6.2: 111).  
 
• Use of traditional healing is limited to a few people in the community in 
which the study was undertaken. Eighty percent (80%) of the respondents 
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indicated that use of traditional healing is rare in the community (Section 
4.7: 116).  
 
Objective 2: To analyse the socio-economic profiles of households enrolling or 
not enrolling in CHI 
• There are more households headed by older adults (45 years and above), 
more female-headed households and more widows/widowers among 
scheme-members than among non-scheme members. However, the 
differences are not statistically significant (Section 5.2: 121). 
 
• The size of the household had a significant relationship with enrolment in 
the CHI scheme (p=0.041), as did the age of the oldest child at home 
(p=0.039). Scheme-members have relatively larger household sizes, with 
45.4% having seven or more household members, compared to only 27% 
among non-scheme members. Similarly, scheme-members are more likely 
to have a child aged 15 years or older (63%) than non-scheme-members 
(52%) (Section 5.2: 121).  
 
• The following variables are not significantly related to enrolment in CHI: 
religious affiliation; education level, occupation, and major source of 
income (Section 5.2: 121). 
 
• The analysis of the wealth profile shows a significant relationship between 
land ownership and enrolment in CHI (p=0.020). Ownership of other 
household assets (radio, bicycle, motorcycle and cellular telephone) is 
consistently higher among scheme-members than among non-scheme 
members. Similarly, more scheme-members reported ownership of any farm 
animal (goats, sheep, cattle, or poultry) than non-scheme-members. Hence, 
the results show some inequalities in enrolment, with the scheme appearing 
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to attract those with a better socio-economic status in the community 
(Section 5.4: 135). 
 
Objective 3: To examine scheme design features that influence the viability of 
community health insurance 
• The scheme’s organisational design follows the insurer model where an 
intermediary organisation, Microcare, collects and pools revenue, and 
purchases the services on behalf of the scheme-members.  Positive trends in 
enrolment and treatment cost recovery appear to have coincided with the 
change in the model of the scheme, from a provider model to an insurer 
model (Section 6.2: 142).  
 
• The scheme has linkages to grassroots organizations especially mutual aid 
groups. Almost all respondents belonged to at least one mutual aid group 
(excluding CHI). Only 6.2% of the respondents, all of whom were non-
scheme-members, indicated that they did not belong to any local mutual 
aid group. The scheme has no direct linkage to local microfinance 
associations, but the findings indicate that scheme-members are more likely 
to be members of a microfinance association than non-scheme-members 
(50.8% and 33.1% respectively) (Section 6.2.2: 146). 
 
• The unit of enrolment in the scheme is a group of households. The rationale 
is to reduce adverse selection (Section 6.3: 150). 
 
• Premiums are community rated and not risk/income rated, and this makes 
them more acceptable to the community. Premiums are calculated 
according to household size and not according to the number of people in 
the household, hence reducing the unit cost for the larger households. The 
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premiums are collected annually. No in-kind payments and no instalments 
are allowed (Section 6.4: 153). 
 
• Co-payments have been instituted to guard against unnecessary use of 
services.  They seem to be an acceptable aspect of the scheme design as 
there were no ill feelings about them among the community members. 
 
• The benefits package covers both in-patient and out-patient care. It 
excludes chronic conditions, such as hypertension, tuberculosis, asthma 
and routine HIV/AIDS medications. These exclusions are a threatening the 
acceptability of the scheme among community members and hence 
affecting its long term viability (Section 6.5.1: 157) 
 
• Service delivery is through one single recommended provider, viz. a PNFP 
hospital.  There is no referral required from lower level health units (Section 
6.5.2: 159). 
 
Objective 4: To assess the current performance of CHI in Uganda 
• The scheme exhibits a steady upward trend in enrolment and membership 
levels from 1,107 households (5,310 members) in 2001 to 3,976 households 
(20,624 members) in 2007. The membership represents about a third of the 
target population in the hospital’s catchment area (Section 7.2: 166). 
 
• Key reasons for enrolment in the scheme include ease of access to health 
care (43.8%), financial protection against the cost of illness (16.2%), and high 
frequency of illness at household level (15.4%) (Section 7.2.2: 167).  
 
• The major constraints to enrolment include unaffordable premiums (43.8%) 
and inadequate understanding of the scheme (27.3%) among others.  Access 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 203
to free health care, which would be an intuitive factor for lack of enrolment 
in CHI, is not a prominent reason (3.3%). Limited provider options (service 
provisioning), however, do limit enrolment. The restrictive provider 
options can be partly attributed to the limited distribution of ‘quality’ 
health service providers in the area (Section 7.2.3: 169).  
 
• Over 75% of scheme-members have all their household members enrolled 
in the CHI scheme. However, the scheme has not fully achieved equity in 
enrolment at community level since there are some indicators of socio-
economic differences in enrolment. Qualitative data showed that the most 
vulnerable groups are not able to enrol in CHI without some form of 
subsidy (Section 7.3: 172). 
 
• The scheme exhibits a steady upward trend in treatment cost recovery since 
2004 (from 65% to 140% in 2007). Only treatment costs are included in the 
calculation of cost recovery. However, administrative and other operational 
costs could escalate and render the scheme inefficient in the absence of 
viable external financial support (Section 7.4: 181). 
 
• Key indicators of sustainability of CHI included the positive trend in 
treatment cost recovery (140% in 2007), growth in enrolment, and a 
moderate degree of community (beneficiary) participation (Section 7.5: 184). 
 
• The key threats to sustainability of CHI are the apparent lack of a policy 
framework at national level; and gaps in managerial capacity due to lack of 
personnel with specialized training and prior experience in managing such 
projects. This may slow down the growth of CHI (Section 7.5: 184). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 204
8.3 Conclusions 
Major conclusions drawn from the study, in line with the specific objectives, 
include the following. 
 
Objective 1: To ascertain the facilitating or impeding factors affecting access to 
free health care in the rural areas of Uganda 
• There is still a dire need for health services due to high levels of illness in 
the community.  
 
• Proximity is a key strength in the government health care system, but it is 
counteracted by serious constraints in the system: limited availability of 
drugs, equipment and trained personnel 
 
• Free health care is not accessible to all as intended by the current health 
policy, hence the need to consider additional strategies to increase access to 
health care 
 
• Because of the significant role played by the private sector, financial 
constraints to accessing health care are still strong despite the free health 
care policy.  
 
• Enrolment in CHI has a positive effect on the reduction of illness at 
household level; but more significantly, it reduces delays in treatment 
seeking by the sick. 
 
• Traditional healing practices would not pose a serious threat to the viability 
of CHI since they do not appear to significantly affect the uptake of 
biomedical care. 
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Objective 2: To analyse the socio-economic profiles of households enrolling or 
not enrolling in CHI 
• In general, CHI has the potential to attract households of all socio-economic 
backgrounds, except perhaps the poorest of the poor.  
 
• Some significant differences in the wealth profile/asset ownership confirm 
the argument that, although CHI schemes are generally able to enrol people 
from low socio-economic categories, the ‘poorest of the poor’ are left out 
(Schneider & Diop, 2001; Tabor, 2005).  
 
Objective 3: To examine scheme design features that influence the viability of 
community health insurance 
• The insurer model of community health insurance enhances its viability. 
Separation of pooling, purchasing and service delivery functions may 
enhance efficiency. The model supports ‘vertical bridging’ (Bennett, 1998), 
which has  the potential to build local capacity and strengthen the viability 
of CHI. 
 
• CHI has effectively made use of the existing mutual aid groups in the 
community. The higher level of membership of mutual aid groups provides 
an opportunity for mobilization and marketing of community health 
insurance in such communities. 
 
• Group enrolment in CHI minimizes adverse selection. Registration of 
whole households contributes to the equity objective in health care access. 
Both aspects strengthen the viability of CHI. 
 
• Prepayment that is inherent in CHI minimizes barriers to health care access 
posed by OOP payments. 
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• Annual lump-sum payments reduce administrative costs of collecting and 
processing premiums; but the lack of instalments and in-kind payments 
disadvantages the poorer households. This could pose a threat to the 
viability of CHI. 
 
• The community rated premiums favour larger households, which are most 
in need of subsidized health care. However, this can result in the creation of 
a higher-risk pool leading to over-use of services and faster depletion of the 
scheme’s resources, which threatens its sustainability. 
 
• The benefits package is relatively comprehensive, aligned to the national 
minimum health care package, and relevant to the health needs of the local 
community. However, exclusion of chronic conditions disfavours groups of 
people who are in most need of health care and financial risk protection. It 
is a major factor discouraging enrolment in CHI, and hence its viability. 
 
• Popular providers, whom the community has confidence that they provide 
better quality services are crucial in ensuring the viability and success of 
CHI. The fact that there is only one provider means that the costs to the 
users of travelling to the facility and time spent waiting there for treatment 
remain high, which may be an obstacle to enrolment and effective access to 
services.  
 
• Hospital-based health care, which the current CHI design encourages, 
introduce inefficient use of health resources in the broader health system, 
and might conflict with the strategic direction of the national health policy. 
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Objective 4: To assess the current performance of CHI in Uganda 
• The widespread awareness of CHI is a crucial step in promoting the 
strategy within the community. However, the lack of adequate information 
on the operations of CHI due to the absence of a deliberate sensitization 
and marketing strategy affects its current performance. 
 
• Sustained growth and retention in membership indicates that CHI is in fact 
acceptable (Tabor, 2005), and this has a positive influence on its viability. 
 
• The reasons for enrolment in CHI reflect people’s ability to interpret the 
primary purpose of insurance, and the benefits of better access to health 
care. They also represent community buy-in an integral part of the current 
viability and future sustainability of CHI (Franco et al, 2004). 
 
• CHI can co-exist with the free health care policy because of the poor 
performance of government health services, and the high preference of the 
PNFP sector by the population. 
 
• CHI can be financially viable with steady growth in enrolment. However, in 
its infancy stages it is important to obtain external financial cushioning. 
 
• The lack of quality service providers, which undermines the government 
health care system, is also likely to affect the viability of CHI in Uganda. 
 
• The absence of a policy and institutional framework can adversely affect the 
promotion of CHI and subsequently its sustainability and effectiveness in 
increasing access to health care. 
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The general conclusion from the study is that community health insurance is a 
viable means of increasing access to health care for rural households in Uganda, 
though not without challenges. 
 
8.4 Key Emerging Issues  
Uganda has undergone a number of policy changes in the health sector since 
independence in 1962. Free health care seemed to have worked with some degree 
of success in the period immediately following independence, but the socio-
political turmoil of the 1970s and early 1980s had a negative impact on it. Cost 
sharing was then instituted under immense pressure from the International 
Financial Institutions as part of the Structural Adjustment Programs. Despite its 
potential strengths, cost sharing led to serious equity problems where the poor 
were unable to access services. In 2001, cost sharing was abolished and universal 
‘free’ health care introduced. Although it is an ideal policy, in practice, it has not 
led to universal access to health care especially among the poor rural 
populations. This study has demonstrated that the free health care policy is not 
fully operational and quality health services are not available to the entire 
population. Only about 30% of the population attempts to access free health care 
from the public health facilities, and even then they are not guaranteed the 
services. Consistent with other reports (AGHA, 2007; Uganda, 2007a), this study 
has highlighted the fact that the free health care system is marred by frequent 
drug stock-outs, shortages of health personnel, equipment and supplies, and 
generally poor quality of care. A summary of the key emerging issues, as 
crystallized by this study, is diagrammatically presented in Figure 21.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 209
Figure 14:  Summary of emerging issues 
 
 
8.4.1 Free Health Care: Equity Vs Quality of Services 
The free health care policy has failed to take off and meet the needs of the 
majority of the population in Uganda. It appears that quality has been sacrificed at 
the altar of equity. In essence, free health care exists in principle but not in practice. 
The quality of that free health care has been compromised to such an extent that 
few people are actually able to benefit from it. While physical structures do exist 
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relatively closer to the population (Section 4.3 & 4.6), there is no effective access 
to the services, mainly due to lack of supplies, personnel and basic equipment. 
Households and individuals are left with no choice but to seek expensive care 
from the private providers (both for-profit and not-for-profit), where the quality 
of care is perceived as relatively better than the free health care in the public 
sector. The major mechanism of payment especially for the PFP providers is OOP 
payment, which remains a key impediment to access.  
8.4.2 Health Seeking Behaviour: Community Members are Not Just Passive 
Recipients of Services 
Community members are not just passive recipients of health services and health 
care. They may be selective in making choices about what constitutes good 
health care. Some may not be comfortable with a service just because it is free. 
Similar to other studies (Alderman & Lavy, 1996; Nabyonga et al, 2005), which 
show that a substantial majority of the population are willing to pay for better 
quality health care, this study has demonstrated that the majority of rural 
households would rather pay for relatively better health care from private 
providers than receive poor quality services from the public sector. It is 
acknowledged, however, that willingness to pay is not synonymous with ability to 
pay. If the state machinery cannot guarantee a fair quality of ‘free’ health care, 
then mechanisms have to be put in place to enable households to access health 
care of an acceptable quality without reintroducing the obstacle of OOP 
payments. Arrangements, which involve prepayment and pooling of resources, 
while at the same time sharing risks, could hold such a promise. Government 
needs to consider a partnership with the CHI schemes that will make quality 
health care a reality for the majority of Uganda’s people.  
8.4.3 The Role and Implications of the Private Health Sector 
The study has shown that, despite government’s free health care policy, the 
majority of the population still prefer to and actually do seek health care from the 
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private providers. The growth of the private health sector suggests that the belief 
that health care should be provided by the state is not without practical 
challenges. It is evident that, for the near future, people will have to take some 
responsibility for meeting the cost of health care through the private sector. Even 
if the quality of services in government health facilities were to be improved to 
an acceptable level, the private sector remains a key partner in health service 
provision. This implies that households, especially in areas under-served by the 
government, still have to meet the cost of health care – even for the basic health 
care package. The GoU works in partnership with the private health service 
providers. In areas where private health facilities are present, no parallel 
government facilities have been set up, as this is seen as an inefficient use of 
resources. The implication is that households in these localities have to pay for 
health care despite the notion of a free health care policy. An emerging 
alternative to offset the financial barriers to access is the private health insurance. 
This targets the formal sector and remains extremely expensive for the majority 
of rural populations, which are mainly poor. Such households need to be helped 
to overcome barriers to access through easier means of paying for health care. 
One way of achieving this is to facilitate the use of CHI. 
8.4.4 Community Health Insurance (CHI) Increases Access to Health Care 
Consistent with studies done elsewhere (Section 2.5: 45), this study has shown 
that CHI increases access to health care for rural households. Households that 
enrol in CHI are more likely to seek early treatment for illnesses, as well as to 
seek health care from providers of their choice. At household level, because 
whole households are enrolled in CHI, there is improved equity in access to care 
with regard to gender and age. Women and children can easily access health care 
since the cost of care is tremendously reduced through prepayment mechanisms. 
The study also confirms that CHI offers financial protection against the cost of 
illness. Both quantitative and qualitative data from all the categories of 
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respondents confirmed this argument. This is based on two key features of CHI, 
namely, prepayment mechanisms, and resource pooling and risk sharing 
arrangements. Firstly, the fact that people do not wait to fall sick in order to 
mobilize resources but that they instead contribute to the scheme beforehand 
means that they are not, for example, under pressure to sell their valuable assets 
in order to meet the cost of care. Secondly, many people contribute to a pool and 
only those who fall sick in a given period benefit from these contributions. 
Ultimately, the total cost of health care on the household is much less than what 
they would have paid without insurance. The study identifies this reduced cost 
of health care as one of the key strengths of CHI, as attested to by both members 
and non-members of the scheme (Section 7.6: 187). Hence, individuals can have 
access to high cost hospital care with relative ease. This also encourages such 
households to seek early treatment as indicated earlier, since they are not afraid 
of the costs.  
8.4.5 The Poorest of the Poor do not Afford CHI without Subsidies 
Another key issue from this study is that the poorest of the poor such as the 
landless are left out of the social security networks. Although CHI schemes are 
largely able to enrol people from low socio-economic categories, the poorest of the 
poor are not able to enrol without some form of subsidy. It was also evident that 
the non-scheme members were more likely to report not being in any mutual aid 
group or micro-finance association. Such a category of people fail to benefit from 
the risk pooling arrangements offered by community health insurance. The 
government should consider making free health only available for the very poor 
so that those who are in position to pay for health can do so. The monies freed up 
can then be used to improve the free services to the poor. Another alternative is 
for the government to subsidize the premiums of the poor to enable them to 
enrol in CHI.  
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8.5 Policy Implications and Recommendations  
Based on the study findings, emerging issues and conclusions, the following 
policy implications are drawn. While some relate to general access to health care 
in Uganda in view of the current policy, other recommendations are specifically 
related to CHI as a strategy for accessing health care.  
8.5.1 Redesign the Free Health Care Policy  
It is generally agreed that free health care or tax based financing is the most ideal 
way of ensuring equitable access to health care (Section 2.3.1: 32). However, the 
study has shown that this policy approach has failed to deliver the promised 
outcomes. The study does not call for a scrapping of the policy since it has its 
own strengths, but for its redesigning. In a bid to ensure universal access, the 
quality of health care has been severely compromised. It is therefore suggested 
that, if the policy is retained, selective provisioning could be considered instead 
of universal access. Policy makers might consider targeting free health care 
services to those who are unable to pay, i.e. a particular category of the 
population, based on either geographical location or other socio-economic 
indicators. Those who are able to pay could then continue contributing directly 
to health care costs. The advantages of this approach would be that those most in 
need could access the free limited health resources whilst those able to pay could 
subsidize a better health delivery system. The original health policy had some 
elements of this through the operation of private wards in government hospitals. 
Because the use of these private services vis-à-vis free health care was left open 
and voluntary, it has not decongested the free health care system. Some authors 
(Preker et al, 2002; Gwatkin et al, 2004) have argued that universal free health 
care actually benefit the well-off, because they have the social and political 
connections to access the few services that exist. This leaves the poor and most 
vulnerable without adequate quality services. Targeting the free health care to 
this most vulnerable group might be more feasible and meaningful. 
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8.5.2 Community Health Insurance as a Transitional Mechanism 
The emerging CHI schemes are one of the attempts to offset the effects of OOP 
spending. They offer an opportunity to pool risks and resources and thereby to 
increase access to health care for households that would otherwise find it 
difficult to meet the financial cost of health care on an OOP basis. It is the 
considered view of the researcher that CHI is a viable alternative in increasing 
access to health care for rural households who are increasingly finding it difficult 
to access the promised free health care by the government. However, this thesis 
does not argue for the replacement of the free health care policy with CHI. 
Instead, CHI can be promoted as a transitional and supplementary strategy 
(operating in the PNFP sector) while efforts and adequate resources and systems 
are being assembled to ensure effective provision of public health care. 
Alternatively, a hybrid of free health care and insurance (including CHI) can be 
pursued in the design of the health policy. This is because there is already a mix 
of health care delivery systems comprising both public and private sectors.  
8.5.3 The Need for a Policy Framework for Community Health Insurance 
This study has demonstrated the potential viability of CHI as a means of 
increasing access to health care. However, it has also been noted that CHI has 
been operating without any policy or legal framework, which poses a threat to its 
sustainability and development (Section 7.5: 184). While the health policy 
(Uganda, 1999) and the NRM campaign manifesto make mention of CHI as a 
possible health financing option, no policy on CHI has been developed thus far. 
Developing policy guidelines for CHI would increase its legality and 
acceptability within the public arena. This could in turn boost and motivate local 
communities to establish and participate in CHI. Some of the issues to be 
considered in formulating the policy would be, for example, the primary 
objectives to be served by CHI. Should it be promoted as an alternative financing 
option for the larger health system or as a safety net for increasing access to 
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health care for the rural and informal sectors? This thesis suggests the latter 
policy objective. Other key aspects that need to be addressed in the policy are the 
sectors to house CHI, the promoting institutions and the monitoring framework. 
For a start, CHI should continue to be housed in the PNFP sector, since the 
public sector is already providing free health care. The PFP sector may not be 
appropriate since it is essentially profit-driven, whereas CHI seems to target the 
poorer sections of the population.  
8.5.4 Collective Support for the Sustainability of Community Health 
Insurance 
There is no doubt as to whether CHI increases access to health care for rural 
households. This study has also demonstrated a positive perception of and a 
willingness by the community to embrace CHI. However, these positive aspects 
alone cannot lead to its sustained growth and development. The predominance 
of poverty, the presence of vulnerable groups, and the high prevalence of disease 
all imply that the development of CHI cannot be left to the local community 
alone. There is a need for concerted support from key stakeholders including 
government, donors, civil society and the community. Financial and technical 
support is mainly required in building the administrative capacity of the 
schemes, and in providing subsidies to reduce premium levels and to make them 
more affordable for the majority of households.  
8.5.5 Subsidising the very poor 
The study has shown that, although rural households do enrol in CHI, the very 
poor sections of the community do not enrol. Households like those of the 
landless, those headed by children, and those of the elderly could be subsidized 
either by the government or by soliciting external support to enable them to join 
the schemes. Subsidies are justifiable, based on the same principle applied in 
social health insurance where the employee contributes only a percentage and 
the employer contributes to the employee’s premium (normally higher than what 
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the employee contributes) (Kalk et al, 2005). While the difficulties in selecting 
and targeting the very poor are acknowledged, the process could be eased by 
adopting generally visible characteristics such as orphan-hood, landlessness or 
geographical locality. Actively involving the local population in identifying 
households and individuals who qualify for subsidies could also ease the 
process. This has been attempted with some degree of success in Rwanda, where 
genocide victims are exempted from payment (Diop & Butera, 2005). Possible 
sources of subsidies include the government, external donors and NGOs. Some 
authors (Kyomugisha et al, 2008) have argued that expecting the government to 
subsidize CHI would put a strain on government, which should be using all its 
resources to improve the quality of free health care in public facilities. It must be 
recognised that government is already in active partnership with the private 
sector. The government does not establish parallel health structures, especially 
where PNFP structures already exist. Nevertheless, the free health care policy 
cannot be imposed on this private sector, so the PNFP providers continue to 
charge user fees. Therefore supporting the development of CHI through 
subsidies would help more people in the catchments areas to access PNFP 
services with greater ease. With regard to external donor support, as long as CHI 
schemes are not for profit, they can develop proposals for financial support in 
the same way that other third sector organizations do. This would however call 
for technical support from more advanced agencies within the respective 
communities. 
8.5.6 Need for On-going Evaluation and Flexibility of Scheme Design 
Features 
The study findings have demonstrated that, despite the technical rationality of 
elements of the design of a CHI scheme, these can adversely affect its viability 
through their negative impact on enrolment. Two key questionable design 
features emerged as crucial for enrolment, namely, the benefits package and the 
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provider options. Probably the most misunderstood and unacceptable element of 
the design is the exclusion of some illnesses from the benefits package. Neither 
scheme-members nor non-scheme-members fully understand the rationality of 
exclusions, much as it makes sense to the scheme promoters and administrators. 
While the study indicated that the benefits package is largely comprehensive 
(covering both in-patient and out-patient care, and the common causes of 
illness), it excludes chronic conditions and self-inflicted injury among others. 
Although there do not appear to be many complaints about self-inflicted injury, 
the issue of chronic conditions was a recurrent one, particularly in the FGDs. The 
scheme administration regards the exclusions as a cost control mechanism, but 
the community considers it as discrimination against those who need health care 
the most. To address this, more community dialogue is needed in determining 
the benefits package. This would reduce suspicion towards the scheme, increase 
the community’s acceptance of it, and subsequently increase enrolment levels. 
 
Another significant consideration is the need to adopt and strengthen the referral 
system if CHI is going to be viable. As highlighted in Section 6.5.2: 159 of this 
thesis, the lack of referral leads to the inefficient use of resources on the supply 
side, as well as to overcrowding at the hospital level, which in turn results in 
long waiting hours and inadequate attention to patients. All these compromise 
the quality of care, and this poses a great threat to the viability of CHI. 
Developed referral procedures where minor illnesses are handled at lower level 
units and only severe cases are referred to hospital care are useful strategies for 
improving the viability of CHI. However, the challenge is that if CHI is to be 
housed in the PNFP sector as suggested in this thesis, there are not many 
functional lower level health units of this nature within the communities. 
Partnerships with the public sector units might create confusion of interest and 
roles. Carefully developed partnerships with selected PFP clinics and PNFP 
clinics where these exist, however, could in part address the problem.  
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8.6 Suggestions for Further Research 
This study adopted a case study approach and was therefore limited in scope 
and geographical coverage. Future studies could investigate more CHI schemes 
in Uganda, and also consider different regions of the country, as these may 
present different contexts for the development of CHIs. This may be useful in 
reaching more specific and practical conclusions on the viability of CHI in 
Uganda. 
 
Although this study highlighted the perceptions of the community and of some 
stakeholders in the health sector about the viability of CHI, it was limited to the 
core health sector. For CHI to succeed, it would need multilevel and multi-
sectoral support of different actors in this field. Thus, future research on CHI 
would need to investigate their perceptions and readiness to support such a 
strategy.  
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APPENDIX A 
 ETHICAL CLEARANCE LETTER 
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APPENDIX B 
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
IS COMMUNITY HEALTH INSURANCE A VIABLE MEANS OF INCREASING ACCESS TO 
HEALTH CARE FOR RURAL HOUSEHOLDS IN UGANDA? 
 
SECTION A:Identification 
Interview No Name  of Interviewer 
Date of Interview Sub-county 
Parish  Village 
Respondent Status Member  1              Non  Member 2  
Status of Interview: Complete1    Incomplete0    To be completed (Date……………….) 
 
Section B: Demographic Information 
No. Question N/A Comment 
Qn1 Age of household head 
1. Less than 18………………… 
2. 18-24…………………………… 
3. 25-29…………………………… 
4. 30-34………………………………. 
5. 35-39………………………………. 
6. 40-44………………………………. 
7. 45-49………………………………. 
8. 50 and above…………………... 
  
Qn2 Gender of household head 
1. Male 
2. Female 
  
Qn3 Marital Status 
1. Single…………………………… 
2. Married…………………………… 
3. Separated/Divorced……………… 
4. Widowed………………………… 
5. Cohabiting………………………… 
  
 
Qn4 If married, what type of marriage are you in? 
1. Monogamous  
2. Polygamous  
  
Qn5  Number of children born 
1. None………………………………. 
2. 1-2…………………………………. 
3. 3-4…………………………………. 
4. 5-6…………………………………. 
5. 7-8………………………………… 
6. 9 and above……………………….. 
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 QUESTION N/A COMMENT 
Qn6 Age of oldest child at home 
1) Less than 1 year 
2) 1-4 years 
3) 5-9 years 
4) 10-14 years 
5) 15-19 years 
6) 20 and above 
  
Qn7 Age of youngest child at home  
1) Less than 1 year 
2) 1-4 years 
3) 5-9 years 
4) 10-14 years 
5) 15-19 years 
6) 20 and above 
  
Qn8 What is your religious affiliation? 
1) Protestant  
2) Roman Catholic  
3) Muslim 
4) Pentecostal  
5) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
 
Section C: Socio-economic Profile 
 
QUESTION N/A COMMENT 
Qn9 Occupation of household head 
1) Peasant farmer 
2) Petty trader/smaller scale enterprise 
3) Civil servant (Administration) 
4) Teaching service (specify level) 
5) Health worker (specify position) ……………… 
6) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn10 Occupation of spouse 
1) Peasant farmer 
2) Petty trader(small scale enterprise) 
3) Civil servant (Administration) 
4) Teaching service (specify level) ……………… 
5) Health worker (specify position) ……………… 
6) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn11 Highest level of education completed 
1) None 
2) Primary 
3) Secondary (Ordinary level) 
4) High School(Advanced ’Level) 
5) Technical/college level 
6) University degree 
7) Other (specify) ……………… 
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 QUESTION N/A COMMENT 
Qn13 
 
Level of education of spouse 
1. None 
2. Primary 
3. Secondary (Ordinary ’level) 
4. High School (Advanced ’Level) 
5. Technical/college level/Vocational 
6. University degree  
7. Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn14 Major source of income 
1. Peasant farming  
2. Commercial farming 
3. Small business (petty trade) 
4. Formal salaried employment 
5. Grants from relatives 
6. Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn15 Other source of income 
1. Peasant farming (sale of bonus agricultural 
produce) 
2. Commercial farming (Dairy farming, poultry 
keeping, medium scale crop farming) 
3. Small business (petty trade) 
4. Formal salaried employment 
5. Grants from relatives 
6. Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn16 Number of people in household 
1) 1-2 
2) 3-4 
3) 5-6 
4) 7-8 
5) 9 and above 
  
 
Section C: Health Profile 
Qn17 Have you fallen sick in the last one month? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
N/A Comment 
  
Qn18 What was the cause of illness? 
1) Malaria 
2) Diarrhoeal diseases 
3) Respiratory tract infections 
4) Accident/injury 
5) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn19 Where did you seek treatment for the sickness? 
1) Government health centre 
2) Government hospital 
3) PNFP health centre 
4) PNFP hospital 
5) Private clinic 
6) Traditional healer 
7) Other (specify) ……………… 
8) Did not seek treatment 
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 QUESTION N/A COMMENT 
Qn20 What was the reason for your choice of health care 
source? 
1) Proximity 
2) Cost of care 
3) Good quality care 
4) Insurance benefit 
5) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn21 Which other member of your household fell sick during 
the last one month? 
1) none 
2) child (below 5 years) 
3) Child (Above 5 years) 
4) Spouse 
5) Other relative (specify) ……………… 
 
  
Qn22 What was the immediate cause of illness? 
1) Malaria 
2) Diarrhoeal diseases 
3) Respiratory Tract infections 
4) Accident/injury 
5) Other (specify) ……………………. 
  
Qn23 Where did they seek health care from? 
1) Government health centre 
2) Government hospital 
3) PNFP health centre 
4) PNFP hospital 
5) Private clinic 
6) Traditional healer 
7) Other (specify) ……………… 
8) None 
  
Qn24 
 
What was the reason for the choice of that health care? 
1) Proximity 
2) Cost of care 
3) Good quality care 
4) Insurance benefit 
5) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
 
Section D: Access to Free health care 
Qn25 How far is the nearest health unit from your home? 
1) Less than 1 km………………………….. 
2) 1-2 km …………………………………… 
3) 3-5 km…………………………………… 
4) More than 5 km ……………………….. 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Qn26 How long does it usually take you to reach the health centre? 
1) Less than 1 hr 
2) less than 2 hrs 
3) less than 3 hrs  
4) less than 4 hrs 
5) More than 4 hrs 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
  
Qn27 What means of transport do you use to visit the health 
centre? 
1) Foot…………………………………………… 
2) Motorcycle…………… 
3) Bicycle...…..………………………………………….. 
4) Motor vehicle………………………………….. 
5) Others (specify……………………………… 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
  
 
QUESTION N/A COMMENT 
Qn28 What is your usual source of health care?  
1) Government health centre 
2) Government hospital 
3) PNFP health centre 
4) PNFP hospital 
5) Private clinic 
6) Traditional healer 
7) Other (specify) ……………… 
8) None 
  
Qn29 
 
Would you say you as a household use the government health 
facility for medical care: 
1) Always 
2) Sometimes 
3) Rarely 
4) Never 
  
Qn30 What makes it easy to use the government health centre? 
1) Free services 
2) Proximity of health facility 
3) Availability of health personnel 
4) Good quality services 
5) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn31 What makes it difficult to access the government health facility? 
1) Distance to health facility 
2) Cost of care 
3) Limited health personnel at the facility 
4) Lack of equipment and other facilities 
5) Over crowding 
6) Long waiting hours 
7) Unavailability of drugs 
8) Other (specify) ……………… 
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Qn32 What is your preferred choice of health care? 
1) Government health facility 
2) PNFP health facility 
3) Private health facility 
4) Private drug shop 
5) Traditional healer 
6) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn33 State and circle the most appropriate reasons for your answer in 
(26) above: 
1) Free services 
2) Proximity of health facility 
3) Availability of health personnel 
4) Good quality services 
5) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
 
Section E: Enrolment in community health insurance  
Qn34 Do you know of any health insurance scheme in your 
community? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
  
Qn35 Have you ever enrolled in a CHI scheme? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
  
Qn36 If no, why have you not enrolled in the CHI scheme? 
1) I do not know of any scheme 
2) Have access to free health care 
3) No major health problems experienced 
4) Cost of premium is high 
5) Large family size 
6) Other competing expenditures 
7) Inappropriate mode of payment 
8) Distance to prescribed health facility 
9) Poor quality of services at health facility 
10) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn37 If yes, when did you first enrol (state: M/Y) ……………… 
 
  
Qn38 Are you currently enrolled in a CHI scheme? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
 
  
Qn39 If yes, what was the most important reason for your 
enrolment in a CHI scheme? 
1) Easy access to health care 
2) Frequently ill 
3) Mutual assistance as a community 
4) Better quality care 
5) Other benefits (specify 
6)  
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Qn40 How many members of your household are enrolled in 
the CHI scheme? 
1) All 
2) 1 
3) 1-3 
4) 4-7 
5) 8 and above 
  
Qn41 How many members of your household are not 
enrolled? 
1) None 
2) 1 
3) 1-3 
4) 4-7 
5) 8 and above 
  
 
QUESTION N/A COMMENT 
Qn42 Who is not enrolled in your household? 
1) children below 5 years,  
2) children 6-17 
3) children above 18 years 
4) spouse  
5) grandparents 
6) other dependants 
  
Qn43 What are the reasons for those members of your 
household not enrolled in the scheme? 
1) Cost of insurance 
2) Not frequently ill 
3) Not my responsibility 
4) Lack of interest 
5) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn44 If no, when did you cease to be a member of the scheme 
(State: M/Y) ………………   
Qn45 What was the major reason for your dropping out of the 
scheme? 
1) Access to free health care 
2) No major health problems experienced 
3) Cost of premium is high 
4) Large family size 
5) Other competing expenditures 
6) Inappropriate mode of payment 
7) Distance to prescribed health facility 
8) Poor quality of services at health facility 
9) Other (specify) ………………  
  
Qn46 Do you plan to enrol again in the health insurance 
scheme? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
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Section F:Scheme Design Features 
 
QUESTION N/A COMMENT 
Qn47 How did you come to know about CHI scheme? 
1) Family 
2) Local councillors 
3) Mutual help group 
4) Health centre 
5) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn48 What is the mode of your enrolment? 
1) Individual 
2) Household 
3) Group 
4) Other (specify) ……………… 
5) Not Sure 
 
  
 
QUESTION N/A COMMENT 
Qn49 Are you aware of the benefits you are entitled to as a 
member of the scheme? 
1) Yes 
2) Partly 
3) Not at all 
  
Qn50 If yes/partly, state any benefits that you are aware of? 
(Tick all mentioned) 
1) All health care needs 
2) Outpatient care 
3) Inpatient care 
4) Surgeries 
5) Child deliveries 
6) Accidents and other emergencies 
7) Dental care 
8) Eye care 
9) Referral  
10) Ambulance  
11) Other (specify) ……………… 
 
  
Qn51 Are you aware of any excluded health services from the 
benefits package? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
  
Qn52 If yes, state any exclusion that you are aware of? 
1) None 
2) Outpatient care 
3) Inpatient care 
4) Surgeries 
5) Child deliveries 
6) Accidents and other emergencies 
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7) Dental care 
8) Eye care 
9) Referral  
10) Ambulance  
11) Other (specify) ……………… 
12) Do not know 
Qn53 How do you rate the current premium costs? 
1) Affordable 
2) Too expensive 
3) Reasonable 
  
Qn54 What aspect of the current scheme design do you find 
most appropriate? (Specify reason in comments section) 
1) Premium rates 
2) Mode of payment 
3) Mode of enrolment 
4) Provider options 
5) Benefits package 
6) Other (specify) ……………… 
7) Nothing 
  
 
 QUESTION N/A COMMENT 
Qn55 What aspect of the current scheme design do you find 
inappropriate? (Specify reason in comments section) 
1) Premium rates 
2) Mode of payment 
3) Mode of enrolment 
4) Provider options 
5) Benefits package 
6) Other (specify) ……………… 
7) Nothing 
  
 
Section G:Sources of Informal Health care 
Qn56 Would you say that most people in your community 
seek formal health care (western medicine and care) 
when they are sick? 
1) All the time 
2) Sometimes 
3) Rarely 
4) Never 
5) Do not know  
  
Qn57 What are the major reasons why some people do not 
report to health facilities when they are sick? 
1) Long distance to health facility 
2) Cost of health care 
3) Lack of drugs at the health facility 
4) Lack of medical personnel  
5) Long waiting hours 
6) Use of traditional medicine 
7) Negative attitude towards formal health care 
8) Ignorance of need for health care 
9) Other (specify) ……………… 
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Qn58 Do you think people in your community use 
traditional healers? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
  
Qn59 Would you say they use them: 
1) Most of the time 
2) Rarely 
3) Never 
  
Qn60 What do you consider to be the reason for use of 
traditional healers by some people in your 
community? 
1) Trust in efficiency of the healing methods 
2) Cheaper cost of medicines 
3) Traditional healers readily accessible 
4) Cultural factors (beliefs and practices) 
5) Unavailability of free formal health care 
6) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
 
Section H: Perception towards Community Health Insurance 
 QUESTION N/A COMMENT 
Qn61 Do you consider community health insurance to be a 
viable option for increasing access to health care for you? 
1) Yes 
2) No (Go to question 62) 
3) Do not know 
  
Qn62 If yes, in what way is it viable? 
1) Faster access to health care 
2) Financial protection against cost of illness 
3) Extension of health care to whole house hold 
4) Other (specify) ……………… 
  
Qn63 If no, why is it not a viable option? 
1) High cost of premium 
2) Widespread poverty 
3) Rigid regulations for enrolment 
4) Poor quality care 
5) Presence of free government healthcare 
6) Negative cultural beliefs and attitudes towards 
insurance 
7) Other (specify)………………….. 
  
Qn64 What is the best strategy that can be adopted to improve 
access to health care for people in your community? 
1) Improve free health care 
2) Cost sharing 
3) Private health care 
4) Other (specify)………………… 
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Section I: Wealth Index 
 
QUESTION YES NO N/A COMMENT 
Qn65 Type of house (Observe) 
1) Mud & Wattle 
2) Semi-permanent (Iron roofed) 
3) Permanent (Brick & concrete) 
4) Other (specify) 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
  
Qn66 Household assets (Tick all that apply) 
1) Bicycle 
2) Motor cycle 
3) Motor vehicle 
4) Radio 
5) Television set 
6) Cellular telephone 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
  
Qn67 Ownership of animals (Circle all that apply) 
1) Cattle……………………………… 
2) Goats/sheep……………………… 
3) Poultry (large scale/subsistence) 
4) Other (specify) ……………… 
5) None 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
State number 
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APPENDIX C 
 FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDES 
 
Is community health insurance a viable means of increasing access to health 
care for rural households? 
 
FGD guide (1): Scheme-members  
 
Screening Questions 
a) Head of household or spouse  
Yes (recruit into group) 
No (Drop) 
b) Have you heard about community health insurance?  
Yes (proceed) 
 No (drop) 
c) Are you a member of community health insurance?  
Yes (proceed) 
No (drop) 
 
Section A: Level of Access to Health Services 
1. What are the alternative health service providers in the community? 
2. What are some of the strengths/good points in seeking care from 
government health facilities in this area? 
3. What problems have you experienced in trying to seek care from 
government health facilities? Probe for: 
• Shortage of drugs 
• Limited health personnel 
• Overcrowding 
• Lack of some facilities like laboratories 
• Others 
4. In case you cannot get health care/medical attention from the government 
health facilities, where else do you commonly report for care? Probe on: 
• Private clinics 
• Drug shops 
• PNFP health facilities 
• Traditional healers 
(Ask for what influences their decisions on where to go) 
 
Section B: Community Health Insurance 
5. You are participating in this discussion because you said you know about 
community health insurance.  
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a) What benefits have you, your household or community realized or 
observed from being a member of community health insurance? 
b) What difficulties have you so far encountered in being a member of 
community health insurance? 
6. Some people in this community have joined community health insurance, 
while others have not. Can you characterize a typical household that is a 
member of community health insurance? 
• Wealth status (land, type  of house, plantation, other assets) 
• Education status 
• Gender 
• Household size 
• Level and frequency of illness 
• Others 
7. Can you characterize a typical household that is not a member of 
community health insurance? (refer to probes in 14 above) 
8. What are the different factors that influence/enable some households to 
join community health insurance while others do not? 
 
Section C: Design of Community Health Insurance 
9. What is your opinion about the way the community health insurance 
scheme works?  
• Risk pooling, resource pooling, prepayment 
• Current ownership/management of the scheme? 
• Community participation in the scheme (Do you think the 
community can do more to help in the proper running of the 
scheme?) 
• Enrolment procedures (whole households, groups, minimum 
number of households in groups) 
• Benefits package (in-patient care, out-patient care, exclusions) 
• Provider options (Hospital vs. primary care, one vs. many 
providers, PNFP vs. private or a mix of providers) 
• Premium levels 
• Mode of payment, co-payments 
10. a) What are the common complaints about the scheme design that are 
likely to affect some people’s ability or interest to join the scheme? 
 
b) In what way can such obstacles be minimized in order for more people 
to join? 
11.  Most people in this community are members of mutual help groups such 
as engozi groups.  
• What attracts people to join such groups? 
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•  Are there some people who do not join such groups? Why don’t 
they join?  
• What would attract more of the households who join mutual help 
groups to join community health insurance too?  
•  Is there a way in which enrolment of these groups may bar some 
people from joining CHI? How? Why? 
 
Section D: Opportunities for CHI and General Recommendations 
12. What factors have made it possible for CHI to operate in this community 
13. What may make it difficult for CHI to continue operating or to scale up its 
operations in Uganda? 
14. What do you think needs to be done to strengthen CHI or make it 
sustainable? 
15. Would you say that it is desirable for CHI to continue operating in this 
community? Would you recommend it to be adopted in other rural areas 
of Uganda? 
16. What other suggestions would you make to help rural households have 
better access to health care? (Probe: Strategies to be adopted at policy 
level, implementation – or service delivery, community’s involvement 
etc.) 
 
Thank you very much for your time and participation 
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FGD guide (2): Non-scheme-members  
 
Screening Questions 
a. Head of household or spouse  
Yes (recruit into group) 
No (drop) 
b. Have you heard about community health insurance?  
Yes (proceed) 
 No (drop) 
c. Are you a member of community health insurance?  
No (proceed) 
Yes (drop) 
 
Section A: Common Health Problems and Level of Access to Health Services 
1. What are the alternative health service providers in the community? 
2. What are some of the strengths/good points in seeking care from 
government health facilities in this area? 
3. What problems have you experienced in trying to seek care from 
government health facilities? Probe for: 
• Shortage of drugs 
• Limited health personnel 
• Overcrowding 
• Lack of some facilities like laboratories 
• Others 
4. In case you cannot get health care/medical attention from the government 
health facilities, where else do you commonly report for care? Probe on: 
• Private clinics 
• Drug shops 
• PNFP health facilities 
• Traditional healers 
(What influences their decisions on where to go?) 
 
Section B: Community Health Insurance: Awareness and differentials in 
Enrolment 
5. You are participating in this discussion because you said you know about 
community health insurance. Can you share briefly what you have heard 
about or know about community health insurance?   
• Risk sharing, resource pooling, prepayment 
 
6. Some people in this community have joined community health insurance, 
while others have not. Can you characterize a typical household that is a 
member of community health insurance? 
• Wealth status (land, type  of house, plantation, other assets) 
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• Education status 
• Gender 
• Household size 
• Level and frequency of illness 
• others 
7. Can you characterize a typical household that is not a member of 
community health insurance? (refer to probes in 14 above) 
8. What are the different factors that influence/enable some households to 
join community health insurance while others do not? 
9. Do you think community health insurance helps households who enrol to 
get better access to health care than those who do not? In what way? If 
not, why not? 
 
Section C: Design of Community health insurance 
10. I would like you to comment on the strengths (positive) and weaknesses 
(negative) of the following aspects of the scheme (For non-members give a 
brief explanation on each of the components, with a view of understanding if in 
fact some may not have joined the scheme due to the way it is designed).  
• Enrolment procedures (whole households, groups, minimum 
number of households in groups) 
• Benefits package (in-patient care, out-patient care, exclusions) 
• Provider options (hospital vs. primary care, one vs. many 
providers, PNFP vs. private or a mix of providers) 
• Premium levels  
• Mode of payment, co-payments 
11. Most people in this community are members of mutual help groups such 
as engozi groups; 
• What attracts people to join such groups? 
•  Are there some people who do not join such groups? Why don’t 
they join?  
• What would attract more of the households who join mutual help 
groups to join community health insurance too?  
•  Is there a way in which enrolment of these groups may bar some 
people from joining CHI? How? Why? 
 
Section D: Opportunities for CHI and General Recommendations 
12. What factors have made it possible for CHI to operate in this community 
13. What may make it difficult for CHI to continue operating or to scale up its 
operations in Uganda? 
14. Would you say that it is desirable for CHI to continue operating in this 
community? Would you advocate it to be adopted in other rural areas of 
Uganda? 
15. What needs to be done to strengthen CHI or make it sustainable? 
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16. What other suggestions would you make to help rural households have 
better access to health care? (Probe: Strategies to be adopted at policy 
level, implementation – or service delivery, community’s involvement etc) 
 
Thank you very much for your time and participation 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 258
FGD guide (3):  Scheme-drop-outs  
 
Screening Questions 
a. Head of household or spouse  
Yes (recruit into group) 
No (Drop) 
b. Have you heard about community health insurance?  
Yes (proceed) 
 No (drop) 
c. You have ever joined community health insurance scheme but are no 
longer a member?  
Yes (proceed) 
Never joined (drop) 
Current member (drop) 
 
Section A: Common Health Problems and Level of Access to health services 
1. What are the alternative health service providers in the community? 
2. What are some of the strengths/good points in seeking care from 
government health facilities in this area? 
3. What problems have you experienced in trying to seek care from 
government health facilities? Probe for: 
• Shortage of drugs 
• Limited health personnel 
• Overcrowding 
• Lack of some facilities like laboratories 
• Others 
4. In case you cannot get health care/medical attention from the government 
health facilities, where else do you commonly report for care? Probe on: 
• Private clinics 
• Drug shops 
• PNFP health facilities 
• Traditional healers 
(What influences their decisions on where to go?) 
 
Section B: Community Health Insurance: Differentials in Enrolment 
5. Some people in this community have joined community health insurance, 
while others have not. Can you characterize a typical household that is a 
member of community health insurance? 
• Wealth status (land, type  of house, plantation, other assets) 
• Education status 
• Gender 
• Household size 
• Level and frequency of illness e.t.c 
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6. Can you characterize a typical household that is not a member of 
community health insurance? (refer to probes in 14 above) 
7. What are the different factors that influence/enable some households to 
join community health insurance while others do not? 
8. Do you think community health insurance helps households who enrol to 
get better access to health care than those who do not? In what way? If 
not, Why not? 
 
Section C: Design of Community Health Insurance 
9. What is your opinion about the way the community health insurance 
scheme works?  
• Risk pooling, resource pooling, prepayment 
• Current ownership/management of the scheme? 
• Community participation in the scheme (Do you think the 
community can do more to help in the proper running of the 
scheme?) 
• Enrolment procedures (whole households, groups, minimum 
number of households in groups) 
• Benefits package (in-patient care, out-patient care, exclusions) 
• Provider options (hospital vs. primary care, one vs. many 
providers, PNFP vs. private or a mix of providers) 
• Premium levels 
• Mode of payment, co-payments 
10. a) What are the common complaints about the scheme design that are 
likely to affect some people’s ability or interest to join the scheme? 
b) In what way can such obstacles be minimized in order for more people 
to join? 
11. Most people in this community are members of mutual help groups such 
as engozi groups.  
• What attracts people to join such groups? 
•  Are there some people who do not join such groups? Why don’t 
they join?  
• What would attract more of the households who join mutual help 
groups to join community health insurance too?  
•  Is there a way in which enrolment of these groups may bar some 
people from joining CHI? How? Why? 
 
Section D: Opportunities for CHI and General Recommendations 
12. What factors have made it possible for CHI to operate in this community 
13. What may make it difficult for CHI to continue operating or to scale up its 
operations in Uganda? 
14. What do you think needs to be done to strengthen CHI or make it 
sustainable? 
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15. Would you say that it is desirable for CHI to continue operating in this 
community? Would you advocate it to be adopted in other rural areas of 
Uganda? 
16. What other suggestions would you make to help rural households have 
better access to health care? (Probe: Strategies to be adopted at policy 
level, implementation – or service delivery, community’s involvement etc) 
 
Thank you very much for your time and participation 
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APPENDIX D 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDES 
 
Key Informant Interview Guide  
  
General Introduction 
 I am a Ugandan, pursuing a doctoral degree in Social Development at the 
University of Cape Town (South Africa), Department of Social Development. As 
part of the requirements for this degree, I am undertaking a research project on 
the topic, ‘is community health insurance a viable means of increasing access to health 
care for rural households in Uganda?’ In order to obtain an objective analysis and 
conclusion on the above question, it was deemed necessary to get responses from 
as many stakeholders in Uganda’s health sector as possible. You have been 
selected as one of the resource persons that can provide meaningful information 
and opinion on this subject. The information obtained will be kept confidential, 
as no personal particulars will be revealed during or after this research process. 
The responses will be utilized to develop an academic discussion on the viability 
of community health insurance in increasing access to health care for rural 
households. I appreciate your cooperation and willingness to share your views 
on this subject.  
 
 
Janestic Twikirize 
Date………………….. 
Email: mwnjan001@uct.ac.za/ 
jtwikirize@ss.mak.ac.ug 
Tel. 256 71 2 875798 
 
Section A: Respondent Identification  
 
Date of Interview: 
Interviewer Code: 
Respondent Code: 
Designation of Respondent: 
Department: 
Interview outcome: Complete……………Incomplete……..(Tick) 
 To be continued (Date & place of next appointment):…………………. 
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Interview Guide (I): Ministry of Health (Health, Planning department) 
 
Required Documents: 
• Uganda health financing strategy 
• Health sector strategic plan I – Evaluation or Review report 
• The baseline report on the national health insurance 
 
A National health policy and access to health care 
1) Uganda has been implementing the free health care policy since 2001? What 
are some of the outstanding achievements of the strategy since its inception in 
2001? 
 
2) What have you observed or documented as the major constraints/challenges 
with the strategy of free health care in Uganda? 
 
3) Would you say free health care is still practicable given the above challenges? 
 
4) Government is in close partnership with the Private-Not-For-Profit sector. 
The sector still charges fees for its services. How does this relate with or affect 
government’s strategy of making health care affordable for all especially for 
households in the rural areas? 
 
B Viability of community health insurance 
5) The Ministry of health initiated community health insurance and sold the 
idea to the PNFP sector. At one time (in 2001) it was ruled that CHI was not 
proving a viable health financing strategy, but the government has continued 
to support it and it is even being considered an option in the NHIS: The 
Ministry of Health is also represented on the board of the Community based 
Health Financing Association and gives some financial support to the 
association.  
 
a) What is the envisaged relationship between community health insurance on 
the one hand and government’s official policy of free health care on the 
other? 
 
b) What is your perception of community health insurance as a strategy of 
improving access to health care for the rural households? 
• Strengths 
• Weaknesses 
• Facilitating factors 
• Hindrances 
• Future prospects 
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c) In addition to extending financial support, are there other ways in which 
government (Ministry of Health/ DDHS) assists/promotes community 
health insurance schemes? 
• Government subsidies and grants 
• Technical support: training, personnel 
• Policy and legal framework 
 
6) Are there any specific strategies that government plans to adopt in order to 
promote CHI? Or is it being left to the PNFP sector? 
• Currently not a priority? 
• Accommodated? 
• To be considered in future 
7) Do you think it is necessary to adjust the free health care policy to cater a 
particular social economic class? If government officially promotes CHI 
alongside the proposed social health insurance, what would be the logic 
underlying the free health care policy? 
 
8) In your view, would community health insurance be a viable option in 
increasing access to health care for rural households? Probe for: 
• Equity in access 
• Financial efficiency 
• Sustainability 
 
9) What overall recommendations would you make in relation to community 
health insurance and access to health care in Uganda? 
• Policy recommendations 
• Adoption of the strategy 
• Strengthening of CHI/Scale up or scale down 
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Interview Guide (II):  District Directorate of Health Services, Rukungiri 
 
Preliminary questions: 
a) Ask for a catalogue of health service providers in the district i.e. a list or 
inventory of all health facilities in the district according to their level and 
ownership – government, non-governmental and other as well as location. I 
am particularly interested in Rubabo County. 
 
b) Any recent report that gives the health utilization status (figures) i.e. out- 
patient/in-patient attendance at both government and non-governmental 
health facilities. 
 
c) Available staffing levels at health facilities in the district. 
 
A Access to health care 
1) What are some of the outstanding achievements of the free health care 
strategy since its inception in 2001? 
 
2) What are the major challenges faced in the provision of free health care of the 
strategy? 
 
3) Government is in close partnership with the Private-Not-For-Profit sector. 
The sector still charges fees for its services. How does this relate with or affect 
government’s strategy of making health care affordable for all, especially for 
households in the rural areas? 
 
4) The Private-Not-For-Profit sector has been promoting community health 
insurance in some parts of the country. The Ministry of Health is also 
represented on the board of the Community based Health Financing 
Association and gives some financial support to the association.  
 
a) What is the relationship between Community health insurance as a 
strategy, and government’s official policy of free health care? 
 
b) What is your perception of community health insurance as a strategy of 
improving access to health care for the rural households? Probe for:  
• Strengths 
• Weaknesses 
• Facilitating factors 
• Hindrances 
• Future Prospects 
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5) In addition to extending financial support, are there other ways in which 
government (Ministry of Health/ DDHS) assists/promotes community 
health insurance schemes? Probe: 
• Government subsidies and grants 
• Technical support: Training, Personnel 
• Policy and legal framework 
 
6) In the current proposed bill on national health insurance, community health 
insurance is listed as a component. Are there any specific strategies that 
government plans to adopt in order to promote CHI? Or is it being left to the 
PNFP sector? 
• Currently not a priority? 
• Accommodated? 
• To be considered in future 
 
7) What is the envisaged policy linkage between free health care and 
community health insurance? Probe: 
• Is it necessary to adjust the free health care policy to cater a 
particular social economic class? If government officially promotes 
CHI alongside the proposed social health insurance, what would be 
the logic underlying the free health care policy? 
 
8) In your view, would community health insurance be a viable option in 
increasing access to health care for rural households? 
 
9) What over-all recommendations would you make in relation to community 
health insurance and access to health care in Uganda? 
• Policy recommendations 
• Adoption  
• Strengthening of CHI/Scale up or scale down Un
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Interview Guide (III): Promoting Institution (Microcare) 
 
A. Access to health care  
1) What do you consider to be the strength and weaknesses of Uganda’s 
current health policy? i.e. 
• Free health service provisioning  
• Financing mechanisms – tax funded, donor dependency, OOP 
• User fees in the private sector 
 
2) To what extent would you consider the free health care policy relevant in 
its current form? i.e. universal access 
 
3) What factors do you think are affecting access to free health care in the 
rural areas in Uganda? 
 
4) Can you give a brief background of your health insurance activities in 
Uganda? 
 
5) What lessons (both negative and positive) have you so far learnt with 
regard to promotion and/or adoption of community health insurance as a 
strategy in accessing health care in Uganda? 
 
B. Scheme Design 
6) By the nature of your organisation (private sector), you are profit oriented. 
You are involved in the promotion of community health insurance, which 
should be voluntary and not for profit, and it actually operates mainly in 
the PNFP sector. How do you ensure that there is no conflict between the 
community’s objectives and your organisation’s objective? Probe for: 
• The model of CHI adopted – relationship between the provider, the 
organisation and the community/household. 
• The objectives of the schemes established 
• The linkage between profit and maximum benefit to the community 
members. 
7) What are the main sources of the scheme’s funds? 
8) To what extent is the scheme dependent on donor funding? 
9) What is the schemes generated income: donor fund ratio? 
10) Does the scheme have an annual budget? 
11) What is the ceiling on bills for an individual beneficiary per year? 
12) In what way do the community members participate in the decision 
making process in the scheme?  
13) What scheme design features facilitate enrolment of community members 
into community health insurance? 
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14) What scheme design features hinder enrolment in community health 
insurance schemes? 
 
C Performance of CHI 
15) From your experience in health insurance, what would you consider as 
key considerations in assessing the viability of community health 
insurance schemes?  Probe for: 
• What indicates that CHI is a successful means of accessing health 
care? 
• What factors/or conditions influence this viability? 
• In your view, are these conditions present in Uganda’s rural 
communities? 
16) What achievements have you realized since inception of CHI as one of 
your projects? Probe for Benefits at various levels: 
• Individual,  
• Households,  
• Community,  
• Organisational and  
• Sector (health sector) levels. 
17) What major challenges have you encountered in the promotion of CHI as 
a strategy for accessing/financing health care at household and 
community level? 
18) What specific arrangements have you made to ensure that CHI is 
inclusive of the most vulnerable groups in the community? Probe for: 
• Whom the organisation considers most vulnerable 
• Arrangements made to avoid excluding them from CHI 
• If no arrangements, the justification (could it be on the assumption 
that they will get care from the government health care system)? 
 
D Conclusions/Recommendations 
19) Would community health insurance be a viable option in increasing access 
to health care for rural households? 
 
20) What overall recommendations/suggestions do you propose for 
improving the rural population’s access to health care in Uganda?  
Consider 
• Different strategies being adopted 
• Over all health policy 
• Role of communities, households and individuals 
• Role of government 
• Other stakeholders. 
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Interview Guide (IV): CHI Administrators, Kisiizi Health Insurance Scheme 
 
A Access to Health Care  
1) What is the level of access to free government health care in this 
community? 
2) What are the factors that affect access to free health care in this 
community? 
3) What is the predominant source of health care for households in this 
community? 
4) What other health care is being sought by the population in this 
community (probe for traditional healers, herbalists, self medication)? 
5) Please provide a brief background of Kisiizi health insurance scheme 
(Note: Ask for project background documents). Probe for: 
• Context and motivation for setting up the association 
• Mission and original objectives (probe on equity of access vs. 
financial efficiency as objectives) 
• Growth since inception, current membership (ask for membership 
records) 
6) What is the socio-economic/health profile of households that enrol/do not 
enrol in community health insurance schemes? 
 
B. Scheme Design 
7) Can you describe the management/administrative structure of the scheme? 
(Detailed description of the model adopted or applied; justification for the 
design and management structure) 
Please describe the procedure for: 
• Determining the benefits package (ask for a copy of the benefits 
package and exclusions). What criteria are used to include or 
exclude an item from the benefits package? (Probe for: community 
health priorities, cost of the service, service availability, emergency 
vis-à-vis planned conditions such as pregnancy …) 
• Recruitment of members (Groups, households, individuals? What 
is the justification for the adopted procedure?) 
• Premium setting and mode of payment 
• Claim of benefits 
• Accessing health care services 
8) What scheme design features facilitate enrolment of community members 
into community health insurance? 
9) What scheme design features hinder enrolment in community health 
insurance schemes? 
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C Performance 
10) What other factors are influencing the effective adoption of community 
health insurance in this area? 
11) How do you assess the relevance of community health insurance as a 
strategy in increasing access to health care in Uganda given the following? 
• the socio-economic situation in the country (for example, high 
poverty levels, illiteracy, low savings culture) 
• Free health care strategy in government health facilities. 
12) What would you consider as key considerations in assessing the viability of 
community health insurance schemes?  Probe for: 
• What indicates that CHI is an effective means of accessing health 
care? 
• What factors/or conditions influence this viability? 
13) In your view, are these conditions present in Uganda’s rural communities? 
14) What achievements have you realized since inception of CHI as one of your 
projects? Probe for benefits at Individual, households, community, 
organisational and sectoral (health sector) levels. 
15) What major challenges have you encountered in the promotion of CHI as a 
strategy for accessing/financing health care at household and community 
level? 
 
D Conclusion/Recommendations 
16) What overall recommendations/suggestions do you propose for improving 
the rural population’s access to health care in Uganda? 
Consider: 
• Different strategies being adopted 
• Over all health policy 
• Role of communities, households and individuals 
• Role of government 
• Other stakeholders. 
 
Thanks for your cooperation. Un
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Interview Guide (V): PNFP (Uganda Community-based Health Financing 
Association) 
 
1) Background of the Uganda Community Based Health Financing 
Association 
• Context and motivation for setting up the association 
• Mission and original objectives (probe on  Equity of access vs. 
financial efficiency as objectives) 
• Growth since inception, current membership (ask to get catalogue 
of members of the association) 
2) To what extent have the objectives of the association been achieved so far? 
Any measurable indicators of achievement? 
3) UCBHFA has existed in the context of government’s free health care 
policy. The strategy promotes user fees. How would you describe the 
relationship between the two strategies? Has there been any conflicts 
arising out of this context?  
4) How has government free health care affected the growth of community 
health insurance in Uganda? Would you say that free health services in 
government hospitals significantly affect CHI? Why or why not (in case of 
a less significant influence) 
5) What other factors apart from free government services affect the growth 
and expansion of CHI in Uganda? 
6) In what other way is government health policy affecting the schemes’ 
viability? 
• Policy framework 
• Health financing strategy (free health care, proposed Social  health 
insurance scheme) 
• Public-private partnership 
 
7) The Ministry of health is proposing the introduction of a NHIS with social 
health insurance as the primary strategy. CHI is also accommodated in the 
bill. How do you think this will affect the growth, relevance and generally 
the viability of community health insurance as a strategy for health care 
access? 
8) What is CHI’s target population?  What specific arrangements are in place 
to include the poor and the most vulnerable given the fact that the 
schemes are voluntary? 
9) Some CHI schemes such as Kisiizi health insurance scheme are linked to 
micro finance institutions. How does this linkage facilitate/impede their 
viability in increasing access to health care particularly in rural settings in 
Uganda? 
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• Equity 
• Sustainability 
• Efficiency 
10) What is CHI’s contribution to health care access in Uganda? 
• Equity 
• Finances 
• Quality of care 
11) Can you describe the predominant design of the schemes? How is the 
design determined? I.e. What factors are considered in the design of the 
schemes? 
12) How do the following design features affect scheme viability? 
• Provider based schemes 
• Insurer based schemes 
• Linked model (intermediary organisation) 
13) What have been the major constraints in the promotion of CHI in 
Uganda?  
14) What measures has your association taken to address the above 
challenges? 
15) In what ways is government facilitating the growth of community health 
financing schemes? 
• Financial assistance (total funds received, what do you consider to 
be the rationale for giving these funds when government promotes 
free health care strategy? 
• Government subsidies to the schemes 
• Technical support – training, supervision) 
16) Given Uganda’s context (rural poverty, government policy) do you think 
community health insurance is the best strategy/option for increasing 
access to health care in Uganda? On what factors/country specific 
evidence do you base your view? 
17) What overall recommendations/suggestions do you propose for 
improving the rural population’s access to health care in Uganda? 
Consider: 
• Different strategies being adopted 
• Over all health policy 
• Role of communities, households and individuals 
• Role of government 
• Other stakeholders 
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Interview guide (VI): Private-For-Profit provider 
A Access to health care 
1) What do you consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of Uganda’s 
current health policy? i.e. 
• Free health service provisioning  
• Financing mechanisms – tax funded, donor dependency, OOP 
• User fees in the private sector 
2) To what extent would you consider the free health care policy relevant in 
its current form? i.e. universal access 
3) What are the factors that affect access to formal health care in the rural 
areas in Uganda? 
4) What factors do you think are affecting access to free health care in the 
rural areas in Uganda? 
5) What is the most common source of health care for the majority of 
households in this community? 
6) What other healthcare is being sought by community members than 
formal health care? In this community, what determines the type of 
healthcare sought? 
7) Do you have any arrangements (such as prepayment, resource pooling, 
and insurance) to ease financial access to health care by community 
members? 
 
B Viability of CHI 
8) Some health service providers have established community health 
insurance schemes as a means of easing household’s access to health care. 
What is your perception of this arrangement? 
• Its potential strengths and weaknesses 
• Practicability in a rural context 
• Effectiveness in improving access to health care 
• Who do you think gains most from the scheme-the provider, the 
household, the community, or the intermediary organisation 
9) What factors do you think would affect its successful adoption in Uganda? 
10) Would you support full scale adoption of community health insurance as 
a major strategy in improving access to health care for the rural 
households? Why or why not? 
11) What overall recommendations/suggestions do you propose for 
improving the rural population’s access to health care in Uganda? 
• Different strategies being adopted 
• Over all health policy 
• Role of communities, households and individuals 
• Role of government 
• Other stakeholders. 
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Interview Guide (VII).Traditional and complementary medicine (coordinator)  
1. What do you consider to be the strength and weaknesses of Uganda’s 
current health policy, with particular reference to universal access to basic 
health care 
• Free health service provisioning  
• Financing mechanisms – tax funded, donor dependency, OOP 
• User fees in the private sector 
• Paying wings (voluntary in some government hospitals 
 
2. To what extent would you consider the free health care policy relevant in 
its current form? i.e. universal access 
 
3. What factors do you think are affecting access to free health care in the 
rural areas in Uganda? 
4. What range of services do you offer?  
5. What is the level of utilization of the services offered? 
6. What is the mode of payment for the services? 
7. What do you do if the patient cannot afford to pay for the service OOP? 
8 Do you have any arrangements in place to ease access to the services you 
offer (financial, geographical, social) 
 
9. In your view what is the most common source of health care for 
households in this community? What factors facilitate this access and 
utilization? 
10. Some health service providers especially in the Private-Not-For-Profit 
(PNFP) sector have established community health insurance schemes as a 
means of easing household’s access to health care. What is your 
perception of this arrangement? 
• Its potential strengths and weaknesses 
• Practicability in a rural context 
• Effectiveness in improving access to health care 
 
11.  Who do you think gains most from the scheme-the provider, the 
household, the community, or the intermediary organisation? 
 
12. What factors do you think would affect its successful adoption in Uganda? 
13. Would you support full scale adoption of community health insurance as 
a major strategy in improving access to health care for the rural 
households? Why or why not? 
13.  What overall recommendations/suggestions do you propose for 
improving the rural population’s access to health care in Uganda? 
Consider; 
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• Different strategies being adopted 
• Over all health policy 
• Role of communities, households and individuals 
• Role of government 
• Other stakeholders. 
 
Thanks for your cooperation. 
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Interview Guide (VIII): Public health care providers 
 
1. What do you consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of Uganda’s 
current health policy? i.e. 
• Free health service provisioning  
• Financing mechanisms – tax funded, donor dependency, OOP 
• User fees in the private sector 
 
2. To what extent would you consider the free health care policy relevant in its 
current form? i.e. universal access 
3. What are the factors that affect access to formal health care in the rural areas 
in Uganda? 
4. What factors do you think are affecting access to free health care in the rural 
areas in Uganda? 
5. Some health service providers have established community health 
insurance schemes as a means of easing household’s access to health care. 
What is your perception of this arrangement? 
• Its potential strengths and weaknesses 
• Practicability in a rural context 
• Effectiveness in improving access to health care 
• Who do you think gains most from the scheme-the provider, the 
household, the community, or the intermediary organisation 
6. What factors do you think would affect its successful adoption in Uganda? 
7. Would you support full-scale adoption of community health insurance as a 
major strategy in improving access to health care for the rural households? 
Why or why not? 
8. What overall recommendations/suggestions do you propose for improving 
the rural population’s access to health care in Uganda? 
• Different strategies being adopted 
• Over all health policy 
• Role of communities, households and individuals 
• Role of government 
• Other stakeholders 
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Interview Guide (IX): CHI Service Provider (Hospital Administration) 
 
A. Access to health care 
1. What is the estimated population served by this hospital ( area within the 
catchment area) 
• How many patients does the hospital handle per month: outpatient, 
in patient, referral 
• What percentage belongs to community health insurance 
 
2. Please give an objective assessment of the challenges met by households in 
accessing health care in the district (Rukungiri) – could be at household, 
community, health service providers, or policy level. 
 
B Performance of CHI 
3. What do you consider as the key contribution of community health insurance 
schemes in the area? 
 
4. How has the scheme impacted on service delivery by the hospital, either 
negatively or positively? 
 
• Quality of care 
• Financial efficiency –percentage of total treatment cost from the 
scheme 
• Services offered 
• Staff morale 
5. What challenges is the hospital facing as a result of working with the 
insurance scheme? 
 
C. Scheme Design 
6. Kisiizi health insurance scheme changed management a few years ago from 
provider based to insurer based model. What were the principles/reasons for the 
change in the model? How has this influenced its growth or the lack of it?  
 
7. Please comment on the appropriateness of the scheme design  in terms of the 
following: 
• Benefits package/exclusions – Are the exclusions justifiable in your 
opinion? 
• Premium rates Vs cost of care and household incomes 
• Mode of Payment 
• Mode of enrolment 
• Service Provider options 
• Claim procedures 
• Any other component 
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D Conclusions/Recommendations 
8. Please comment on the viability (potential/usefulness, ability to bear fruit) of 
the community health insurance strategy in terms of the following: 
 
• Access to health care – particularly in terms of equity (i.e. different 
socio-economic groups, gender, age). Is there evidence that the very 
poor have more access to health care as a result of the insurance 
scheme? 
• Efficiency (value for money) i.e. benefits in relation to resources 
invested in the scheme. Are the resources spent justifiable? Is it 
possible to get similar benefits with fewer resources spent? (This is 
an opinion question) 
• Sustainability: How sustainable is the strategy? 
 
9. Would you advise government and other stakeholders in the health sector to 
scale up or promote community health insurance schemes in other rural parts of 
Uganda? Please provide a brief justification. 
 
10. Please suggest recommendations for the successful adoption of community 
health insurance in Uganda. 
 
11. What alternative do you suggest for improving access to quality health care 
for Uganda’s rural households? 
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APPENDIX E 
 FINDINGS-ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table 25:  Level of illness, health-seeking behaviour and common sources 
of health care 
  
  
CHI enrolment Status 
Scheme-Member Non-scheme- member Total 
f % f % f % 
Has any other member of your household fallen sick during the last six months? 
Yes 97 74.6 102 78.5 199 76.5 
No 33 25.4 28 21.5 61 23.5 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
What was the cause of illness? 
Malaria 71 73.2 68 66.7 139 69.8 
Respiratory Tract 
Infection  18 18.6 16 15.7 34 17.1 
Diarrhoea 0 .0 5 4.9 5 2.5 
Accident/Injury 3 3.1 9 8.8 12 6.0 
Others 5 5.2 4 3.9 9 4.5 
Total 97 100.0 102 100.0 199 100.0 
Did they seek health care? 
Yes 96 99.0 100 98.0 196 98.5 
NO 1 1.0 2 2.0 3 1.5 
Total 97 100.0 102 100.0 199 100.0 
From where did they seek health care? 
Government health 
centre 7 7.3 33 33.0 40 20.4 
Government Hospital 2 2.1 4 4.0 6 3.1 
PNFP health  centre 8 8.3 9 9.0 17 8.7 
PNFP Hospital 73 76.0 32 32.0 105 53.6 
Private clinic 6 6.3 21 21.0 27 13.8 
Other 0 .0 1 1.0 1 .5 
Total 96 100.0 100 100.0 196 100.0 
How long does it usually take you to reach the health centre? 
Less than 1 Hr 87 66.9 90 69.2 177 68.1 
1 to 2 Hrs 37 28.5 34 26.2 71 27.3 
2 to 3 Hrs 6 4.6 5 3.8 11 4.2 
More than 3 hrs 0 .0 1 .8 1 .4 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Do you think people in your community use traditional healers? 
Yes 64 49.2 49 37.7 113 43.5 
No 66 50.8 81 62.3 147 56.5 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
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Table 26:  Level and ownership of the nearest health facility 
 CHI enrolment Status  
Scheme member Non-scheme-member Total 
f % f % f % 
Level of nearest health facility 
Health Centre I 4 3.1 3 2.3 7 2.7 
Health Centre II 20 15.4 13 10.0 33 12.7 
Health centre III 53 40.8 68 52.3 121 46.5 
Health Centre IV 3 2.3 2 1.5 5 1.9 
Clinic 27 20.8 22 16.9 49 18.8 
Hospital 23 17.7 22 16.9 45 17.3 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Ownership of the nearest health facility mentioned above 
Government 62 47.7 78 60.0 140 53.8 
PNFP 43 33.1 29 22.3 72 27.7 
PFP 25 19.2 21 16.2 46 17.7 
Don’t know 0 .0 2 1.6 1 .8 
Total 130 100.0 130 100.0 260 100.0 
Source: Field data, September 2007 
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APPENDIX F 
FINDINGS-ADDITIONAL FIGURES 
 
Figure 22:  Level of awareness and enrolment in the CHI scheme 
(N=260) 
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Source: Field data, September, 2007 
 
Figure 23:  Sources of information about the CHI scheme  
(N=360) 
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Source: Field data, September, 2007 
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APPENDIX G 
 KISIIZI HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS PACKAGE 
 
Covered services: 
• Casualty and outpatient services; 
• In-patient services;  
• Referral for consultation with consultants recognized by registered hospital 
and medication prescribed by the consultant provided that it appears on the 
Microcare drug list; 
• Surgery; 
• Special investigations including x-ray, ultrasound, electrocardiogram and 
laboratory facilities available within hospital; 
• Pharmacy: drugs prescribed by the Hospital medical practitioner within the 
agreed treatment protocols of the specific scheme; 
• Maternity cover including delivery (normal or by c-section), provided the 
woman attends a minimum of 3 antenatal check-ups; 
• Dental care including cavity filling, tooth extraction and general consultation;  
• Optical consultation; 
 
Exclusions and Limitations: 
The Microcare Health Plan will not cover:  
• Dental surgery other than as a result of severe accidental injury;  
• Optical appliances, sight correction other than general optical consultation;  
• Routine medical check-ups (students, army, employer etc.); 
• Circumcision for religious reasons (or other reasons than medical); 
• Hearing-aids;  
• Cosmetic surgery; 
• Intentional self-injury or illness; illness or injury arising out of involvement in 
riot, civil commotion, affray, political or illegal act by a member (including 
imprisonment or detention by any authority);  
• Psycho-neurosis, nervous or mental disorder;  
• Treatment not scientifically recognized and their consequences; 
• The investigation and treatment of infertility; 
• Alcoholism or drug addiction, or the costs incurred by accident, injury or 
illness resulting from such addiction; 
• Private room charges and any other private charges for drugs or surgeon etc.  
• Chronic medication and routine testing (e.g. for chronic diseases) is not 
covered for outpatients. Chronic diseases include diabetes, hypertension, 
asthma, epilepsy, ulcers, sickle cell etc.  
• Anti retroviral drugs and anti fungal drugs.  
Source: Microcare scheme policy (Kisiizi) (no date) (Accessed September 2007) 
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APPENDIX H 
 KEY COMPONENTS OF THE UGANDA NATIONAL MINIMUM 
HEALTH CARE PACKAGE (UNMHCP) 
 
1. Cluster 1: Health promotion, disease prevention and community health 
initiatives 
• Health promotion and education 
• Environmental health 
• Control of diarrhoeal diseases 
• School health 
• Epidemic disaster prevention, preparedness and response 
• Occupational health 
 
2. Cluster 2: Maternal and child health 
• Sexual reproductive health and rights 
• Health and survival of newborns 
• Management of common childhood illness 
• Expanded programme on immunisation 
• Nutrition 
 
3. Cluster 3: Prevention and control of communicable diseases 
• STI/HIV/AIDS 
• Tuberculosis 
• Malaria 
• Diseases targeted for eradication and/or elimination (leprosy, guinea 
worm, sleeping sickness, onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis, trachoma, 
lymphatic Filariasis) 
 
4. Cluster 4: Prevention and control of non-communicable diseases 
• Non-communicable diseases 
• Injuries, disabilities and rehabilitative health 
• Gender based violence 
• Mental health and control of substance abuse 
• Integrated essential clinical care 
• Oral health 
• Palliative care 
 
Source: Uganda (1999, 2005b) 
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